Ruth Benedict – A Defense of Ethical Relativism

Key Thesis

Benedict argues that judgments of “normal” and “moral” are products of cultural selection. Each society, like an artist, foregrounds some human tendencies and suppresses others, creating a coherent but locally specific pattern of life. Because cultures make different selections, no single set of values or behaviors can claim universal authority.

Cultural Variability of Behavior

Modern anthropology reveals wide differences among isolated societies, disproving the idea that familiar customs are inevitable. Practices that appear pathological or immoral in one culture often function smoothly elsewhere, showing that standards of sanity and virtue hinge on local history and environment.

Illustrative Cases

Trance and catalepsy: Celebrated in many traditions as signs of spiritual giftedness, yet treated as aberrant in Western settings.
Homosexuality: Condemned in some societies but honored or institutionalized in others, from classical Greece to certain Indigenous North American tribes (e.g., the berdache institution).
Dobu (Melanesia): Social life centers on mutual suspicion, black-magic accusations, and secrecy—traits akin to paranoia in Western psychiatry but regarded as ordinary and necessary there.
Northwest Coast peoples: Head-hunting to avenge any death expresses an approved, even prestigious, megalomaniac-paranoid ethos. Individuals averse to this ethos become their culture’s deviants.

Normality and Morality Redefined

“Normal” behavior equals what a given culture rewards; “abnormal” equals behaviors it neglects or punishes. Likewise, morality is simply the label for habits a society approves. The same personality trait can earn esteem in one culture and stigma in another.

Social Moulding and Deviance

Most people are plastic enough to internalize whatever pattern their society prizes, whether trance, property accumulation, or suspicion. Temperamental outliers exist everywhere, but their rarity results from this plasticity, not from any transcultural standard of mental health or ethics.

Consequences for Ethical Theory

Because cultural patterns vary so widely and work coherently on their own terms, claims of universal moral truth lack empirical support. Ethical relativism—understanding right, wrong, normal, and abnormal as culturally conditioned—best fits the anthropological record.

The author's main aim is to establish the thesis that judgments of “normal” and “moral” are products of cultural selection, rather than universal truths. Benedict argues that each society selectively emphasizes or suppresses certain human tendencies, forming a unique and coherent pattern of life. Consequently, no single set of values or behaviors possesses universal authority.

Several main themes and concepts emerge from the text. Firstly, Cultural Variability of Behavior highlights that practices considered aberrant in one culture can be normal and functional in another, implying that standards of sanity and virtue are culturally contingent. Secondly, Illustrative Cases such as trance, homosexuality, and the cultural norms of Dobu and Northwest Coast peoples, provide concrete examples of this variability. Thirdly, Normality and Morality Redefined emphasizes that “normal” behavior is simply what a culture rewards, and morality is what it approves. Lastly, Social Moulding and Deviance explains that most individuals adapt to their society's prized patterns, making temperament outliers rare due to societal plasticity rather than absolute standards of mental health or ethics.

What I find most interesting and compelling is Benedict's redefinition of "normal" and "moral" behaviors as culturally relative constructs. The idea that deeply ingrained societal values, often perceived as universal, are actually just "habits a society approves" is a powerful challenge to ethnocentric views. The examples of trance states being celebrated or head-hunting being prestigious really drive home the extent to which cultural context shapes perceptions of sanity and virtue, forcing a reconsideration of what is inherently "right" or "wrong."

After reading the text, several questions emerged for me: If all morality is culturally conditioned, does this imply that there can be no universal ethical principles, such as human rights? How do cultures evolve their specific patterns, and can external influences or internal critiques lead to shifts in what is considered "normal" or "moral"? Furthermore, if temperament outliers exist everywhere, what is the fate of individuals who cannot or will not conform to their culture's prized patterns?

This text strongly connects to discussions about cultural relativism versus universalism in anthropology and ethics. It directly challenges universalist ethical theories that posit inherent, transcultural moral truths. It also aligns with discussions on social constructionism, demonstrating how concepts like sanity, deviance, and morality are not fixed but are socially defined. It might contrast with readings that argue for innate human characteristics or a baseline universal morality. For instance, it could be discussed alongside theories of human rights or universal psychological traits, highlighting the tension between cultural specificity and shared human experience.

One potential weakness in Benedict's argument, or at least a common critique of strong cultural relativism, is its implication for judging extreme practices. If "morality is simply the label for habits a society approves," then how can one critique practices like genocide, extreme discrimination, or torture, if they were, hypothetically, approved by a particular society? The argument risks undermining any basis for universal human rights or inter-cultural ethical dialogue. While Benedict highlights the descriptive reality of cultural variability, it becomes problematic as a prescriptive ethical framework if it negates the possibility of universal claims regarding human dignity or harm, thereby making all cultural practices equally valid from a moral standpoint.