Metaphysical Freedom and Compatibilist Theories

The lecture focuses on "metaphysical freedom," defined as the level of control over actions required for moral concepts such as responsibility, praise, blame, and desert.
The "Master Argument" against free will is presented as a disjunction of two possible physical realities.
The Deterministic Picture (The Domino Picture): God sets up initial conditions and laws of nature, then "flips the first domino." Every subsequent event or "slice of the universe" is fixed. Because our actions are just intermediate dominoes, we have no real "say" in the matter.
The Indeterministic Picture (The Die Mechanism): God uses a purely probabilistic mechanism (a die) to decide how the universe evolves. If the die lands on a certain number, the agent performs a specific action (e.g., rolling a $1$ or $2$ results in eating an apple). In this scenario, the agent still lacks control because the outcome depends on the die, not the agent.
Belagua addresses "partial causation," suggesting it is essentially the same as the indeterministic model (like flipping a coin instead of rolling a die) and does not provide the requisite control for freedom.

Compatibilists argue that free will and determinism are compatible. They accept the "domino picture" but redefine free will.
Under this view, free will is not about being uncaused; it is about being "caused in the right way."
The Alignment View Schema: An agent $\text{s}$ exercises free will at time $\text{t}$ by performing action $\text{a}$ exactly when:
- Their strongest desire at $\text{t}$ is to $\text{a}$ .
- Their desire to $\text{a}$ caused them to $\text{a}$ at $\text{t}$ .
This requires a robust causal connection (an alignment) between an agent’s attitudes and their actions.

Inclusivity Problem: The view may make free will too easy to obtain.
Kleptomania and Brainwashing: A kleptomaniac acts on a strong urge to steal. According to the Alignment View, they are exercising free will despite having a compulsive disorder. Similarly, victims of brainwashing act on desires that have been externally manipulated.
Moral Responsibility: Simple alignment does not capture the intuition that these individuals are less morally responsible (exculpatory) than others.
Young Children and Animals: Pre-linguistic children and animals have desires and act on them, but we typically do not attribute the same level of moral responsibility or metaphysical freedom to them as we do to adults.

To address the simplicity of the Alignment View, philosophers like Harry Frankfurt developed "Deep Self" views involving a more complex psychological structure.
First-Order Desires: Desires for things that are not themselves desires (e.g., the desire for ice cream).
Second-Order Desires: Desires about desires (e.g., the desire to have a specific first-order desire).
The Unwilling Addict Case: An addict has a first-order desire for a drug but a second-order desire to not possess that first-order desire. This represents a conflict between levels of the self.
Deep Self View Schema: An agent $\text{s}$ exercises free will at time $\text{t}$ by performing action $\text{a}$ only if:
- Their strongest first-order desire is to $\text{a}$ .
- That first-order desire caused action $\text{a}$ .
- Their strongest second-order desire is to desire to $\text{a}$ .
- The second-order desire caused the first-order desire.

Origin of Desires: A student noted that if determinism is true, desires are fixed by conditions from $\text{14}$ billion years ago, which seems to undermine freedom regardless of alignment. The lecturer acknowledged this as the core of the argument from determinism.
Knowledge of Desires: One participant asked if knowledge/introspection of desires is required. The lecturer stated that in current schemas, only the causal relationship matters, though epistemic access might be important for moral responsibility.
Cognitive Science vs. Philosophy: A student questioned whether second-order desires actually cause first-order desires in reality. The lecturer admitted that this "moral psychology" literature often functions as "armchair cognitive science" and may not perfectly align with empirical science.
Coercion: A student asked about external coercion. The lecturer mentioned Susan Wolf’s work in this area and suggested that while free will might technically exist via alignment, moral responsibility might be absent due to other unmet conditions.
Course Administration: Mention of the Copyright Act $\text{1968}$ section $\text{113 p}$ and the University of Melbourne guidelines.