GV

Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence Notes

Diminished Responsibility and the Juvenile Death Penalty

The article examines the criminal culpability of juveniles, particularly concerning the juvenile death penalty, from a developmental perspective. It argues that juveniles should not be held to the same criminal responsibility standards as adults due to diminished decision-making capacity, susceptibility to coercive influence, and the ongoing development of their character.

International and U.S. Practices

Few countries, including the U.S., have executed individuals for crimes committed as juveniles since 1990. As of the article's writing, twenty-one states in the U.S. allowed the execution of individuals under 18, with some permitting it for offenders as young as 16. The Supreme Court has deemed the death penalty unconstitutional for those under 16 at the time of the offense but has not categorically prohibited it for 16- and 17-year-olds.

Legal and Ethical Considerations

Recent events suggest a need to reexamine the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) that executing mentally retarded offenders violates the U.S. Constitution. Some Supreme Court justices have also expressed dissatisfaction with the current doctrine. The case of Lee Malvo, one of the Washington-area serial snipers, brought national attention to the debate.

Broader Implications for Juvenile Justice

The article addresses the larger issue of whether juveniles should be punished to the same extent as adults for similar crimes. This is relevant to discussions about sentencing guidelines, transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal justice system, and incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities. High-profile cases, such as Lee Malvo and Lionel Tate, highlight these concerns, but they also arise in less visible cases, including nonviolent crimes. The authors challenge the shift towards harsher treatment of youthful offenders and argue for a more lenient approach based on adolescent development.

Excuse vs. Mitigation

The authors distinguish between excuse and mitigation. Excuse refers to the complete exculpation of a criminal defendant, meaning no responsibility or punishment. Mitigation, however, acknowledges culpability but places it on a continuum, warranting less punishment due to compromised capacities or coercive circumstances. Mental illness, not severe enough for an insanity defense, is an example of a mitigating factor.

The public debate often focuses on excuse, assuming the only alternative to adult punishment is no punishment. The authors argue that developmental immaturity mitigates culpability, justifying more lenient punishment, but is not generally a basis for excuse, except for very young offenders. Mitigation can still ensure accountability, send a message about the costs of crime, and protect the community. Criminal law accounts for excuse and mitigation in determining the seriousness of offenses and appropriate punishment.

Factors Reducing Criminal Culpability

Factors that reduce criminal culpability are grouped into three categories:

  1. Endogenous Impairments: Deficiencies in decision-making capacity due to mental illness, mental retardation, extreme emotional distress, or susceptibility to influence.

  2. External Circumstances: Compelling external circumstances that might cause a reasonable person to succumb to pressure, such as duress, provocation, threatened injury, or extreme need.

  3. Out-of-Character Acts: Evidence that the criminal act was atypical and not a product of bad character, such as a first offense, genuine remorse, a history of steady employment, and respect for the law.

Developmental Immaturity and Mitigation

Adolescents' cognitive and psychosocial development shapes their choices, distinguishing them from adults. Their decision-making capacities are immature, and autonomy is constrained, making them more vulnerable to coercive circumstances. Also, because adolescents are still forming their identity, their criminal behavior is less likely to reflect bad character. These factors suggest that typical adolescents are less culpable than adults. This means that adolescent criminal conduct is driven by transitory influences constitutive of this developmental stage.

Deficiencies in Decision-Making Capacity

Reasoning capabilities increase from childhood to adolescence, with preadolescents differing substantially from adults in cognitive abilities. While some argue that teenagers' reasoning skills approximate those of adults by mid-adolescence, the authors question this, especially in real-world settings. Laboratory studies may not accurately reflect how youths make decisions under stressful, unstructured conditions.

Psychosocial Factors

Even when cognitive capacities are similar to adults, adolescent judgment and decisions may differ due to psychosocial immaturity. Relevant factors include susceptibility to peer influence, attitudes toward risk, future orientation, and self-management. These psychosocial factors influence adolescent values and preferences, affecting their cost–benefit calculations.

Evidence of Immaturity

Research indicates that psychosocial maturity continues to develop during adolescence:

  • Peer Influence: Teenagers are more responsive to peer influence than adults, peaking around age 14 and declining during high school. Peer influence affects judgment directly through pressure and indirectly through the desire for approval.

  • Future Orientation: Adults project their visions further into the future than adolescents. Adolescents discount the future more and weigh short-term consequences more heavily. This may be due to cognitive limitations or limited life experience.

  • Risk Assessment: Adolescents place less weight on risk relative to reward than adults. This may be related to a limited time perspective or different values and goals. People also make riskier decisions in groups, and adolescents spend more time in groups.

  • Impulsivity and Self-Management: Impulsivity increases during middle adolescence and early adulthood, then declines. Adolescents have more rapid and extreme mood swings, potentially leading to impulsive behavior.

Neurobiological Underpinnings

Brain development studies suggest that key developments occur in regions involved in long-term planning, emotion regulation, impulse control, and risk/reward evaluation. Changes in the limbic system may increase novelty-seeking and risk-taking. Development in the prefrontal cortex, crucial for complex tasks, may extend into late adolescence. This neurobiological evidence aligns with psychological findings, suggesting that adolescents are more susceptible to influence, less future-oriented, less risk-averse, and less able to manage impulses.

Implications for Culpability

Juveniles may have diminished decision-making capacity due to psychosocial immaturity that is likely biological. This immaturity can contribute to choices to engage in crime. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the immature judgment of youth in cases such as Thompson v. Oklahoma (1998), prohibiting the execution of juveniles whose offenses occurred before their 16th birthday. Similarly, Atkins v. Virginia (2002) cited diminished capacities in mentally retarded offenders as mitigating their culpability. Many factors influencing youthful decision-making are similar to those compromising the choices of mentally retarded actors.

Heightened Vulnerability to Coercive Circumstances

Criminal culpability can be reduced based on circumstances that impose extraordinary pressures on the actor. Adolescents may respond adversely to external pressures that adults can resist. The legal standard for evaluating an adolescent's behavior should be compared to that of an