America, the Holocaust, and the Abandonment of the Jews – Study Notes

Overview

David S. Wyman’s work, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945, first released in $1984$ , quickly became the most celebrated analysis of U.S. responses to the Nazi genocide. Rafael Medoff’s $2003$ article examines why Wyman’s book achieved such resonance, the historiographical context in which it appeared, the public and scholarly reactions it provoked, and the directions it set for subsequent research.

Unique Qualities of Wyman’s Book

Wyman unearthed new archival evidence, especially the diaries of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and revealed episodes previously overlooked—most notably Washington’s refusal to bomb Auschwitz and the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB). Unlike its six precursors, the book widened the lens beyond the White House by scrutinising the State Department, Congress, the media, and the American public. Its accessibility, coupled with Wyman’s perspective as a committed Christian, distinguished it from earlier works.

Contemporary Historiography Prior to $1984$

The modern scholarly conversation began with Arthur D. Morse’s While Six Million Died and Wyman’s own Paper Walls (both $1968$ ), which accused the Roosevelt administration of deliberate obstructionism toward Jewish refugees. Henry L. Feingold, Saul S. Friedman, Martin Gilbert, Monty N. Penkower, and others deepened the indictment during the $1970$ s–early $1980$ s, documenting missed rescue chances and Allied indifference. A spike in public engagement followed the $1967$ Six-Day War, the $1976$ film Voyage of the Damned, the $1978$ TV miniseries Holocaust, the Skokie neo-Nazi controversy, establishment of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, and press exposes of Nazi war criminals on American soil.

Wyman’s “Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed” (Commentary, $1978$ )

His seminal article demonstrated that U.S. bombers repeatedly struck industrial targets within five miles of Auschwitz—e.g., the raid of $20$ August $1944$ that dropped over $1,000$ bombs—proving technical feasibility. Yet Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy rejected Jewish pleas for raids, citing the alleged “diversion” of essential resources. Wyman later uncovered that no genuine feasibility study existed; rather, the War Department had adopted a February $1944$ policy barring military assets for refugee rescue unless incidental to combat.

Crafting the Title

Titles considered included A Web Too Frail and The Anvil of Indifference. Ultimately The Abandonment of the Jews conveyed a moral rather than legal dereliction: the United States betrayed its humanitarian ethos even if it owed no juridical duty to Europe’s Jews.

Reception and Impact

Between $1984$ and $1994$ Wyman delivered more than $400$ lectures. The book enjoyed seven hardcover printings, translated editions in four languages, sales above $150,000$ , five weeks on the New York Times best-seller list, and numerous awards (Bernath Prize, Saloutos Award, Ansfield-Wolf, National Jewish Book Award). Reviews were overwhelmingly laudatory: Yehuda Bauer praised its “immense scholarship,” Raul Hilberg called it integrative, while Elie Wiesel deemed its evidence “irrefutable.” A handful of critics—including Lucy Dawidowicz, Marie Syrkin, and Henry Feingold—faulted its moral tone or treatment of Jewish leadership.

A Christian Historian’s Moral Lens

Wyman explicitly rooted his critique in Christian ethics: help those in need. Admirers, such as A.J. Sherman and Peter I. Rose, celebrated his “moral vision.” Feingold countered that Wyman imposed anachronistically high standards and misconstrued the realist limits on nation-states at war. Wyman replied that $1930$ s– $1940$ s Americans shared today’s basic humanitarian norms; their government simply failed to live up to them.

Capitol Hill Resonance

Senators Claiborne Pell and Paul Simon publicised Abandonment’s themes. Pell asserted the Allies tacitly left Jews to Hitler, quoting Wyman; Simon urged Americans to protest injustice, writing that the book “will haunt you.” Treasury revelations about State Department obstruction and WRB creation became touchstones in Congressional discussions. Notably, copies of Abandonment given to Vice-President George H. W. Bush influenced “Operation Joshua,” the $1985$ U.S.-backed airlift of $812$ Ethiopian Jews from Sudan. Bush later vowed: “Never again will the cries of abandoned Jews go unheard by the United States government.”

Determinants of U.S. Policy

Medoff summarises Wyman’s enumeration of factors: nativism, political calculation, bureaucratic inertia, hostility to Zionism, and, to a lesser degree, antisemitism. While Wyman found Roosevelt guided chiefly by expediency, later scholars disagreed over the weight of antisemitism. Joseph W. Bendersky and Bat-Ami Zucker have since demonstrated pervasive anti-Jewish biases among War College alumni, Army officers, and U.S. consuls that shaped policy implementation.

American Jewish Leadership

Wyman judged Rabbi Stephen Wise’s unquestioning loyalty to Roosevelt detrimental. Fear of domestic antisemitism, organisational rivalries, and universalist agendas blunted mainstream activism. The dissident Bergson Group, led by Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson), used theatrical pageants, full-page adverts, a rabbis’ march, and the Wagner-Rogers rescue resolution to pressure Washington, culminating in the WRB’s establishment, which saved approximately $200,000$ Jews and $20,000$ non-Jews. Critics such as Syrkin and Dawidowicz minimised Bergson’s role; archival evidence (e.g., Treasury memos) substantiates Wyman’s account.

Media and Church Responses

American newspapers—especially the New York Times—downplayed Holocaust news, while most churches remained apathetic. Subsequent studies by Deborah Lipstadt, Laurel Leff, Haim Genizi, and Robert Ross built on Wyman’s initial findings, exposing systematic underreporting and Protestant indifference.

Ethical and Philosophical Stakes

Wyman’s work provoked debate over the moral obligations of democracies toward foreign victims. Medoff notes that U.S. traditions—embodied in the Statue of Liberty—define national identity through humanitarian responsibility. Failure to act, Feingold once wrote, endangers “the soul of a nation.”

Legacy and Future Research Paths

Garland’s $1990$ thirteen-volume America and the Holocaust reproduces Wyman’s source base, enabling new scholarship. Medoff highlights unresolved questions: denominational church reactions, biographies of key Congressmen (Sol Bloom, Emanuel Celler), detailed media studies (Time, The Nation), analyses of U.S. cabinet members (Morgenthau, Frances Perkins), minority community responses, and the role of liberating soldiers. Abandonment thus remains both foundation and catalyst for continued inquiry.

Key Numerical and Statistical References (Selected)

• Book sales: >150,000 copies.
• Auschwitz raid: $20$ August $1944$ , $1,000$ bombs.
• Ethiopian airlift (“Operation Joshua”): $812$ refugees rescued in $1985$ .
• WRB estimated lives saved: $200,000$ Jews, $20,000$ non-Jews.
• Wyman lectures post-publication: >400.
• Scholarly word count of Medoff article: $11,658$ words.

Concluding Perspective

Rafael Medoff argues that because Wyman combined exhaustive documentation with a relentless moral call, The Abandonment of the Jews transcended academic circles to shape public conscience, governmental rhetoric, and scholarly agendas. Two decades after publication, its central claim—that democratic societies abandoned European Jewry despite concrete, feasible rescue options—continues to challenge historians and policymakers alike.

According to the provided notes, Wyman's work was critiqued in a few areas related to potential biases or missed aspects:

Moral Lens and Anachronistic Standards: Wyman, a committed Christian historian, explicitly rooted his critique of U.S. policy in Christian ethics, emphasizing the moral obligation to help those in need. While admirers celebrated his "moral vision," critics like Henry Feingold argued that Wyman might have imposed anachronistically high standards on a nation-state at war, potentially misconstruing the realist limits on their actions.
Weight of Antisemitism: While Wyman identified factors such as nativism, political calculation, bureaucratic inertia, hostility to Zionism, and to a lesser degree, antisemitism, as determinants of U.S. policy, later scholars disagreed over the precise weight of antisemitism as a contributing factor. This suggests Wyman's assessment might have downplayed its pervasive influence, which subsequent research by scholars like Joseph W. Bendersky and Bat-Ami Zucker has further demonstrated among U.S. officials.
Treatment of Jewish Leadership: Some critics, including Lucy Dawidowicz and Marie Syrkin, faulted Wyman's treatment of American Jewish leadership, specifically minimizing the role of the dissident Bergson Group. However, the notes state that archival evidence substantiates Wyman's account of their impact.
Areas for Further Study (What Wyman May Have Missed/Not Fully Explored): Rafael Medoff highlights several unresolved questions and paths for future research that imply areas where Wyman's original work might not have been exhaustive or could be deepened. These include:
- More detailed analyses of denominational church reactions.
- Biographies of key Congressmen like Sol Bloom and Emanuel Celler.
- Detailed media studies beyond just the New York Times, such as Time or The Nation.
- In-depth analyses of other U.S. cabinet members like Frances Perkins.
- Responses from various minority communities.
- The specific role of liberating soldiers