Notes on Cognitive Psychology as a Radical Behaviorist Views It (Moore, 2013)

Introduction

Cognitive psychology is presented as a class of positions that embrace mentalism—explicitly nonbehavioral states, mechanisms, processes, structures, and similar concepts operating in a nonbehavioral dimension of the mind. The article reviews the background and nature of cognitive psychology, especially in contrast with behaviorism, focusing on theoretical and philosophical differences in explanatory practices. It argues that cognitive psychology has conceptual affinities with mediational neobehaviorism, while Skinner’s radical behaviorism differs from both. The discussion involves mentalism, cognitive science, philosophical functionalism, token physicalism, type physicalism, and the idea of multiple realizability.

Historical Background

Historically, cognitive psychology can be traced to forms of mentalistic thinking present in ancient Greek thought, philosophy, and major religious traditions. Figures such as Descartes (1596–1650), Kant (1724–1804), Freud (1856–1939), and Piaget (1896–1980) embody precursors to cognitive psychology. Early 20th-century precursors include information and communication theory, cybernetics, electrical engineering, mathematics and computer technology, psycholinguistics, and the verbal learning tradition. In the contemporary period, many researchers use a computer metaphor and the information-processing concept. The term “cognitive psychology” rose with the 1950s–1960s information-processing paradigm, leading to the 1960 Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies and the publication of Plans and the Structure of Behavior by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram in 1960. Neisser’s 1967 general text Cognitive Psychology was influential, and the 1970s saw growing recognition supported by philanthropic groups (e.g., Sloan Foundation). The evolution toward an interdisciplinary “cognitive science” emphasizes philosophy, neuroscience, engineering, and other fields, reflecting an information-processing framework. Everyday folk psychology language—beliefs, intentions, wishes, wants, hopes, desires—suggests enduring cognitive concepts: mental entities that cause behavior.

Mentalism

An important general characteristic of cognitive positions is an explicit embrace of mentalism, defined here as appealing to nonbehavioral elements from a nonbehavioral dimension as causally effective antecedents in explanations of behavior. Mentalism contends that a complete causal explanation of behavior cannot rest solely on observable behavior; unobservable causal elements from a mental dimension are needed. Terms for nonbehavioral elements include acts, states, mechanisms, processes, entities, faculties, or structures, while terms for the nonbehavioral dimension include mental, cognitive, spiritual, psychic, conceptual, hypothetical, mystical, or transcendental. The umbrella term for the nonbehavioral dimension is the dimension of mind. Mentalism rests on several assumptions, with emphasis on the contemporary information-processing form:

1) Behavior occurs in the publicly observable dimension, yet psychology must also acknowledge a mental or cognitive dimension that is unobservable but can be causally related to behavior. (a) Public behavior is not typically one-to-one with environmental input; thus, behavior must be causally related to something beyond direct input—a mental act, state, or mechanism. (b) The history of science shows the importance of considering unobserved factors that may be fruitful in understanding a subject, so cognitive psychology follows this tradition. (c) People are often introspectively aware of phenomena not observable by others, and our intuitions support their causal role prior to behavior.

2) Mind components (acts, states, mechanisms) have operating characteristics. Understanding these characteristics and their relations—the functional content and architecture of the mind—illuminates the causes of behavior. As Fodor (1983) stated, “Behavior is organized, but the organization of behavior is merely derivative; the structure of behavior stands to mental structure as an effect stands to its cause” (p. 2). Causal properties range from initiating to mediating. Initiating denotes autonomous causes; mediating views environmental stimuli as activating unobservable inner acts, states, mechanisms, or processes that mediate between stimulus (S) and response (R). The mediator is the proper focus of theorizing since the organism is primarily in contact with the mediator, not directly with external stimuli. Some mental elements are conscious and introspectible; others are unconscious. Mental elements can be dualist or materialist; most contemporary cognitive psychology regards mentalism as materialist and physiological, though the mental concepts reside in a nonbehavioral dimension.

3) Three kinds of data should be used to justify inferences about mental acts and processes: publicly observable behavioral data, physiological recordings, and introspective self-reports. (a) Public behavioral data include latencies, reaction times, ratings, and reasoning task answers. (b) Physiological data involve central nervous system measurements (e.g., fMRI) believed to correlate with the psychological phenomenon in question. (c) Introspective self-reports, typically correlated with other data, are not usually primary data sources.

4) An organism is an active, independent contributor to its behavior. Behavior reflects information reception, transformation, reduction, elaboration, organization, storage, and retrieval by a mediator or initiating agent. Explanations may safely use intentional language (e.g., intentionality, agency), even if such terms originate in everyday folk psychology. In sum, cognitive psychology’s mentalism seeks to explain behavior by understanding how the mind works—the universal, innate operating characteristics and capacities of internal structures and systems that enable behavior in context. The enterprise resembles theoretical engineering, often represented with flowcharts, and typically adopts a top-down design stance. It is interdisciplinary, intersecting psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and engineering, focusing on underlying theoretical elements that explain complex human phenomena (language, memory, problem solving, consciousness, creativity, social behavior, abnormal behavior, therapy).

Three representative philosophical aspects of cognitive psychology

The dominant philosophical stance associated with cognitive psychology is philosophical functionalism: mental states are defined by their causal contributions to behavior, i.e., they are functional states determined by their role in the internal system. Much of cognitive psychology embraces token physicalism (particular mental state instances are physical) but rejects type physicalism (types of mental states are defined by specific physical properties). Under token physicalism, when an individual intends or believes, certain neurons are active at specific brain coordinates; however, the same mental state may be realized by different neural loci in different individuals. Thus, mental states are functional states, not strictly identical to specific neural activity. The same type of mental state can be multiply realized across different physical substrates. Modern computer metaphor supports this view: a computer has input mechanisms (e.g., keyboard, USB) and output mechanisms (e.g., monitor, printer), as well as internal states that process information deterministically. These internal states are functional and multiply realizable, so defining a state purely in terms of physical parameters is insufficient.

Relations Between Behaviorism and Cognitive Psychology (From the Standpoint of Cognitive Psychology)

Key passages from Fodor and others highlight the deep, sometimes controversial, differences between mentalism and behaviorism. Fodor (1968) suggested that to qualify as a broad behaviorist, the proposition “For each mental predicate used in psychological explanation, there must be at least one description of behavior to which it bears a logical connection” defines a sharp divide between mentalists and behaviorists. Flanagan (1991) argued that any science failing to talk about mental events cannot fully account for regularities between stimuli and responses, likening behaviorism’s focus on observable relations to ignoring the “between” in the cosmos. Chomsky (1959) criticized Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, helping to fuel the cognitive revolution. In the last five decades, cognitive psychologists have argued they are revolutionary replacements for behaviorism, capable of better predictions and explanations.

Different forms of behaviorism complicate this picture. J. Moore (1996, 2008) notes that the dominant form is mediational S–O–R neobehaviorism, which posits unobservable organismic mediators. Skinner’s radical behaviorism rejects mentalistic explanations altogether. The discussion here identifies three alleged differences often cited by cognitive psychologists, while arguing that these differences do not necessarily separate cognitive psychology from either neobehaviorism or radical behaviorism:

1) The public vs unobserved data point: Cognitive psychology emphasizes unobservables as causal factors; neobehaviorism also posits unobservables (mediators). Hence, this difference is overstated.
2) Definitions: Cognitive psychology uses theory-laden concepts not strictly tied to observable data, whereas behaviorism claimed definitions were operationally tied to observable data. Yet historic debates show that both traditions accept hypothetical constructs or intervening variables, and modern neobehaviorism uses partial definitions and intervening variables that can accommodate cognitive constructs. Feigl’s (1963) stance and MacCorquodale & Meehl (1948) on intervening variables illustrate the shift toward partial definitions rather than exhaustive definitions. (Ainsights: both traditions allow unobservables; the distinction is a matter of emphasis, not kind.)
3) Explanation style: Cognitive psychology emphasizes underlying phenomena; behaviorism emphasizes the hypothetico-deductive model. Both traditions use hypotheticodeductive reasoning; the mediator’s status can be operationally defined or treated as a hypothetical construct.

Overall, the article contends that these purported differences are not actual, fundamental differences; mediational concepts in neobehaviorism and cognitive psychology can be compatible with a broader scientific stance.

Relations Between Cognitive Psychology and Radical Behaviorism

Skinner’s radical behaviorism rejects the mentalistic, referential view of verbal behavior and instead adopts a behavioral view where meaning is a function of contingencies for both speaker and listener. Meaning is not a referent or symbolically represented in another dimension; it is determined by contingencies that control emission and interpretation of verbal behavior. This leads to a distinct view on analyzing cognitive psychology versus radical behaviorism. Several factors shape mental talk by cognitive psychologists and its interpretation by listeners: (1) social–cultural traditions are heavily dualistic, shaping mentalistic explanations; (2) language practices convert adjectives or adverbs describing behavior into nouns that are treated as referents in another dimension; (3) metaphor use—such as “buckets that fill up,” “springs that wind,” or “computers that store input”—often relies on dualistic or mechanistic intuitions. Such factors lead to a tendency toward mechanical, antecedent causation, assuming a one-to-one relation between a prior mental act and subsequent behavior. Radical behaviorists argue this misses the contingencies that actually cause behavior, including phylogeny (innate species-level contingencies), ontogeny (lifetime contingencies shaping operant behavior), and culture (contingencies shaping practices). They emphasize the role of selection as a causal mode, which they argue is absent in many cognitive accounts. Radical behaviorists also criticize attempts to reconcile cognitive psychology with radical behaviorism by misusing operational definitions, hypothetical constructs, or token-type physicalism—arguing that these moves still rely on mentalistic interpretations of verbal behavior. They therefore oppose the mentalistic explanations that rely on referential or symbolic meaning in verbal behavior and advocate a contingencies-based account.

Summary of the radical behaviorist stance: mental talk in cognitive psychology arises from social and linguistic practices, metaphors, and inherited dualistic traditions, which obscure actual contingencies that govern behavior. By foregrounding contingencies, radical behaviorism suggests that both innate and learned aspects of behavior should be understood through environmental relations and selection pressures, with attention to ontogeny and culture as primary sources of behavioral control. The author argues that radical behaviorism offers a more parsimonious, contingency-based framework for understanding behavior than cognitive psychology or neobehaviorism, and cautions against using metaphors that imply a hidden, internal mental realm as the causal source of behavior.

Summary and Conclusions

The piece acknowledges that mechanisms are an inherent part of behavioral systems and that physiological structures relate to gaps in a behavioral account (from the environmental encounter to the response, and from experience to behavioral effects). However, it argues that invoking inner mental life or magical numbers (e.g., Miller’s magical number seven, plus or minus two) as explanatory mechanisms is philosophically and methodologically problematic. It criticizes cognitive psychology for leaning on metaphors and theoretical constructs that may reify dualistic concepts. Uttal (2008) argues that cognitive psychology, by presuming to study mental life as a science, is empirically and methodologically flawed in many respects. While neuroscience and physiology can contribute to understanding mechanisms, they should not be conflated with mental life or internal cognitive processes. Some attempts to reconcile radical behaviorism with cognitive or neobehaviorist perspectives—arguing that all terms are operationally defined or that all terms are hypothetical constructs, or that token-state physicalism is sufficient—are criticized as fundamentally misrepresenting radical behaviorism’s stance against referential mentalism. The core message is that radical behaviorism stands in opposition to verbal behavior theories, mentalistic explanations, philosophical functionalism, neobehaviorism, and logical positivism because these frameworks rely on mentalistic analyses of verbal behavior. In Moore’s view, radical behaviorism encourages a focus on contingencies, selection, and the environment as the primary drivers of behavior, rather than positing internal mental states as causal agents. The article closes by emphasizing the need to consider ethical and practical implications: an emphasis on contingencies can lead to interventions that more effectively shape behavior in real-world settings, and de-emphasize potentially misleading metaphors that obscure the actual environmental determinants of behavior.

Study Questions

1) What is the definition of mentalism according to the article? What is meant by the term folk psychology, and what is the relation between folk psychology and mentalism?
2) Summarize assumptions 1, 2, and 3, upon which the article argues mentalism is predicated.
3) Briefly describe the characteristics of philosophical functionalism as the philosophy of mind associated with cognitive psychology.
4) Briefly distinguish between token and type physicalism. Which form of physicalism is accepted by cognitive psychologists, and which rejected?
5) According to the article, what are three differences between cognitive psychology and behaviorism from the standpoint of cognitive psychology?
6) According to the article, how do radical behaviorists respond to the three differences between cognitive psychology and behaviorism from the standpoint of cognitive psychology?
7) Summarize three possible sources of mentalistic talk, according to radical behaviorists.
8) What is the ultimate liability of cognitive psychology, according to radical behaviorists?

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