Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986

Authors: Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett
Source: The American Political Science Review, September 1993, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 624-638.
Publisher: American Political Science Association
JSTOR Stable URL: Link to the article

Democratic states have a similar propensity to engage in conflict compared to nondemocracies; however, they seldom clash with each other in violent conflict.
This study explores the reasons for the lower likelihood of violent clashes among democratic states.

**Democracy's Effect on Conflict:
- Democracy has a consistently negative effect on conflict likelihood in state dyads.**
- Empirical data reveal that democracies engage in conflicts less often than expected, indicating that democracy is not a spurious factor in peace.
**Two Explanatory Models:
- Normative Model:** Highlights how norms of compromise and cooperation shape interactions between democracies, preventing escalation into violence.
- Structural Model: Suggests that institutional constraints within democratic governance hinder leaders from initiating conflict with other democracies.

Foundations: Influenced by thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson; modern scholars such as Doyle (1986) contribute to this model.
Normative Assumptions:
- Assumption 1: States tend to externalize domestic political norms to international behavior.
- Assumption 2: In an anarchic international system, nondemocratic norms dominate, undermining the application of democratic norms.
Proposed Mechanism:
- Democratic norms foster compromises in political conflicts, leading to peaceful resolutions.
- Leadership in democracies is less inclined to pursue eliminative politics, promoting stability and a culture of “live and let live.”
Expected Outcomes:
- Conflicts between democracies often lead to resolution through third-party mediation or stalemate rather than violence.

Foundations: Discussed by modern scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and Rummel (1979, 1983).
Key Assumptions:
- Assumption 1: International challenges compel political leaders to mobilize domestic support for policies.
- Assumption 2: Mobilization of support can only occur in emergencies due to complex democratic processes.
Proposed Mechanism:
- The cumbersome nature of mobilization in democracies renders leaders hesitant to initiate conflicts.
- On the other hand, nondemocratic regimes face minimal structural constraints, making them more prone to conflict initiation.

Non-Mutually Exclusive: Both models highlight different aspects of democratic politics that contribute to peace.
Research Gaps: Prior studies have not clearly distinguished between normative and structural implications, presenting challenges in testing them as alternative hypotheses.
Hypotheses:
- H1: Higher degrees of democracy correlate with lower instances of militarized disputes while controlling for other factors (wealth, growth, etc.).
- H2: Deeper roots of democratic norms lower conflict likelihood and escalation.
- H3: Greater political constraints on executives reduce conflict likelihood.

Economic Factors:
- Wealthy states are less inclined to engage in conflict due to the high costs and low benefits associated with wars.
- Rapid economic growth further disincentivizes conflict among states.
Alliance Systems:
- Post-World War II democracies often formed direct or indirect alliances that reduced conflict likelihood through shared interests.
Geographic Contiguity and Military Capability Ratios:
- These are significant predictors of conflict escalation and should be included in the analysis.

The analysis revolves around the dyad-year as a unit of analysis, examining pairs of states across the post-World War II era of 1946-1986.
Data sources include various international conflict data sets (e.g., Militarized Interstate Disputes, International Crisis Behavior).

Dependent Variables:
- Dispute Involvement: Dyad-year characterized by conflict or no conflict.
- Dispute Escalation: Levels of hostility using Gochman-Maoz scale (0-4).
Independent Variables:
- The democracy index is grounded in the Polity II data, calculating overall democratic vs. autocratic characteristics of each state included in dyads.

Exploratory Hypotheses Testing: Conduct multiple regression analyses to assess the effects of democracy and control variables on conflict involvement.
Normative vs. Structural Model Comparison: Assess the efficacy of each model using varying sets of data.
Critical Tests: Conduct tests to determine which model better predicts absence or presence of conflict in cases of high vs. low constraints.

Robustness of Findings:
- Support for the hypothesis that democracies are less likely to engage in militarized disputes.
The Role of Normative Restraints:
- Democratic norms consistently have a stronger correlation with reduced conflict compared to structural restraints.
Implications for Future Research:
- Understanding democratic peace can inform policies during the democratization process in global politics, indicating that as states stabilize their democratic norms, international conflicts may decrease.

The authors acknowledge the Israeli Foundation Trustees, the World Society Foundation, and various contributors for their support and feedback.

Important references including the works of Axelrod, Rummel, and various datasets utilized in the study are mentioned across the paper to substantiate findings and hypotheses.