International Organizations and the United Nations

Introduction to International Organizations

• Authority and power dynamics:
  • Within countries: Primarily wielded by governments of sovereign states.
  • Between countries: Also primarily wielded by governments of sovereign states.
• Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs):
  • Composed of member states represented by their governments.
  • Nature, purposes, and rules are based on voluntary agreements between these governments.
  • Voluntary agreements are binding under international law; however, enforcement relies on the states themselves.
  • The types of IGOs that develop and their effectiveness depend on member states' objectives and capabilities.
• The United Nations (UN):
  • It is a collection of different, often independent IGOs.
  • Refer to the UN “organization chart” on pages 40-41 of Ziring, Riggs and Plano for an overview.
• Most IGOs vs. UN General Assembly:
  • Most IGOs do not have universal membership or a general purpose.
  • Examples are classified in a table (see original document).
• Classification of IGOs:
  • General Purpose
    • Universal Membership: United Nations General Assembly (GA)
    • Regional/Limited Membership: European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Arab League
  • Specialized/Single Purpose
    • Universal Membership: World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank
    • Regional/Limited Membership: United Nations Security Council (SC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Basic Characteristics of IGOs

• Shared characteristics of IGOs:
  1. Divergent Goals: Most goals are not universally shared because:
     • Goals are chosen by governments in power.
     • Governments differ in:
       • Democracy and political accountability.
       • Authoritarian regime types (one-party states, military dictatorships, theocracies).
       • Dominance by individual leaders vs. strong institutions.
       • Focus on broad national goals (economic development) vs. maintaining political power.
       • Moderate vs. extreme ideological goals.
     • These factors influence how governments treat their populations and other countries.
  2. Disagreement on Rules: Even when goals are accepted, disagreements arise about rules and conflicting interests in pursuing common goals.
  3. Vote-Trading: In IGOs with many members and diverse purposes, vote-trading is common.
     • Members exchange support on less important issues for support on more important ones.
     • This support may extend beyond the IGO's activities.
  4. Outcomes Depend on Voting Power: Outcomes (resolutions, rules) depend on the formal and informal voting power of members.
     • Outcomes are more significant if binding on policymakers.
     • Formal IGO decisions are called judgments.
     • Government decisions to implement judgments are called actions.
     • IGO judgments are legally binding on governments; however, IGOs lack the means to enforce actions.
     • Effectiveness depends on many member governments wanting to implement judgments.
     • Example: Lack of significant UN Security Council action against Sudan for atrocities in Darfur, South Sudanese civil war, and Sudanese civil war.
     • The SC did not blame Sudan’s government or impose sanctions, and instead sent a “peacekeeping” mission without peace to keep.
• Questions for consideration:
  1. To what extent do countries vote based on what is right versus their interests or those of their allies?
  2. How does dealing with international issues in various IGOs make a difference? Are conflicts more or less readily resolved in some IGOs compared to direct negotiations? What impact does each organizational/diplomatic track have on the overall outcome? Why do governments prefer certain tracks?
  3. How can IGOs like the UN General Assembly or Security Council be reformed to improve their performance?

The League of Nations

• The League of Nations was the predecessor organization to the UN between World War I and World War II.
• The League is often considered a failure, which led to a different structure for the UN to achieve similar goals more effectively.
• Origins of the League:
  • Revulsion against the death and destruction of World War I, leading to a new diplomatic approach.
  • Idealistic leadership from US President Woodrow Wilson (though the US did not join due to Senators' concerns about obligatory defense commitments).
• The League Covenant:
  • Constitution-like treaty outlining the League’s goals and methods.
• Purpose:
  • Preserving and restoring international peace and security through:
    • General adherence to international law.
    • Covenant procedures for peaceful dispute resolution and collective defense.
• Institutions:
  • The Assembly:
    • Composed of all member states (mostly European and Latin American countries).
    • A forum for discussing international issues and conflicts.
  • The Council:
    • Composed of Principal Allies (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and potentially the US) and initially four other member states (later increased to 11).
    • Designed to be the executive organ directing actions for security against foreign aggression.
• Rules:
  • Disputes among members to be submitted to:
    • Arbitration: Parties agree in advance to resolve the dispute via a third party.
    • Judicial settlement: Submission to an international judicial institution.
    • Inquiry by the Council: Acceptance of arbitration by the League’s Council.
  • Council decisions require unanimous vote (excluding involved states).
  • Members cannot wage war against another member complying with dispute resolution procedures.
  • Members must wait three months after dispute resolution before warring against a non-complying state.
  • Note: No guarantee of a clear legal outcome; war is legal three months after a non-decision.
• Method of Enforcement:
  • War in violation of the Covenant:
    1. Obligates all members to sever economic relations with the aggressor.
    2. Military remedies decided unanimously by the Council (excluding involved states).
  • Under a 1921 ruling, each state was not obligated to comply with sanctions unless it agreed that the target state was an aggressor.
• Summary:
  1. Dispute resolution was not assured; war was legally possible after three months if the Council did not vote unanimously.
  2. Economic sanctions were automatic for unanimously branded aggressors, but military sanctions depended on Council unanimity.
  3. The 1921 decision required each country to decide if another acted as an aggressor for both economic and military sanctions.
  4. Unanimous Council resolutions were implemented by member states based on their interests.
• Failures of the League:
  1. Japan’s invasion of Chinese Manchuria in 1931:
     • Japan used its veto power to slow down the League’s investigation.
     • By the time the Council condemned Japan, Manchuria had become a satellite state, and Japan withdrew from the League.
     • No further action was taken.
  2. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1934:
     • Italy stalled League action while mobilizing and then invaded.
     • Most members imposed a limited economic embargo, but many countries (including the US) continued trade.
     • No military action was recommended.
     • Sanctions were withdrawn after Italy’s victory.
  3. Nazi Germany’s rearmament and conquest:
     • Included Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
     • The League failed to organize earlier and stronger resistance, even when great powers' interests were involved.
• Questions to Consider:
  1. Why was an economic embargo imposed on Italy but not Japan?
  2. Why was the economic embargo against Italy eventually lifted?
  3. Why were no military actions taken against either Japan or Italy?
  4. Britain and France were concerned not to alienate Italy in an expected future struggle with Nazi Germany. Is there reason to expect that Britain and France would have taken military action against Italy even if Germany posed no threat at all?
  5. Would the outcomes have been different without the League? (Not militarily, but the economic embargo against Italy might have been less effective.)
  6. Suppose the League had been organized like the UN. Would it have done any better? Would either the League or the UN set-up have done better had the US been a member in the period between World War I and World War II?

Introduction to the United Nations

• Origins:
  • Desire to prevent another world war and foster peaceful conflict resolution, similar to the League of Nations.
• The UN Charter:
  • Constitution-like treaty outlining the UN’s goals and methods, analogous to the League’s Covenant.
• Basic Goals/Objectives of the UN (According to the Charter):
  1. Peace and security: Secure peace, remove threats, peacefully resolve disputes between states.
  2. Non-intervention in internal affairs: Protect the right of legitimate governments to control their internal affairs.
  3. Self-determination of peoples: Assist in the transition from colonial rule to self-rule.
  4. Human rights: Protect basic individual rights.
  5. Progress and cooperation: Encourage conditions contributing to progress, international law, and friendly relations.
• Not included: Democracy.
• Means:
  • Use force only when necessary in the common interest.
  • Do not intervene in domestic affairs unless necessary to preserve peace and security.
• Discussion:
  1. Are the five broad goals above compatible?
     • The Charter acknowledges that peace and security sometimes conflict with non-intervention, prioritizing peace and security in cases of international aggression.
  2. What about non-intervention vs. self-determination of peoples?
     • The UN diplomatic consensus claims no conflict since decolonization was completed.
     • However, the reasoning is political and fake.
     • What is the difference between an old-style European colonial empire and the former Soviet Union?
     • The Soviet Union was treated as legitimate, and its imperial efforts were ignored or justified.
     • What about multi-ethnic states like China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Nigeria, and Ethiopia?
     • How is rule by these states different from “colonialism” for internal ethnic minorities?
     • Why is there a UN diplomatic consensus that some forms of “colonialism” are wrong, and others are right?
     • If one takes the principle of self-determination to its logical conclusion, where does it end?
     • Is there any way to draw definitive borders that will establish self-determination for all “peoples”?
  3. What about non-intervention vs. human rights?
     • Does non-intervention always trump human rights?
     • If not, when is “humanitarian intervention” justified?
     • Only in response to threats to international peace and security?
     • Only in cases of extreme human rights abuses, such as genocide?
     • Is the current situation in Darfur one where intervention is justified?
     • (Using recent UN terminology, it is sometimes argued that humanitarian intervention is justified by states’ “responsibility to protect” their citizens.)
• Priorities:
  • In practice, some goals take priority over others; priorities are not consistent across time and space.
  • Member countries interpret the UN Charter on a case-by-case basis, based on government-defined interests.
  • The non-intervention principle almost always takes priority, whether in the Security Council or the General Assembly. Is this surprising?

The Security Council (SC)

• Purpose:
  • The Security Council (SC), according to the Charter, has “primary responsibility” for maintaining peace and security, which is the UN’s basic goal.
• Evidence of primacy:
  • The SC may pass legally binding resolutions (under Chapter VII of the Charter) on member countries, unlike the General Assembly (GA).
  • The GA is specifically instructed to defer to any proceedings of the SC in any matter involving peace and security.
  • Unlike the GA, the SC is in permanent session.
• Additional roles:
  • The SC also votes with the GA on the election of the Secretary-General and the judges of the International Court of Justice, and on the admission, restriction, and expulsion of member countries.
• Composition and Voting:
  • Five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the U.S.) have veto power on substantive resolutions (all resolutions commenting on international affairs).
  • No veto power on procedural votes regarding SC meeting conduct.
  • Temporary members are elected by a 2/3 vote of the General Assembly.
  • Until 1965:
    • Six temporary members.
    • Seven of 11 total votes (without permanent member vetoes) needed to pass substantive resolutions.
  • Since 1965:
    • Ten temporary members.
    • Nine of 15 total votes (without permanent member vetoes) needed to pass substantive resolutions.
  • Each year, the GA elects five temporary members for two-year terms.
  • Contrary to the Charter, abstention of a permanent member is, by convention, not taken to constitute a veto.
  • SC members that are direct parties to a dispute have the right to vote on most resolutions, including Chapter VII resolutions.
• Method for Protecting Peace and Security:
  1. Member countries must resolve disputes peacefully, and if that fails, submit them to the SC for investigation and resolution.
  2. In the event of war or the threat of war, the SC will make recommendations for conflict resolution and/or take active measures to encourage or impose a peaceful outcome.
  3. Active measures include severing economic, transportation, communications, and diplomatic relations, and/or use of armed force.
  4. Members shall provide the necessary armed forces and resources, subject to domestic political approval. The SC shall control the armed forces, subject to any provisions agreed to with Members providing armed forces.
• Discussion Questions:
  1. How can member states be obligated to help in providing military forces and resources to the SC, while at the same time doing so only if there is domestic political approval for doing so?
  2. How can the SC control the armed forces used, if such control is subject to any provisions that member countries impose? As we will discuss, the SC has never controlled a military action that it authorized, because no country has ever supplied large military forces to the SC or any other international entity with no strings attached. Why not? Is it possible to imagine the US government providing the SC with US military forces with no strings attached? Why or why not?

Comparison of the UN SC with the League Council

• Function: Both primarily aim to preserve peace and security.
• Voting requirements for military action:
  • League Council: Unanimity required.
  • UN SC: 7/11 or 9/15 majority needed (without vetoes).
• Voting on resolutions regarding aggression:
  • League Council members could not vote on resolutions determining whether they themselves committed aggression.
  • SC members can vote on legally binding Chapter VII resolutions even when directly involved (important for veto powers).
• Economic sanctions:
  • A Security Council majority makes economic sanctions legally binding on all members.
  • Under the League Covenant (1921 interpretation), each country decided for itself.

The General Assembly (GA)

• Purpose:
  • To investigate, discuss, and recommend concerning any issue touched upon in the Charter.
  • Empowered to consider any issue affecting the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.
  • The only clear limitation is that the GA may not interfere in a matter under consideration by the SC. This limitation is frequently ignored in practice.
• Composition and Voting:
  • Almost all countries are members (founding or accepted by the SC and 2/3 GA votes).
  • Exceptions: States with "real-world" characteristics not recognized by significant numbers of governments.
    • Examples: Taiwan, the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
  • Situations:
    • The UN “deferred” a decision on whether to switch representation from the old, elected government, to the new military junta in Burma.
    • In Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the UN has recognized the one of two warring governments that controls far less territory
    • Regions that have effectively seceded from other states, but which are not widely recognized and are not in the UN. Examples are Turkish Northern Cyprus; secessionist regions of the former Soviet Republics of Georgia and Moldova; parts of the failed state of Somalia; and parts of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
  • Voting:
    • 2/3 majority needed on the budget and important procedural matters (electing officials, admitting/expelling members).
    • Absolute majority needed on other matters, including substantive resolutions on international affairs (referred to as “exhortative” because they are expressions of international opinion, but are not binding under international law).
• Methods:
  1. Use of resolutions to influence international public and elite opinion and governments.
  2. GA investigations and reports, reflecting the voting balance on related resolutions.
  3. “Quasi-legislative” outgrowths: influencing customary international law or proposing treaties that become binding for ratifying countries.
  4. Control of the UN budget. Budget distribution aligns with political coalitions determining resolution outcomes.
• Budgetary Fundamentals:
  • Larger developed countries (US, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy) contribute the overwhelming majority of the budget based on population and average income.
  • Spending is controlled by coalitions controlled by developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
  • This explains why the regular UN budget is not larger, and why larger contributors have sometimes refused to contribute their allotted shares. However, the UN has gotten around this limitation by soliciting funding on a case-by-case basis to fund important activities outside the regular UN budget (around $3.6$ billion per year, in recent years).
  • Primarily the large rich countries donated money outside the regular UN budget to support specific activities they support.
  • The most important activities funded are peacekeeping missions and UN development and humanitarian assistance organizations (UNDP, World Food Program, United Nations Environmental Program, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), etc.).
• Foreign Aid and the UN:
  • UN-channeled foreign aid is a small percentage of total aid to needy people in poor countries; mainly from government to government is much larger.
  • Aid is disbursed by private charities and is generally considered a better approach.
  • Governments controlling foreign aid money generally siphon off a lot for their own purposes or direct it disproportionately to their political supporters.
  • Money is fungible: Foreign aid reduces pressure to spend their own money on similar projects, freeing it to be used for other, often less-desirable purposes.
• The Resource Curse:
  • The phenomenon in which countries with more valuable mineral resources perform more poorly in economic terms due to easy seizure and control by governments.
  • The money can then be used to build up security forces and pay off political cronies and supporters, thus entrenching more repressive and corrupt governments in power.
  • Well-known examples are Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
  • Governments that have to extract more revenue by taxing their citizens face more pressure to be accountable to the broad needs and demands of their citizens.
• Foreign aid funneled through governments can play a “resource curse” role similar to money governments obtain from mineral resources.
• Therefore, donors commonly make efforts to oversee how governments use the money. But, regardless of how effective the oversight is, money disbursed through governments will tend to be used for those governments’ own purposes.
• Most private charities prefer to work directly with non-government partners in destination countries.