Information - chapter 10
10.1. Information Asymmetry
- Complete information: state of being fully informed about the choices that a person and other relevant economic actors face
- Information asymmetry: a condition in which one person knows more than another
- Asymmetric information creates problems because it allows a person who is more informed to achieve goals at the expense of a person who is less informed
- If the incentives of both parties are aligned, then the information asymmetry doesn’t matter
10.2. Adverse Selection
- Adverse selection: a state that occurs when buyers and sellers have different information about the quality of a good or the riskiness of a situation; results in failure to complete transactions that would have been possible if both sides had the same information
- As a result, some buyers and sellers fail to complete transactions that would have been possible if both sides had the same information
- Relates to unobserved characteristics of people or goods and it occurs before the two parties have entered an agreement
10.3. Moral Hazard
- Agent: a person who carries out a task on someone else’s behalf
- Principal: a person who entrusts someone with a task; also, in finance, the original amount borrowed or invested
- Moral hazard: the tendency for people to behave in a riskier way or to renege on contracts when they do not face the full consequences of their actions
- In contrast to adverse selection, moral hazard has to do with actions
- Happens after the two parties have entered into an agreement
- Generally occurs when a principal entrusts an agent with a task, but cannot observe the agent’s actions, as in the employer-employee relationship
10.4. Screening and Signalling
- Screening: taking action to reveal private information about someone else
- Examples: interviewing job candidates and checking references when hiring, or offering insurance products that appeal to people with different characteristics
- Works best when there is a way to ensure that the information received is credible since people have an incentive to keep their private information private
- Signalling: taking action to reveal one’s own private information
- Examples: certifying a used car, getting a university degree, and dressing for success
- Useful in cases in which the more-informed party would prefer to eliminate the information asymmetry
- For a signal to be credible, it must carry some cost or mechanism that makes it inaccessible or unappealing to those it is meant to exclude
- Otherwise everyone will use the signal and it will lose its meaning
10.5. Reputations
- The potential to develop a reputation creates an incentive for the more informed party to an exchange to behave in a way that is fair and favourable toward the less-informed party
- Because hidden information often reveals itself over time, people who consistently take advantage of a less-informed party will develop a bad reputation and customers will begin to avoid doing business with them
- A good reputation is a signal that a business or person has treated partners well in the past
10.6. Statistical Discrimination
- Statistical discrimination: distinguishing between choices by generalizing based on observable characteristics in order to fill in missing information
- When specific information is missing, rules of thumb and inferences based on statistical averages can serve as rational decision-making tools
- However statistical averages aren’t necessarily accurate in every situation and neither are inferences made using statistical discrimination
- Even if they’re the best option when full information is unavailable
10.7. Education and Regulation
- When an information problem is pervasive and has a pronounced negative effect on society, the government will sometimes step in to provide the missing information or require that others reveal private information
- The effectiveness of these interventions depends in how well the government’s requirements are enforced and how well people understand the information they receive
- In a few cases, the government may mandate participation in a market or program to counter a severe adverse selection problem