BA Outline
Limited Partnerships
- RULPA acts as the default agreement if the limited partnership lacks a partnership agreement.
- If an issue is unaddressed by a partnership agreement or RULPA, UPA or RUPA controls, depending on which is in effect (RULPA §1105).
- Key differences between limited and general partnerships:
- Creation
- Personal liability
- Management
- Profits and losses
- Dissolution
- General partners possess the same rights, obligations, and duties as general partners in a general partnership.
- Limited partners are investors with no personal liability for the partnership's debts.
How Decisions are Made in LP
- Unless specified otherwise in the partnership agreement, general partners make the decisions for the limited partnership (RULPA §§ 403, 302, 405).
- The default rule mirrors RUPA/UPA, granting each general partner an equal say (RULPA § 403(a)).
- Limited partners can be granted decision-making authority (RULPA § 302).
- Limited partners owe a duty to act fairly and in good faith when dealing with the partnership itself (305).
- Participation in control may raise liability exposure.
- A limited partner faces liability exposure if:
- The limited partner is also a general partner; or
- --RULPA § 303(a) --The limited partner participates in the “control of the business” and a third party believes the limited partner is a general partner.
- RULPA § 303(b) defines certain activities that do not constitute “control” for the purposes of § 303(a).
- Some states, like NC, have eliminated the possibility of limited partner liability based on control:
N.C.G.S. §59-303
- A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership by reason of being a limited partner and does not become liable for the obligations of a limited partnership by participating in the management or control of the business of the limited partnership.
Fiduciary Obligations in LPs
- Except as provided in RULPA or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a general partnership to the partnership and the other partners (RULPA § 403(b)).
- This encompasses potential liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
In re USACAFEs, L.P.
- Fiduciary duty summary: "One who controls property of another may not, without implied or express agreement, intentionally use that property in a way that benefits the holder of the control to the detriment of the property or its beneficial owner."
- The Court finds that there is a fiduciary duty owed by the directors of the corporate general partner to the limited partners of the LP.
Transfer of LP Interests
- RULPA § 702 states that assigning a partnership interest does not dissolve a limited partnership nor does it entitle the assignee to any rights of a partner.
- An assignment only allows the assignee to receive distributions the assignor would have been entitled to.
- RULPA § 702 states that a partner ceases to be a partner upon assignment of their entire partnership interest, unless the partnership agreement specifies otherwise.
Adding a Partner to a Limited Partnership
- Unless stated otherwise in the partnership agreement, unanimous written consent from all general and limited partners is required to add a new partner (general or limited) (RUPLA § 301(b)(1); § 401).
Distributions
- Unlike UPA/RUPA, the default rule for profit/loss allocation in a limited partnership is based on the value of each partner's contributions (RULPA § 503).
- The value of contributions, including for services, should be tracked by the limited partnership (RULPA § 105).
Withdrawal of a General Partner
- RULPA § 602 states that a general partner can withdraw from an LP at any time but may owe damages if it violates the partnership agreement.
- RULPA § 801(4) specifies that a withdrawal of a general partner does not cause dissolution if:
- There is at least one remaining general partner, and
- The partnership agreement allows remaining general partners to continue the partnership, and
- The remaining general partners do so; or
- All partners agree to continue the business within 90 days of the withdrawal
Withdrawal of a Limited Partner
- RULPA § 603 dictates that unless otherwise specified in the partnership agreement, a limited partner can withdraw from an LP with at least six months’ prior written notice to each general partner.
- This implies a partnership agreement can prohibit a limited partner from withdrawing.
- Withdrawal of a limited partner does not cause dissolution (see § 801).
Payment Upon Withdrawal
- RULPA § 604 entitles a withdrawing partner to:
- Payment for their partnership interest as per the partnership agreement, or
- If not specified in the partnership agreement, the fair value of their partnership interest at the time of withdrawal.
- RULPA allows withdrawal upon 6 months' notice unless prohibited by the LP Agreement (RULPA § 603).
Dissolution
- Nonjudicial dissolution (See RULPA 801)
- Judicial dissolution (See RULPA 802)
Case Law
Ryan v. Buckeye
- A limited-partnership agreement can generally alter or eliminate traditional fiduciary duties.
In Re USACafes, L.P.
- A director of a corporate general partner owes fiduciary duties to the other partners and to the partnership, in addition to the duties owed to the corporate general partner.
Gibson v. Gibson Family LTD
- Unless a partnership agreement states otherwise, a limited partner may not dissociate from a limited partnership prior to the dissolution and winding up of the partnership.
Corporations
Sources of “Corporate Law”
- State corporations statutes (NCGS Chapter 55)
- Articles of Incorporation
- Corporate existence begins when Articles of Incorporation are filed with the Secretary of State (MBCA § 2.03).
- Articles of incorporation only require minimal information but may include other information and provisions.
- The Articles are a fundamental document for the corporation and can only be amended with shareholder approval (§ 10.03) after stock has been issued.
- Certain default rights under the MBCA may only be modified by a provision in the Articles of Incorporation. For example, § 7.21(a) (one share, one vote).
- Bylaws
- The incorporators or the board of directors adopt initial bylaws for the corporation.
- Bylaws may contain any provision for managing the business and regulating the affairs of that corporation that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation.
- Shareholder Agreements
- Case Law
- Federal law (for issues like issuing stock; employment laws)
De Facto Corporation Theory
- Courts may refuse to hold individuals liable if they believed in good faith that a de jure corporation existed.
Corporation by Estoppel Theory
- A third party contracting with what they believe is a corporation will be estopped from obtaining a judgment against the individuals acting on behalf of the purported corporation if no corporation existed.
Stock
- The articles of incorporation must set forth any classes of stock, and the number of shares of each class and series of stock, that the corporation is authorized to issue (§ 6.01).
- If more than one class or series of shares is authorized, the rights and limitations of each class must be described in the articles of incorporation (§ 6.01).
- The Board of Directors typically makes the decision to issue stock (see MBCA § 6.21 – though this authority may be reserved to the shareholders under the articles of incorporation).
- A corporation may, but is not required to, list a par value for some or all of its stock in its certificate of incorporation. Par value is the minimum price at which the company may sell stock. See generally Model Business Corporation Act § 6.21 Official Comment (2016). Stock for which no par value has been assigned may be sold at any price. A stock’s par value is only relevant when the company is issuing the stock. A purchaser of par value stock may sell the stock at any price she deems acceptable.
- Before the Board issues stock, it must determine that it is receiving adequate consideration for the stock (MBCA § 6.21(c)).
- Although some states limit the types of consideration that a corporation may accept for stock, the MBCA and most states give corporate directors wide latitude to accept money, tangible property, intangible property, or any other benefit to the corporation as consideration for stock. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21 (2016);
- A subscription agreement is an offer to buy stock in a corporation. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.20 (2016). A subscription agreement may be entered either before or after the corporation is officially incorporated. The default rule is that pre- incorporation subscription agreements are generally irrevocable for a period of time (e.g., three or six months). However, the terms of the subscription agreement itself may provide for revocation in certain circumstances. Additionally, a subscription agreement may be revocable if the corporation or all other subscribers agree to allow the revocation, depending on the laws of the governing state. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.20; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 503.
- Now rule is that directors cannot issue dividends if that would render corporation insolvent
- For example of statutes recognizing par value, see DE §§ 153(a), 154.
- State statutes govern most aspects of corporate law. However, if a corporation decides to offer its stock to the public using a stock exchange or other form of interstate
- Federal law applies to public stock offerings, mandating special disclosure and registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.).
Limited Liability for Shareholders
- Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct (MBCA § 6.22 ).
Contractual and judicial exceptions to limited liability for shareholders exist - Personal guaranty allows for contractual exception.
Judicial exception = PCV Piercing the Corporate Veil – Dewitt Truck v. Flemming Fruit
- Factors considered by courts in piercing the corporate veil include:
- The inadequate capitalization of the corporation;
- The failure to observe corporate formalities;
- Nonpayment of dividends;
- The insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time;
- Factors considered by courts in piercing the corporate veil include
- Siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder;
- Non-functioning of other officers or directors;
- Absence of corporate records; and
- The fact that the corporation is merely a façade for the operations of the dominant stockholder.
- In addition to the factors mentioned above, the situation must “present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.”
- Most veil-piercing cases boil down to the following:
- The shareholder is not playing by the rules, not respecting the corporation as a separate entity, and
- There is some unfairness involved.
Piercing the Corporate Veil – In re Silicone Implants
- Factors for piercing the veil from sub to parent:
- The parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers;
- The parent and subsidiary have common business departments;
- The parent and subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax returns;
- The parent finances the subsidiary;
- The parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary;
- Factors for piercing the veil from sub to parent:
- The subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital;
- The parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary;
- The subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent;
- Factors for piercing the veil from sub to parent:
- The parent uses the subsidiary’s property as its own;
- The daily operations of the two corporations are not kept separate;
- The subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities, such as keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder board meetings; and
- Commingling of funds.
- “When a corporation is so controlled as to be the alter ego or mere instrumentality of its stockholder, the corporate form may be disregarded in the interest of justice.”
- The prevailing theory of corporate veil piercing is the alter-ego doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts will pierce the corporate veil of limited liability, and hold a shareholder personally liable for corporate obligations, if two general requirements are satisfied. First, the shareholder must have effectively disregarded the corporate form, exerting such complete dominion or control over the corporation that it effectively became an extension of the shareholder, a mere instrumentality to accomplish the shareholder’s will. Second, and crucially, this disregard of the corporate form must have been meant to cause, and must have caused, some unfair harm or injustice against the party seeking to pierce the veil. However, actual fraud is not required, although courts typically look for some indication of bad faith.
- Difference between tort and contract claims?
Shareholders - Defined
- A “shareholder” is the person in whose name shares are registered or the beneficial owner of shares (MBCA § 1.40(21)).
- “Shares” = the units into which the proprietary interest in a corporation is divided (§ 1.40(22)).
Shareholders – What do they do?
- Shareholders must approve certain “fundamental changes” to the corporation:
- Amendment to articles of incorporation (MBCA § 10.03)
- Dissolution (MBCA § 14.02)
- Merger (MBCA § 11.04)
- Sale of substantially all assets (MBCA § 12.02)
- Shareholders elect directors (MBCA § 8.03(c))
When/Where do shareholders elect directors?
- Shareholders elect directors at the annual meeting of shareholders (§ 8.03)
How do shareholders elect directors?
- Unless otherwise provided in the articles, directors are elected:
- By a plurality of votes cast
- By the shares entitled to vote in the election
- At a meeting in which a quorum is present
- Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a quorum is a majority of the votes entitled to be cast on a matter. (§§ 7.25(a), 7.28(a))
Board of Directors – Does a corporation have to have a board?
- Yes (§ 8.01), except as provided in § 7.32
- An agreement among shareholders that complies with § 7.32 may eliminate the board of directors.
- 7.32 does not apply to publicly traded corporations
What does the Board do?
- The Board exercises all corporate powers and manages (or oversees the management of) the business and affairs of the corporation (§ 8.01(b)).
How long do directors serve?
- Typically, one year (§ 8.05(b)).
- Unless the corporation has staggered terms for directors.
- Staggered terms divided the Board into 2 or 3 groups, and the directors serve 2 or 3 year terms (§ 8.06).
- Staggered term must be provided in the articles of incorporation (§ 8.06).
Can Directors be removed by shareholders?
- Yes, with or without cause (unless the articles provide for removal only with cause) (§ 8.08).
Is there anything else the Board does?
- Yes, it appoints officers (§ 8.40).
What offices are there?
Those specified in the bylaws or designated by the Board.
- Typically:
- President/CEO
- Vice President(s)
- Treasurer
- Secretary
What do officers do?
- Whatever the bylaws, the Board, or more senior officers tell them to do (§ 8.41).
How long do officers serve?
- Until resignation or removal (§ 8.43).
- An officer may be removed by the Board with or without cause (§ 8.43(b)).
VOTING – Who gets to vote at shareholder meetings?
- Shareholders as of the “record date” get to vote at a meeting of shareholders (§ 7.07(a)).
- The corporation’s bylaws may fix the “record date.” If not set by the bylaws, the board of directors may fix the record date (§ 7.07(a)).
- The record date may not be more than 70 days nor less than 10 days before the meeting or action requiring a shareholder vote (§§ 7.05(a), 7.07(b))
- Owners of shares as of the record date get notice of the meeting and are entitled to vote at the meeting (§ 7.05(a)).
Where do shareholders vote?
- Shareholders may vote on issues at:
- The annual meeting of shareholders (required by § 7.01), or
- A special meeting of shareholders, which may be called by:
- The board,
- Holders of at least 10% of the voting stock, or
- Persons authorized by the articles or bylaws to call special meetings (see § 7.02)
Is a meeting of shareholders the only way to vote?
- No, shareholders may take action without meeting if consented to in writing by all of the shareholders entitled to vote on the action (§ 7.04(a)).
Do you have to attend to vote?
- Not necessarily, a shareholder may vote by proxy (§ 7.22).
Shareholder Voting Thresholds
- Thresholds vary depending on what is being voted on:
- Election of Directors –
- Plurality of votes cast (MBCA § 7.28(a))
- Plurality of votes present (DE § 216(3))
- Removal of Directors – A director is removed if . . .
- MBCA – more votes cast in favor of removal than against (MBCA § 8.08(c))
- DE – majority of shares entitled to vote favor removal (DE § 141(k))
- Non-fundamental change (e.g., approval of compensation plan for CEO) –
- MBCA – more votes cast in favor of the action than oppose the action (MBCA § 7.25(c)) [i.e., abstentions have no impact];
- DE – majority of shares present at the meeting favor the action (DE § 216(2) [i.e., treats abstentions as “no” votes]
- Fundamental change (e.g., dissolution) –
- MBCA – more votes cast in favor of the action than oppose the action (MBCA § 14.02(e); 7.25(c)) [i.e., same standard as for non-fundamental changes);
- DE (and NC) – majority of the votes entitled to be cast (DE § 275(b); NC § 55-14-02(e)) [i.e., absolute majority requirement; both abstentions and no shows are treated as “no” votes]
- Election of Directors –
- A limited number of states (e.g., NY) require super-majority approval (2/3) vote shareholder vote to dissolve pre-1998 corporations (NY Bus. Corp. Law § 1001(b))
Dividends
- A dividend is a special type of distribution, a payment to shareholders by the corporation out of its current or retained earnings in proportion to the number of shares owned by the shareholder.
- MBCA § 6.40(a) – A board of directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions to its shareholders subject to restrictions by the articles of incorporation and the limitation in subsection (c).
- MBCA § 6.40(c) – No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect:
- The corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or
- The corporation’s assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus preferential dissolution rights.
- MBCA § 8.32 – A director who votes for a dividend in violation of § 6.40(a) may be held personally liable.
Traditional Approach
- Three accounts
- Stated Capital – generated from issuance of stock – par value
- Capital Surplus – generated from issuance of stock – excess over par
- Earned Surplus – generated from operation of business
- May pay dividends from Capital Surplus and Earned Surplus, but NOT Stated Capital
Zidell v. Zidell
- The Court states that those in control of corporate affairs have fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing toward the minority shareholders.
- Dividend policy decisions satisfy this duty if they are made:
- In good faith and
- Reflect legitimate business purposes rather than the private interests of those in control.
- Plaintiff has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the directors in determining the amount of corporate dividends.
- The Court says the following issues are relevant to the determination of bad faith:
- Intense hostility of the controlling faction against the minority;
- Exclusion of the minority from employment by the corporation;
- High salaries or bonuses or corporate loans made to the officers in control;
- The fact that the majority group may be subject to high personal income taxes if substantial dividends are paid;
- The existence of a desire by the controlling directors to acquire the minority stock interests as cheaply as possible.
Duty of Care
- The duty of care requires corporate directors to exercise “that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent [people] would use in similar circumstances.” -- Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. (Del. 1963) (Note: Sounds tort-ish, but this duty of care allows mistakes to happen without being liable)
Standards of Conduct for Directors
- MBCA § 8.30(b)
- The members of the board . . . when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
Business Judgment Rule
- Judicially created rule pursuant to which courts decline to second-guess board decisions.
- MBCA § 8.31 Official Comment:
- “As a general rule, a director is not exposed to personal liability for injury or damage caused by an unwise decision.”
Why have a BJR?
- Institutional (in)competence – judges are not business experts
- BJR encourages directors to take risks they might not otherwise take
- Shareholders voluntarily invest their money in corporations (and management), they should be held to the results of management’s decisions
- Hindsight = 20/20
- Cognitive bias – things seem more likely to occur after they have actually happened
“Abstention” version:
- Absent a showing that the conduct of the defendant directors “at least borders on” fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest, the court will abstain from reviewing the directors’ decision
- Exemplified by Shlensky v. Wrigley
Joy v. North
- “Liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule.”
- The business judgment rule does have a limit. It does not apply in cases in which the corporate decision:
- Lacks a business purpose,
- Is tainted by a conflict of interest,
- Is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or
- Results from an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.
Business Judgment Rule
“Presumption” version
- BJR creates a presumption that in making a decision directors were:
- Informed
- Acted in good faith, and
- Honestly believed that the decision was in the best interest of the corporation
- This version of the BJR isn’t as protective of directors as the “abstention” version.
- The presumption can be rebutted by allegations/evidence to the contrary
Barnes v. Andrews
- The duty of care encompasses a duty “in general to keep advised of the conduct of corporate affairs.”
- Defendant breached this duty, but . . . plaintiff must show causation.
- In effect, plaintiff must show that if defendant had performed his duties, the company would have avoided its loss.
- See also MBCA § 8.31(b)(1)(ii) – Causation burden on plaintiff
- (ii) the harm suffered was proximately caused by the director’s challenged conduct;
Smith v. Van Gorkom
- BJR “is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
- BJR protects only informed decisions.
- Directors who fail “to act in an informed and deliberate manner” may not assert the BJR as a defense to duty of care claims.
- “Whether a business decision is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.”
- “We think the concept of gross negligence is the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one.”
- Board decision was not “informed”:
- The board “lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed business judgment as to the fairness of $$55 per share for the sale of the company”
- Failed to obtain financial analysis
- Failed to consider a recess to obtain a financial analysis
- Did not push Pritzker for an extension of time to consider the transaction
- Take-away: Process matters
- Directors’ decisions are protected by presumptions of BJR
- Also . . . legislative changes after Van Gorkom allow for corporations to protect directors (see DE § 102(b)(7); MBCA § 202(b)(4))
Exculpation Provisions
- DE Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7) – the certificate of incorporation may contain a provision eliminating or limiting personal liability of a director or officer for breach of fiduciary duty, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit liability for:
- Breach of the duty of loyalty, or
- Acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.
- MBCA § 202(b)(4) – the articles of incorporation may set forth a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director . . . for any action taken or any failure to take action, as a director, except for liability for:
- The amount of a financial benefit to which the director is not entitled;
- An intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders
In re Caremark Int’l
- “The Court is of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system is adequate and exists.”
- “The failure to do so may render a director liable for losses.”
- “Generally, where a claim for director liability is predicated on ignorance of liability-creating activities, then only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
- Ignorance of liability-creating activities can lead to director liability if there's a sustained or systematic failure to oversee.
Standards of Liability for Directors
- MBCA § 8.31 – A director is not liable for any action or inaction unless the plaintiff establishes that the challenged conduct consisted of or was the result of:
- Action not in good faith;
- A decision as to which the director was not informed or did not believe to be in the best interests of the corporation;
- A self-interested transaction; or
- A sustained lack of attention or oversight.
- Burden is on the plaintiff
Duty of Care Review
- Courts have said that it is not their role to second-guess directors’ decisions; that is for the shareholders to do (by voting)
- Core element of any duty of care inquiry is whether there was a good faith effort to be informed and exercise judgment
- This may have process implications (Van Gorkom)
- May also require that directors take steps to ensure they are informed or at least have access to information (In re Caremark)
- Breach by action
- Breach by inaction
Breach by Action
- Gross negligence standard
- Business judgment rule
- Presumption
- Directors are presumed to have acted on informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that action was in best interests of corporation
- Protection from liability
- Directors are not liable for breach of duty of care if they have acted on informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that action was in best interests of corporation
- Presumption
Business judgment rule does not apply if
- Fraud (Shlensky v. Wrigley)
- Illegality (Shlensky)
- Conflict of interest (Shlensky)
- Lack of business purpose (Joy v. North)
- No-win decision (Joy v. North)
- Failure to be informed (Van Gorkom)
Inaction of Director
- Failure to give adequate attention to the affairs of the corporation
- Give reasonable attention/keep advised with some particularity (Barnes)
- Good faith attempt to assure adequate information systems (In re Caremark)
- Business judgment rule does not apply when sustained and systematic (obvious and prolonged) failure to exercise oversight results in liability (MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(iv); In re Caremark)
Duty of Care Review
- Protections for directors:
- Causation burden on plaintiff (MBCA § 8.31(b))
- Exculpation provisions in articles of incorporation (MBCA § 2.02(b)(4))
Duty of Loyalty v. Duty of Care
- Duty of loyalty seeks to prevent directors from acting against the best interests of the corporation or in a way that reaps personal benefits at the expense of the corporation
- Duty of care involves poor decision making or lack of attention, but no personal benefit
Duty of Loyalty
- Cases typically involve:
- Competition with the corporation
- Usurpation of a corporate opportunity
- Self-dealing transactions
- Unlike the duty of care, directors may not be “exculpated” in the articles of incorporation from breaches of the duty of loyalty
Northeast Harbor Golf Club
- Court rejected the DE “line of business” test.
LOB Test
- A corporate director or officer may not take a business opportunity for his own if:
- The corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;
- The opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business;
- The corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and
- By taking the opportunity for his own, the fiduciary will be placed in a position adverse to his duties to the corporation
Court adopted the ALI test –
- A director or senior executive may not take advantage of a corporate opportunity unless:
- 1. It is first offered to the corporation with disclosure of conflict;
- 2. It is rejected by the corporation; and
- Either
- The rejection is fair to the corporation;
- The opportunity is rejected in advance by disinterested directors; or
- The rejection is authorized (either in advance or after-the-fact) by disinterested shareholders.
DE (Guth) – Line of Business Test
- A corporate officer or director may not take a business opportunity for his own if:
- The corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;
- The opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business;
- The corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and
- By taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position adverse to his duties to the corporation
- A director or officer may take a corporate opportunity if:
* The opportunity is presented to the director or officer in his individual capacity;
* The opportunity is not essential to the corporation;
* The corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and
* The director or officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity. - Offering an opportunity to the corporation before taking it for oneself may shield a corporate fiduciary against a charge of usurpation of corporate opportunity, but it’s not required under DE’s line of business test.
In Re Ebay ®
- “The complaint gives rise to a reasonable inference that the insider directors accepted a commission or gratuity that rightfully belonged to eBay but that was improperly diverted to them. Even if this conduct does not run afoul of the corporate opportunity doctrine, it may still constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.”
- ® “Goldman Sachs was aware (or charged with a duty to know) of earlier SEC interpretations that prohibited steering ‘hot issue’ securities to persons in a position to direct future business to the broker-dealer.”
Interested Director Transactions
- Different levels of scrutiny given to interested director transactions depending on whether or not the conflict of interest is disclosed
- If an interested director transaction is disclosed and approved by disinterested directors or shareholders, courts will not review the “fairness” of the transaction (i.e., courts will defer to the decision to enter into the transaction; some courts say they are applying the BJR to the transaction).
- If a director does not fully disclose the conflict of interest, a reviewing court will consider the fairness of the transaction
HMG/Courtland Properties v. Gray
- DE § 144 – Transaction between corporation and corporate fiduciary is not necessarily void or voidable if:
- Material facts are disclosed and board authorizes;
- Material facts are disclosed and shareholders approve; or
- The transaction is fair to the corporation.
Director’s Conflicting Interest Transactions
- Why not have a blanket prohibition against transactions if a director has a conflict of interest – making such transactions always void