Notes on The Self in Critical Social Psychology
Historical Background
The self is portrayed as central to human life and personal identity, yet distinctly individualized for each person. This has made the self a long-standing topic in philosophy and the social sciences.
Western origins: Plato (ca. 428–348 BCE) and Aristotle (ca. 384–322 BCE) pondered the essential core of a human being.
Eastern origins: Upanishads (sixth century BCE) discuss the self as part of ultimate reality and the nature of life.
Enlightenment focus: Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant explored the self as a central philosophical issue.
In psychology, mainstream interest centers on William James (The Principles of Psychology, 1890), who offered a influential dual-aspect model of the self:
The I: the self as the centre of experience, introspection, and the continuity of being.
The me: the self as known through social interaction; a social self composed of a collection of social selves recognized by others, encapsulated in James’ line: “a man [sic] has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” (Vol. 1, p. 294).
This dualist, somewhat essentialist view (I as inner centre; me as outwardly recognized self) has shaped early social psychology but has also shown limitations for explaining how people create, negotiate, and enact selves in everyday social life.
Early sociocultural and social-psychological thinkers also emphasized the social nature of the self:
Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) highlighted the development of the social self through interaction with others.
The chapter argues that a more critical approach is needed to understand how the self operates in social life, beyond James’ framework.
The Self and Mainstream Social Psychology
James’ framework influenced subsequent social psychology, but later work broadened the scope beyond a simple I/me dichotomy.
A Proliferation of Self-Related Constructs (Allport, 1955; Leary & Tangney, 2003)
Allport observed a surge of self-related constructs in the mid-20th century (e.g., self-image, self-actualisation, self-affirmation) that tended to describe related elements rather than the self as a whole.
This proliferation produced a range of ‘hyphenated elaborations’ (Allport, 1955, p. 37) such as self-esteem, self-actualisation, etc., often without tying them to a unifying concept of the self.
Leary & Tangney (2003) identified at least five different common uses of the term ‘self’ with little overlap, contributing to a lack of consensus on what the self fully involves.
The consequence: social psychology’s self-related constructs describe parts or orientations of the self rather than a coherent, unified self concept.
Despite the proliferation, mainstream texts continue to feature many self-related terms (e.g., Myers, Abell, & Sani, 2014 list >40 self-related terms), illustrating ongoing interest while also signaling conceptual fragmentation.
The Self as Social Categoriser (SIT and SCT)
A second major approach foregrounds social categorisation and social identity over personal identity.
SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986): identity is formed through social categorisation, social identification, and social comparison.
Individuals adopt social identities tied to group memberships (gender, nationality, age, etc.), locating themselves within a recognisable social landscape.
Implications for self: self-esteem is driven by the desire to maximise self-esteem via favorable group comparisons; people adopt identities to optimize self-worth when available.
SCT (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Turner et al., 1987): outlines when individuals shift from personal to social identities; a salient social identity can supersede personal identity when a relevant identity is accessible and contextual salience makes it meaningful.
In SIT/SCT, the self becomes less central to daily social life, functioning as a default or a processing mechanism for social information rather than a distinctive, enduring attribute of a self.
Both approaches share two core features: a dualist and essentialist bias, treating individuals and society as separable yet interdependent, and locating social phenomena as properties of the individual or interpretable through cognitive processes rather than as emergent from social practice.
Social identities are situated within a social landscape, while the self is treated as an essential property of the individual.
Critical introduction to the self challenges these mainstream dualist/essentialist assumptions and proposes a fundamentally different approach focused on social life, discourse, and interaction.
Critical Approaches to the Self
Core principle: focus on how people live and act in social life, rather than treating individuals and society as separable entities with fixed properties.
Discourse as site of investigation: language is central to negotiating and constructing everyday life meanings as social beings.
Discursive approaches treat familiar social psychology topics (attitudes, cognitions, group relations) as outcomes of social interaction and talk rather than intrinsic properties of individuals or pre-existing social worlds.
Two main discursive pathways in relation to the self:
Macro approaches
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): Fairclough (1995); Meyer (2001); van Dijk (2001); Wodak (2001).
Focus: how talk enacts and reproduces forms of social or political inequality; aims at exposing power and ideology in discourse with emancipation as a possible outcome.
Foucauldian discourse analysis (Parker, 1992, 2014): emphasizes how discourses shape subject positions available in particular historical periods; resistance is possible but constrained by dominant discourses.
Micro approaches
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) and Conversation Analysis (Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974): study how people make sense of everyday lives through practical reasoning and turn-taking in talk.
Discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 1993; 2005): examines how people construct and negotiate psychological concepts in everyday interaction.
Micro approaches emphasize the action orientation of discourse: discourse is an active medium used to accomplish actions (justifying actions, accounting for events, blaming, etc.).
The social self in discursive research is constructed in talk-in-interaction, not inside the head; selves are outcomes accomplished through interaction.
Gördman’s radical re-conception of self (1959) is highlighted as a key precursor to discursive micro-analytic approaches:
Self is not a property of the individual but something the individual performs in interaction.
People perform impressions of themselves; others interpret these performances; performances carry risk if misinterpreted or unsuccessful.
The appeal of micro approaches: focus on real-time social life, understanding how selves are built and used in specific contexts to achieve particular social outcomes.
Constructing the Self
The chapter provides concrete discursive examples showing how people construct selves in everyday talk, drawing on inner dispositions, experiences, and references to how others know them.
Constructing an Inner Self (FV case)
Context: older (50+), non-employed individuals signing on at jobcentres to seek work (McVittie, McKinlay, & Widdicombe, 2008).
Extract: FV describes two kinds of brains, one that separates work from life and one that integrates them; the “brain that can split the two” is associated with agency in seeking or avoiding employment depending on whether there is something he likes.
The self is described as rooted in biology and inner disposition toward work; this inner self is used to account for current non-employment status.
Constructing an Inner Self and the Role of Defectiveness (Jessie)
Context: evangelical broadcasting; individuals discuss personal faults in relation to spiritual standards.
Jessie describes leaving church choir to pursue a secular music career; she portrays her prior self as a “wicked lazy… servant” who was “playing it safe” and frames God as the source of critique.
This negative construction of the past self makes the current self appear laudable for pursuing a musical career, justifying the change.
Self as Known by Others (Angela; ME narrative; Chloe)
Angela (ME sufferer): mother’s knowledge is invoked (“I know my daughter”) to bolster claims about Angela’s true self, combining inner experience with socially recognized knowledge to legitimize her current state.
Angela’s lines (194–197) express a shift from an active, on-the-go orientation to a sit-down reality due to ME; the mother’s voice supports the self-described change.
Chloe (undergraduate student; drinking choices): describes herself as someone who does not drink “for my own reasons” and notes different social responses (men vs. women) to her stance; she presents both inner reasons and social recognition of her non-drinking self.
Across these cases, selves are anchored both in internal experience and in what others know or recognise in social situations.
The purpose of constructing a self known to others is to bolster claims about one’s identity and to justify actions in social contexts.
Criticising Others (Ron and Jill on Norisle; McKinlay & McVittie, 2007)
Ron presents two mutually inconsistent self-versions: being British/English vs. being a Norisle man; Jill’s responses show how local identity demands and racism accusations shape self-positioning.
The inconsistency itself becomes the focus, used to critique local residents and highlight tensions around belonging and exclusion.
Self in Discourse: Self-construction is contextual, situated in interaction, and oriented toward specific social outcomes (employment, religion, illness, university life, belonging).
Temporal and Continuity Considerations
The selves described are not fixed; they are constructed to accomplish momentary interactional work.
Debates persist about whether these self-constructions reflect stable personal histories or recurrent patterns across contexts (Taylor & Littleton, 2012; Hollway & Jefferson, 2013; Potter, 2012).
Current Trends in Self-Construction
Virtual media contexts: Turkle (1995) proposed that the internet is a laboratory for self-construction and re-construction; online interactions can obscure or reveal different aspects of the self.
Positive vs. negative potentials of online self-fashioning:
Positive: anonymity or discretion allows concealing stigmatized aspects (Görman’s concept of “passing”).
Negative: online environments can enable damaging self-presentations or deceptive claims.
Online communities can provide support and validate certain selves (e.g., ME sufferers in supportive forums; Hurley, Sullivan, & McCarthy, 2007).
Risks of online self-representation: some users may fabricate identities or misrepresent experiences (e.g., ME narratives or 419 scam emails; Blommaert, 2005; Chiluwa, 2009).
Pro-ana sites: online spaces that promote disordered eating as lifestyle choices, illustrating how virtual selves can be both appealing and dangerous (Bates, 2015).
Conclusion of Constructs
Critical approaches argue that selves are constructed and negotiated through discourse in everyday life interactions.
The self as an enduring or isolated individual property is rejected in favor of a view that sees selves as ongoing social achievements contingent on context and interaction.
The selves people propose in discourse are fluid, revisable, and aimed at achieving particular social outcomes.
The Self in Discourse: Methodological Implications
Self-construction is not simply descriptive; it is action-oriented, designed to justify actions, criticize others, or accomplish social goals.
The question of authenticity remains: self-descriptions can be challenged if there is suspicion of a “stake” in presenting a certain self (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993).
To address this, speakers may invoke knowledge that is verifiable by others (e.g., social validation from others) to bolster credibility of a self.
Across micro-analytic cases, the self is treated as a discursive resource; the analysis focuses on how talk accomplishes social work rather than on uncovering hidden mental states.
Current Trends and Prospective Directions
Virtual media contexts have expanded opportunities for self-presentation; this includes both advantages (privacy, selective disclosure) and risks (inauthentic claims, manipulation).
Supportive online communities can reinforce certain kinds of selves (e.g., ME survivors, victims of abuse or violence) by providing validation and solidarity.
There are ongoing debates about whether self-constructions in multiple contexts constitute a stable personal history or simply recurring situational performances.
If selves are treated as social accomplishments, then the research focus shifts toward the mechanisms by which discourse and interaction produce, sustain, or modify self-identity over time.
Conclusion
Critical social psychology contends that to understand selves in social life, we must reveal how selves are constructed and negotiated through discourse within social interactions.
This approach challenges James’ dualist and essentialist framework as internally inconsistent or unsustainable for explaining everyday life.
The self is neither a fixed internal product nor a standalone personal project; it is an ongoing, socially situated process shaped by language, interaction, and context.
The selves people present are ongoing projects that can be developed, reworked, or reframed as social life unfolds.
Key References (selected)
Gergen, K. J. (2009). An invitation to social construction (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Görman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2003). The self as an organizing construct in the behavioral and social sciences. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity (pp. 3–14). London: Guilford Press.
McKinlay, A., & McVittie, C. (2008). Social psychology and discourse. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
McVittie, C., McKinlay, A., & Widdicombe, S. (2008). Passive and active non-employment: age, employment and the identities of older non-working people. Journal of Aging Studies, 22, 248–255.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Ed.: C. W. Morris). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the screen: Identity in the age of the internet. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979, 1986). Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Relations (foundational chapters in various volumes).
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50, 696–735.
Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about: A summary of its history, important concepts and development. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 1–13). London: Sage.
Xanthopoulou, P. (2010). The production of ‘defectiveness’ as a linguistic resource in broadcast evangelical discourse: A discursive psychology approach. Discourse & Society, 21, 675–691.
Note: The notes above are organized to reflect the chapter’s structure and content, highlighting major ideas, subpoints, and examples used to illustrate how selves are constructed, performed, and contested in social life. Where exact quotes or page references appear in the source, they are retained as paraphrase or verbatim snippets for instructional clarity.