Introduction to Constitutional & Administrative Law and the UK Constitution
Foundations of Constitutional and Administrative Law (Public Law)
Scope and Definition of Public Law:
Public law comprises constitutional law and administrative law, forming the legal and institutional architecture that regulates the state internally and governs its relationships with individuals.
Sir Stephen Sedley defines public law in Lions Under the Throne: Essays on the History of English Public Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 1) as:
"[T]he body of law, embracing both constitutional and administrative law, by which the state is regulated both institutionally and in its dealings with individuals."
The constitutional dimension focuses on the substance of this body of law, its core institutional arrangements, and the fundamental principles it is designed to uphold.
The administrative dimension focuses on the procedural and legal mechanisms governing how public bodies, officials, and institutions execute and apply these laws in day-to-day governance.
Definition and Function of a Constitution:
A constitution is the overarching framework of principles, values, rules, and processes that structure and regulate the government of a state.
It fulfills three foundational functions:
Sets the comprehensive structural framework within which state power is constituted and exercised.
Regulates the conduct, boundaries, and interactions of key political actors and state institutions.
Serves as the ultimate normative benchmark against which the legitimacy of governmental actions and enactments is evaluated.
In modern liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom, constitutional frameworks encompass:
Mechanisms of law-making, executive execution, and judicial dispute resolution.
Core democratic principles that extend beyond regular representation and free elections to incorporate solidarity, social justice, and distributive economic justice.
The protection of individual human rights and civil liberties.
The Tripartite Division of Governmental Power:
Liberal constitutions allocate public authority across three distinct branches of representative government:
The Legislature: The constitutional organ empowered to enact, amend, and repeal primary legislation (laws).
The Executive: The organ charged with administering the state, formulating public policy, and implementing enacted statutes.
The Judiciary: The independent system of courts and judges tasked with interpreting legislation, developing common law principles, and adjudicating disputes arising on specific facts.
The constitution directly dictates the distribution of powers among these three branches and establishes the limits of their legal authority relative to private citizens.
Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law
The Concept of Constitutionalism:
As articulated by former Law Lord Steyn (cited in Stanton & Prescott, Public Law, p. 12):
"[C]onstitutionalism…is a political theory as to the type of institutional arrangements that are necessary to support the democratic ideal. It holds that the exercise of government power must be controlled in order that it should not be destructive of the very values which it was intended to promote."
Constitutionalism establishes that raw majority rule cannot operate without substantive constraints; state authority must be channeled through institutions that protect foundational values.
These core values include:
The Rule of Law.
Separation of powers.
Fair, rational, and accountable public administration.
Fundamental human rights.
Principles of distributive and social justice.
State Authority, Power, and Legitimacy:
The exercise of state power alone does not guarantee legitimacy. Compliance with constitutional values and norms constitutes the fundamental baseline for legitimate governance, irrespective of a government's momentary popular support.
Political power becomes recognized as legitimate authority only when it operates within established constitutional limits and commands normative assent.

Core Dimensions of the Rule of Law:
The Rule of Law operates as an indispensable constitutional counterweight to unchecked political majoritarianism, comprising five interconnected institutional virtues:
Transparency: Laws, administrative procedures, and official actions must be open, public, and accessible to the governed.
Predictability: Legal outcomes and obligations must be foreseeable, enabling individuals to plan their conduct under known legal rules.
Stability: Fundamental legal standards must remain consistent rather than being subjected to volatile, arbitrary, or retroactive alteration.
Enforceability and Accountability: Laws must be effectively and impartially enforced, with public officials held strictly accountable under the law for their decisions.
Due Process: Fair, independent, and impartial adjudicative procedures must be guaranteed whenever rights, obligations, or liberties are determined.

The Metaphor of Association: Balancing Majority Rule and the Rule of Law
Hypothetical Meeting Scenario:
First Meeting: A collective association unanimously establishes two founding constitutional rules:
Procedural Rule : Dictates that all future collective decisions require absolute unanimity and may only be deliberated at scheduled meetings held strictly every six months.
Substantive Rule : Dictates that no collective decision will ever be adopted if it compromises or harms the vital interests of any individual member.
Second Meeting: A majority faction convenes and adopts two new measures against the dissenting vote of a single minority member:
Resolution : Declares that henceforth, all decisions will be determined by a simple majority vote, and meetings may be summoned at any time deemed necessary by the chair.
Substantive Decision : Enacts a policy favored by the majority that directly compromises the material interests of the dissenting minority member.
Underlying Constitutional Conflicts Generated by the Metaphor:
The Dilemma of Legal Validity: Is the dissenting minority member legally bound by Resolution when it was enacted in explicit defiance of the entrenched unanimity requirement in Procedural Rule ?
Substantive Constitutional Breach: Can Substantive Decision be considered valid law when its substance violates the founding protection guaranteed by Substantive Rule ?
The Nature of Unconstitutionality: Did founding rules and cease to possess constitutional status the moment the majority enacted and , or do and represent invalid, ultra vires, unconstitutional usurpations of authority?
The Scope of Majoritarian Power: Does a simple political majority possess an inherent, unlimited power to rewrite the fundamental rules of the association at will?
Adjudicative Authority: Which neutral arbiter or institutional body holds the legitimate authority to settle these competing claims?
Application to the Modern State:
The Minoritarian Claim: The individual asserts that fundamental constitutional rules cannot be discarded at the convenience of a temporary majority; otherwise, predictability, stability, and legitimate expectations dissolve.
The Majoritarian Claim: The collective claims that democratic mandates grant current majorities the authority to override older conventions, statutes, and consensus agreements to address immediate political necessities.
The Critical Distinction of State Citizenship: While a member of a private voluntary association can resolve unresolvable oppression by resigning, an individual in the modern world cannot easily abandon citizenship. Because citizenship carries an assumed constitutional consent to state authority, liberal constitutions must embed rule-of-law constraints to protect the individual from arbitrary majoritarian imposition.
Comparative Constitutional Models: Codified Legal Constitutions vs. The British Model
The Legal (Codified) Constitutional Model:
Originates with the United States Constitution, drafted in (one year following the Declaration of Independence) and formally ratified in .
Heavily influenced by Enlightenment social contract theory, it represents the first modern constitution embodied in a single, legally binding document establishing a "higher fundamental law."
In codified regimes:
Constitutional rules are legally entrenched and cannot be repealed or altered through the ordinary legislative process.
Primary legislation passed by the legislature that contradicts constitutional provisions can be struck down as void by constitutional courts.
This codified approach serves as the prevailing constitutional architecture for the vast majority of modern global democracies.
The British (Uncodified) Constitutional Model:
The United Kingdom represents a rare constitutional exception alongside Israel and New Zealand, lacking a single, unified constitutional text.
In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, at paragraph 40, Lord Neuberger characterized the UK system as follows:
"Unlike most countries, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution in the sense of a single coherent code of fundamental law which prevails over all other sources of law. Our constitutional arrangements have developed over time in a pragmatic as much as in a principled way, through a combination of statutes, events, conventions, academic writings and judicial decisions."
Characteristics of the UK Constitution:
Uncodified: Sourced across multiple instruments rather than consolidated into a single foundational text.
Partly-Written and Dispersed: Formed through a combination of historical statutes, common law court judgments, international treaties, and written historical charters, alongside unwritten elements.
Partly-Legal and Partly-Political: Composed both of enforceable legal rules and unenforceable political habits known as constitutional conventions.
Flexible: Lacks formal procedural entrenchment; constitutional laws can theoretically be enacted, amended, or repealed by an ordinary Act of Parliament through the standard legislative procedure.
Stanton & Prescott note in Public Law that:
"[T]he day-to-day political events of our governmental system are as much a part of the constitution as the various legal sources…."
The Mechanics of the Flexible UK Constitution: The Prerogative of Dissolution and Election Calling
The Historical Baseline: The Royal Prerogative:
Prior to (and revived since ), the authority to dissolve the House of Commons and trigger a general election resided in the Royal Prerogative of the Monarch.
While formally a crown power, the actual operation of this prerogative was governed by two competing, non-legal constitutional conventions:
The Democratic Convention: The Monarch exercises the dissolution power solely upon the formal request of the Prime Minister, at a date chosen by the Prime Minister. Because monarchs have consistently obliged since , this convention effectively vests a former absolute royal power directly into the hands of the executive branch without requiring prior parliamentary consent.
The Lascelles Principles: An obscure constitutional convention published in an anonymous letter to The Times in by Sir Alan Lascelles (writing under the pseudonym "Senex"). Under this convention, the Sovereign retains the reserve power to refuse a Prime Minister's request for dissolution if three cumulative conditions are met:
The existing Parliament remains "vital, viable, and capable of doing its job."
A general election would be clearly "detrimental to the national economy."
The Sovereign can "rely on finding another prime minister who could govern for a reasonable period with a working majority in the House of Commons."
Constitutional Tension: The Lascelles Principles directly conflict with the foundational democratic norm requiring the unelected Monarch to remain entirely detached from political controversies.
The Statutory Experiment: Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA 2011):
The FTPA removed monarchical discretion and executive unilateralism by replacing the royal prerogative with clear statutory rules.
It established fixed five-year parliamentary terms and dictated that an early general election could occur only under two strict statutory conditions:
A motion for an early general election passed by a two-thirds supermajority of the total membership of the House of Commons.
A formal vote of no confidence in Her Majesty's Government, followed by a -day statutory period during which no alternative administration could gain a vote of confidence.
Legislative Circumvention: Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019:
When prime ministerial deadlock over Brexit in failed to command the statutory two-thirds supermajority required by the FTPA , the government bypassed the FTPA by introducing a separate primary statute: the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019.
Because Parliament cannot bind its successors under the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the Act set an early general election date for December 12, , with a simple legislative majority, demonstrating the extreme flexibility of the UK's unentrenched arrangements.
The Restoration: Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022:
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act formally repealed the Fixed-term Parliaments Act .
The Act expressly revived the ancient royal prerogative powers to dissolve and summon Parliament upon prime ministerial request.
By resurrecting the prerogative, the Act reinstated the underlying constitutional ambiguity: the Prime Minister can unilaterally determine election timing, while the Crown theoretically retains the contested convention to refuse dissolution.
The House of Lords proposed amendments requiring the Prime Minister to obtain parliamentary approval prior to requesting dissolution, but the House of Commons rejected these amendments, ensuring dissolution authority returned entirely to the executive prerogative.
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Concept of the Political Constitution
The Foundational Rule: Crown-in-Parliament:
The primary, absolute legal rule of the UK Constitution is Parliamentary Sovereignty.
The core legal doctrine dictates:
"Whatever the Crown in Parliament enacts is law."
Primary legislation passed by both Houses of Parliament and granted Royal Assent cannot be struck down, invalidated, or declared void by any domestic court.
Unlike codified constitutional democracies where constitutional courts enforce "higher law," the UK Parliament is not legally bound by prior statutes, historical precedents, or constitutional conventions.
The Nature of the UK Political Constitution:
As detailed by Stanton & Prescott (Public Law, "A legal and political constitution"):
"…In the UK, due to the uncodified nature of… [the legal parts of the] constitution, the political machinery that takes place within the institutions and that seeks to influence and legitimize the exercise of power is also a defining factor—more so than in codified systems, where the legal framework is both clearer and stronger. This refers to what we call the political constitution. In short, our constitution is not just legal in nature, but also political."
Key constitutional dynamics rely on institutional accountability, parliamentary debate, ministerial responsibility, media scrutiny, and public electoral pressure rather than solely on legal sanctions applied in courtroom litigation.

The Role of the Judiciary and Public Law in the UK Constitutional Order
Judicial Functions within an Uncodified System:
Although the UK possesses a largely political constitution, public law and the judicial branch perform essential, stabilizing constitutional functions:
Statutory Interpretation: Senior judges are entrusted with clarifying ambiguous language within Acts of Parliament and integrating statutes with existing common law precedents.
Common Law Development: The higher courts elucidate fundamental principles (e.g., the right to access justice, natural justice, the rule of law) derived from centuries of case law and authoritative legal treatises.
Judicial Review of Administrative and Executive Action:
Through judicial review, specialized courts review the legality of decisions, orders, and omissions by government ministers, departments, and public bodies.
Provided that the constitutional standard violated is anchored in a recognized legal source (statute, common law, or international obligations incorporated by Parliament), the courts can declare executive actions:
Illegal: Exceeding the statutory or prerogative powers granted by law.
Ultra Vires: Operating outside the jurisdiction conferred upon the body.
Void and Of No Effect: Legally nullified as unconstitutional executive overreach.
Boundary of Judicial Review: Courts possess the power to quash executive and secondary legislative action, but they hold no constitutional power to invalidate primary Acts of Parliament.
The Counter-Majoritarian Dilemma and Judicial Criticism:
When higher courts enforce constitutional limits against popular executive decisions, critics and politicians frequently accuse unelected judges of exceeding their judicial remit and "legislating from the back door."
This tension is particularly acute when court decisions intersect with volatile political controversies, raising enduring questions regarding where legitimate judicial oversight ends and unwarranted interference in democratic politics begins.
Constitutional Crises in Action: The Brexit Litigation (Miller 1 and Miller 2)
The Miller 1 Decision (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5):
The Legal Issue: Following the referendum vote to leave the European Union, the government sought to use royal prerogative powers to formally trigger Article of the Treaty on European Union without seeking the approval of Parliament.
The Supreme Court Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that because triggering Article would inevitably lead to the alteration and loss of rights granted to UK citizens by primary legislation (the European Communities Act ), the executive could not use the Crown's prerogative to bypass the legislature. Only an Act of Parliament could authorize the notice.
Political Backlash: The High Court ruling preceding the Supreme Court judgment provoked extreme public and media hostility against the senior judiciary. The Daily Mail published the portraits of the three presiding judges (Sir Terence Etherton, Lord Justice Sales, and Lord Chief Justice Thomas) under the front-page banner "ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE," charging the unelected judiciary with thwarting the will of voters.

The Miller 2 Decision (R (Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41):
The Legal Issue: In August , Prime Minister Boris Johnson advised Queen Elizabeth II to prorogue (suspend) Parliament for a period of five weeks during the climax of debates surrounding a potential no-deal Brexit.
The Government's Justification: The Prime Minister claimed the prorogation was an ordinary procedural suspension to conclude the existing parliamentary session and prepare a new Queen's Speech laying out domestic policy agendas for the NHS and violent crime.
Constitutional Outcry: The Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, labeled the move a "constitutional outrage." Cross-party MPs, civil society leaders, and the public challenged the advice as an unlawful attempt to silence parliamentary accountability during a national political crisis.
The Supreme Court Ruling: In a historic, unanimous judgment, an -judge panel of the UK Supreme Court held that the Prime Minister's advice to prorogue Parliament was justiciable (subject to court review) and unlawful.
Legal Reasoning: The suspension prevented Parliament from fulfilling its constitutional function of holding the government to account without reasonable justification. Consequently, the prorogation was declared null, void, and of no legal effect, meaning Parliament had legally never been suspended at all.
