Study Notes on Decision Making in Political Systems by George Tsebelis

Decision Making in Political Systems

  • Author: George Tsebelis

  • Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 289-325

Key Concepts

  • Veto Players:

    • Defined as individuals or collective actors whose agreement is needed to change the status quo (status quo implies a current state of affairs).

    • Types of veto players:

      • Institutional Veto Players: Found in presidential systems (e.g., Presidents, legislative chambers).

      • Partisan Veto Players: Found in parliamentary systems (e.g., political parties).

  • System Types:

    • Presidentialism: Characterized by clear separation of powers, a directly elected president serves as an institutional veto player.

    • Parliamentarism: Characterized by a prime minister and cabinet serving as linked to the parliamentary majority; often entails coalition governments involving multiple parties.

    • Bicameralism vs Unicameralism: Bicameral systems have two chambers, while unicameral systems have one; the efficacy and power of these chambers can differ based on their respective roles in governance.

  • Capacity for Policy Change:

    • The ability of a political system to effect change is influenced by the number of veto players, their policy congruence, and their cohesion.

      • More veto players decrease the likelihood of policy change.

      • Dissimilarity of policy positions (incongruence) among veto players decreases potential for change.

      • Internal cohesion of veto players affects the stability of policy positions.

Theoretical Framework

  • Veto Player Framework:

    • This framework allows comparison across different political and party systems while offering predictions about government and regime instability based on the number and congruence of veto players.

    • Increases clarity in political systems' capacity for change and governance.

Key Arguments

  • Outcome of Institutional Structures:

    • Different studies show conflicting views on whether presidential or parliamentary systems are more prone to authoritarianism or democratic stability (noted divergence in studies by Linz, Horowitz, and Shugart & Carey).

  • Bicameralism:

    • Generally promotes checks and balances, but can also lead to inefficiencies, especially when upper chambers lack meaningful powers.

    • The interaction between bicameral chambers is underscored; often viewed as delaying policy decisions and increasing complexity in legislative processes.

  • Veto Players as a Source of Stability:

    • Stability in policy is assessed through the lens of veto players. The more veto players exist, the less likely significant changes occur in government policy.

Independent Variables

  1. Number of Veto Players:

    • More veto players correlate with increased policy stability due to increased resistance to changes.

  2. Congruence Among Veto Players:

    • Higher congruence among players leads to a larger measurable winset (the range of potential successful policy outcomes), whereas incongruence restricts this winset, reducing stability.

    • Proposition 1 states: As the required agreement to change the status quo increases, the winset of the status quo does not increase, affirming a loss in decisiveness.

  3. Cohesion of Veto Players:

    • The ability of veto players to maintain a unified position on policies enhances policy stability. Cohesive organizations are more unified and influential than fragmented ones.

    • Cohesion decreases the winset of status quo, making policy changes more difficult.

Applications and Comparisons

  • Regime Stability:

    • Stability of regimes often relates to the internal dynamics of veto players; larger numbers of incongruous players may lead to regime and government instability.

    • Evidence highlighted that regimes exhibiting high numbers of veto players are at risk of crisis or breakdowns, with empirical evidence supporting the connection between system characteristics and stability outcomes.

  • Comparative Studies:

    • Effectively contrasts different democratic systems (e.g., US vs. UK) and explores outcomes such as budget deficits relative to the decision-making structures in place.

      • Empirical outcomes of studies demonstrated divergent capabilities in policy-making processes across countries.

Conclusion

  • The analysis provides a systematic, comparative framework to understand how political decision-making varies across systems. By integrating the concepts of veto players with the analysis of political systems, one can better predict policy changes, governance stability, and the overall functioning of democratic institutions.

  • Tsebelis, George. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25. Cambridge University Press.