Rebecca Bennett's Response to Procreative Beneficence Unit 3 P2

Rebecca Bennett's Response to Procreative Beneficence
Harmless Wrongdoing and Impersonal Harms

  • Savulescu's argument relies on the idea of harmless wrongdoing or impersonal harm.

  • Definition of Impersonal Harm: A harm that doesn't affect a specific individual but makes the world worse off. It involves bringing people into existence who have worse lives than those who could have been brought into existence instead. Violating the principle of procreative beneficence leads to impersonal harm.

  • Examples:

    • Asthma case: Choosing the embryo with the predisposition to asthma.

    • Rubella case: A woman conceiving before waiting three months after contracting rubella.

    • Nuclear accident case: Involving decisions affecting entire societies rather than individuals.

  • Bennett challenges the existence of impersonal harm and offers alternative explanations for our intuitions in these cases. She rejects Savulescu's notion of impersonal harm, advocating for the view that no wrong is done if an individual is not harmed and the life they have is worth living. According to Bennett, choices between energy policies or IVF embryos are morally neutral preferences, so long as resulting lives are worthwhile and not dominated by pain and suffering. Bennett's argumentative strategy includes a critique of impersonal harm, aiming to dismantle the theoretical foundation of the principle of procreative beneficence by disproving impersonal harm; and error theory, providing an explanation for why our moral intuitions exist, even if they do not align with moral truth. This is analogous to Rachels' argument on euthanasia: Similar to Rachels' explanation of why we think killing is worse than letting die, Bennett believes our intuitions are based on misleading associations.

Bennett's Argument: Preference vs. Morality

  • Bennett argues that our intuitions in cases like the asthma and rubella examples are driven by preference, not morality.

  • According to Bennett, choices between energy policies or IVF embryos are morally neutral preferences, so long as resulting lives are worthwhile and not dominated by pain and suffering.

  • Key Quote: "If it is true that no particular person is harmed by a choice between energy policies, then this choice is outside the realms of morality. It is a morally neutral choice of preference."

  • She rejects Savulescu's notion of impersonal harm, advocating for the view that no wrong is done if an individual is not harmed and the life they have is worth living.

  • Implication: It is not inherently wrong to choose an embryo with a predisposition to deafness or any disability, provided the child's life is still worth living.

Challenges to Bennett's View

  • Bennett needs to explain why we have negative intuitions in cases like the rubella example (conceiving before waiting three months after contracting rubella) if it is not actually wrong.

  • The Non-Identity Problem: Bennett must address why we believe it is wrong to pollute the planet for future generations, even if that pollution doesn't harm specific individuals (since the affected individuals would not have existed otherwise).

    • Policy decisions today affect which individuals are born in the future (butterfly effect), complicating the idea of comparing harms.

    • If climate change is not addressed, future individuals will be different from those who would have existed under different policies.

    • Since harm is comparative, it's difficult to argue that pollution harms future individuals if they have lives worth living, regardless of the pollution.

Bennett's Argumentative Strategy

  • Critique of impersonal harm: She aims to dismantle the theoretical foundation of the principle of procreative beneficence by disproving impersonal harm.

  • Error theory: Bennett provides an explanation for why our moral intuitions exist, even if they do not align with moral truth.

  • Analogy to Rachels' argument on euthanasia: Similar to Rachels' explanation of why we think killing is worse than letting die, Bennett believes our intuitions are based on misleading associations.

Reasons to Favor Bennett's Account

  • Bennett offers three reasons to support her account over Savulescu's

    1. The principle of procreative beneficence values one human life over another, conflicting with the idea of equality.

    2. The principle of procreative beneficence infringes on reproductive autonomy (the right to make choices about when and how to have children).

    3. Accepting the principle of procreative beneficence is akin to advocating eugenics, which is morally wrong.

The Inequality Objection

  • Embryo selection could worsen social inequality as wealthier individuals can afford IVF and select embryos with the "best" genetics. This widens the gap beyond mere financial differences to include genetic endowments.

  • Savulescu's responses:

    • Initial response: The principle of procreative beneficence outweighs concerns about social inequality (a response Bennett finds insufficient).

    • Better response: Address social inequality separately at the societal and governmental levels, without interfering with reproduction.

    • Alternative solution: Subsidize IVF and embryo selection to make it accessible to everyone, potentially improving a country's overall genetic pool (unlikely in countries without universal healthcare access).

Discrimination and the Disabled

  • Selecting against embryos with Down syndrome at high rates could increase discrimination against disabled people.

    • It may imply that lives with Down syndrome are less worthwhile.

    • Reducing the number of people with Down syndrome could lead to further marginalization.

    • Reduced funding for research and accessibility: As certain conditions become rarer, there are fewer incentives to develop treatments or improve accessibility.

Savulescu's Responses to Discrimination Concerns

  • Denial: Savulescu denies that procreative beneficence implies that people with impairments have less worthwhile lives.

  • Argument by analogy: Preventing car accidents (which cause paraplegia) does not imply disrespect for paraplegics. Reducing diseases that negatively affect well-being is morally analogous; thus, it does not imply disrespect for those with said diseases. Attemptingtopreventharmfulcaraccidentsbecausetheycauseparaplegiadoesnotimplythatparaplegicsarelessdeservingofrespect.Attempting to prevent harmful car accidents because they cause paraplegia does not imply that paraplegics are less deserving of respect.

Attemptingtoreducediseasesthathaveanegativeeffectonwell−beingismorallyanalogoustoattemptingtopreventharmfulcaraccidentsbecausetheycauseparaplegia,whichalsohasanegativeeffectonwell−being.Attempting to reduce diseases that have a negative effect on well-being is morally analogous to attempting to prevent harmful car accidents because they cause paraplegia, which also has a negative effect on well-being.

∴\therefore Attempting to reduce diseases that have a negative effect on our well-being does not imply that people with those diseases are less deserving of respect.

  • Bennett counters this by arguing that accepting the principle of procreative beneficence inherently devalues the lives of people with disabilities.