Comprehensive Study Notes on Meta-Ethics, the Purpose of Morality, Divine Command Theory, and Cultural Relativism

Distinction Between Matters of Fact and Matters of Preference

• Core Criterion of Distinction:

  • The fundamental distinction between a matter of fact and a matter of preference is whether an external standard exists independent of a person's belief to determine whether that belief is true or false.
  • An external standard is defined as something that exists entirely outside of an individual's personal belief or internal psychological state.

• Matters of Fact:

  • Objectivity: A matter of fact is objective precisely because an external standard determines the correctness or incorrectness of a belief.
  • Divergence of Belief and Truth: In matters of fact, belief and truth can come apart, meaning that holding a belief does not guarantee its truth; a belief can fail to correspond with external reality.
  • Genuine Dispute: Disagreements concerning factual matters constitute genuine disputes because at least one party can hold an objectively false belief and be genuinely mistaken.
  • Concrete Example: The designated capital of New York is Albany. If an individual maintains the belief that Selden is the capital of New York, that individual holds a false belief because it fails to correspond to reality.

• Matters of Preference:

  • Subjectivity: A matter of preference is subjective because there is no external, independent standard capable of adjudicating which preference is correct or incorrect.
  • Collapse of Belief and Truth: In matters of preference, belief and truth collapse into each other because an individual's statement of belief simply mirrors and reports their own personal preference.
  • Absence of Genuine Dispute: Disagreements over preferences do not involve genuine disputes; neither party is mistaken or wrong simply for possessing a distinct preference, as their views are merely different.
  • Concrete Example: One person may prefer chocolate ice cream while another prefers vanilla ice cream. Neither individual holds an erroneous belief, as there is no objective fact determining which flavor is inherently superior.

Meta-Ethical Application to Moral Claims

• The Central Meta-Ethical Question:

  • The distinction between facts and preferences gives rise to the foundational meta-ethical inquiry: Are moral claims matters of fact, or are they matters of preference?

• Application to Moral Disagreements (e.g., Abortion):

  • When two individuals engage in a dispute concerning the morality of abortion, the meta-ethical status determines the nature of their disagreement.
  • If Morality is a Matter of Fact:
  • Moral beliefs are true or false based on an external standard that exists beyond individual belief.
  • The disputants are engaged in a genuine dispute in which one or both parties can be objectively mistaken.
  • If Morality is a Matter of Preference:
  • Moral claims function merely as expressions of personal or collective preference.
  • Disagreements over practices such as abortion do not constitute genuine disputes about objective rightness or wrongness, but are simply clashes of opposing subjective tastes.

The Purpose of Morality and the Social Coordination Problem

• Morality as a Solution to Social Coordination:

  • A moral code serves as a proposed solution to the social coordination problem by establishing shared rules that enable individuals to trust one another, cooperate, and flourish.

• The State of Nature:

  • Defined as a hypothetical, imagined condition in which morality does not exist and every individual looks solely after their own self-interest.
  • In this state, despite individuals being driven by self-interest, everyone shares the common goal of human flourishing, which is defined as wanting to live well.

• The Social Coordination Breakdown:

  • In the absence of moral rules, mutual trust and reliance become virtually impossible.
  • Individuals cannot be confident that others will reciprocate cooperative efforts or that personal labor and investments will yield secure benefits.
  • Without trust, cooperative endeavors collapse, severely constraining what human beings can collectively achieve.

• Functions of a Moral Code:

  • Establishing Shared Expectations: Morality institutes regularized, predictable standards regarding how individuals must treat one another, thereby creating the trust necessary for cooperative survival and achievement.
  • Promoting Human Flourishing: By making sustained cooperation viable, a moral code creates the necessary conditions for people to live well.
  • Fair Distribution of Benefits and Burdens: Living cooperatively produces both collective advantages (benefits) and duties or obligations (burdens); morality establishes the normative framework ensuring these benefits and burdens are distributed fairly.
  • Ultimate Purpose: Morality exists instrumentally to enable individuals to live well together in community.

Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma

• Definition of Divine Command Theory (DCT):

  • Divine Command Theory asserts that actions are morally right or morally wrong strictly in virtue of God's commands.
  • Concrete Example: Stealing is morally wrong if and only because God commands people not to steal.

• The Appearance of Objectivity:

  • DCT is often thought to offer an objective basis for morality because it roots moral rules outside of human individuals, cultures, or societal preferences, anchoring them instead in the external commands of God.

• The Euthyphro Question:

  • Formulated as a fundamental dilemma: Is an action morally right because God commands it, or does God command an action because it is already morally right?

• Failure to Provide an Objective Basis:

  • Horn 1 (Right because commanded): If an action is right solely because God commands it, morality becomes arbitrary. Whatever God commands—regardless of what it is—would automatically become morally right, depriving moral rules of an independent, rational foundation.
  • Horn 2 (Commanded because right): If God commands an action because it is already morally right, an external, independent standard of morality must exist prior to and apart from God's commands. Under this horn, God recognizes moral truth rather than generating it, demonstrating that divine commands are not the foundational source of morality.
  • Conclusion: Both horns of the dilemma demonstrate that Divine Command Theory fails to serve as the ultimate objective basis for morality.

Moral Motivation and Religious Belief

• Nature of Genuine Moral Motivation:

  • Genuine moral motivation requires a direct, unmediated concern for the well-being of other individuals rather than self-interested calculation.

• Self-Interest versus Moral Duty in Religion:

  • If an individual acts morally solely to obtain an external reward (such as heaven) or to evade divine punishment (such as hell), that individual is motivated by prudence and self-interest rather than genuine morality.

• Independence of Moral Motivation from Religion:

  • Human beings possess the capacity to care directly for the well-being of others without holding religious commitments.
  • Consequently, religion is neither necessary for genuine moral motivation nor does it supply a distinctively moral form of motivation.

Cultural Relativism: Definition and Theoretical Conflicts

• Definition of Cultural Relativism (CR):

  • Cultural Relativism is the ethical theory holding that moral truth is entirely relative to a specific culture.
  • Under CR, what is morally right or wrong depends exclusively on what a particular culture deems socially acceptable.
  • Concrete Example: One culture may consider the consumption of meat to be morally acceptable, whereas a different culture deems eating meat to be morally wrong; under CR, both moral evaluations are equally valid within their respective societies.

• Conflict with Genuine Moral Disagreement:

  • CR renders genuine moral disagreement between distinct cultures impossible.
  • If each culture constitutes its own final moral authority, cultures with divergent practices are not engaged in an objective dispute about what is genuinely right or wrong; they merely display divergent cultural preferences.
  • In the absence of an overarching, external, objective standard that transcends cultures, no culture can ever be judged as holding a false belief, being mistaken, or acting morally wrong.

• Conflict with Genuine Moral Improvement:

  • CR cannot account for the concept of genuine moral improvement or progress over time.
  • If a society alters its practices and ceases to endorse an action it previously deemed acceptable, CR can only describe this shift as a change in prevailing cultural preferences.
  • Because preferences can only be different—and cannot be ranked as objectively superior, inferior, better, or worse without appealing to an external standard—CR cannot accommodate the idea that a society has genuinely improved or morally deteriorated.