5.2 Four Physicalist Arguments and the Case Against Dualism
Introduction to Physicalist Arguments
Objective of the Lecture: This lecture (5.2) focuses on the arguments in favor of physicalism. While much of the section addresses anti-physicalist positions, it is essential to understand the compelling reasons why many scholars remain physicalists.
The Physicalist Tension: Physicalism is supported by reasons so strong that many find it difficult to accept dualist arguments. Proponents often resist dualism even if it requires a "dismissivist" approach toward our current conceptions of the world.
The Philosophical Stance: Entering the debate neutrally can make dualism seem intuitively true; however, understanding the physicalist framework reveals the substantial intellectual pressure against adopting dualist views.
Jack Smart’s Argument from Meta-Induction
Historical Context of Irreducibility: Jack Smart proposes an inductive argument based on the history of science. Historically, various phenomena were claimed to be irreducible to physics, yet science eventually proved otherwise.
Chemistry and Microbiology: In the past, these fields were considered irreducible to physics.
Vitalism and the 1800s: During the , the view known as "vitalism" was highly popular. It posited that life required an élan vital (life force) to explain the animation of cells, their movement, and their ability to reproduce.
The Success of Reductionism: Physicalism successfully provided a reduction of both chemistry and microbiology to fundamental physics.
Nature of Reduction: These were not "old school" reductions (based on simple calculations) but involved complex laws relating microbiology and chemistry to physical principles.
Application to Consciousness: Current arguments suggest that consciousness is irreducible to the physical. Smart’s meta-induction suggests that this claim is merely an echo of past claims regarding chemistry and life.
The Inductive Conclusion: Because past claims of irreducibility were wrong, we should not presume that consciousness is unique. Future science may well provide a reduction of consciousness to physics.
Dualist Counter-Argument to Meta-Induction:
Persistence of the Problem: The mind-body problem has persisted for a long time, which could be inductive evidence that it will continue to resist solution.
Conceptual vs. Empirical: Unlike chemistry or biology, it is unclear what empirical research would solve the consciousness problem. It appears to be a conceptual problem rather than an empirical one, and conceptual confusions are unlikely to be cleared up by science alone.
Ontological Simplicity and Occam’s Razor
The Principle of Parsimony: Jack Smart invokes Occam’s razor: if two theories explain a phenomenon equally well, the theory with the simplest ontology should be preferred.
Simplicity Comparison: Physicalism is ontologically simpler than dualism because it posits only one type of substance/property (), whereas dualism posits two ().
The Dualist Response (The Explanatory Gap): Dualists argue that physicalism and dualism do not explain the phenomena equally. They claim physicalism fails to explain consciousness entirely.
The Chocolate Analogy: If one proposes a simple theory stating that planets orbit the sun due to "chocolate," the theory is simple (one term) but lacks explanatory power. A theory that explains nothing cannot be considered simpler than a theory that attempts an explanation.
The Physicalist Retort (The Explanatory Power of Dualism): Physicalists question what dualism actually explains.
Critique of Descartes: Describing the mental as an "immaterial substance" does not provide a mechanism or a functional explanation of how the mental works.
Dualism of the Gaps: Physicalists suggest dualism is an ad hoc "one-time-off" explanation. It may explain why consciousness is hard to explain, but physicalists can also explain this as a "necessary flaw" in our human conception of consciousness.
The "Fishy Smell" and Ad Hoc Explanations
Suspicion of Brute Facts: Smart suggests that something "doesn't smell right" about theories that claim the mind-brain connection is a "brute fact."
Definition of Ad Hoc: An ad hoc explanation is one invented specifically for a single occasion without broader application.
The Emergentist Defense: For emergentist dualism to be credible, it should show that emergence is a widespread phenomenon in nature, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
Potential Examples of Emergence: Biological functions, social movements/sociology, and complex system science.
The Physicalist Challenge: Unless the mind can be shown to follow a general rule of emergence found elsewhere in nature, the dualist claim remains an isolated, ad hoc exception.
Nomological Danglers and Transordinal Laws
Transordinal Laws Defined: These are laws that relate entities at one level of reality to those at a higher, different level.
Nomological Danglers: Smart argues against these "laws that just sort of hang around freely." In the sciences, we typically explain phenomena in terms of low-level laws rather than laws that bridge the low to the high without further grounding.
The Scientific Norm: Explanations should stay grounded in low-level laws. The physicalist argues that the mind should not be treated as a special case that requires unique, unexplained brute transordinal laws.
Questions & Discussion
Note on Next Section: The lecture concludes by transitioning from these physicalist defenses to "anti-supervenience arguments" which provide the counter-perspective for dualism.