Untitled Notes

The following notes are based on two significant works regarding the decision to use the atomic bomb:
- "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Henry L. Stimson, published in Harpers’ Magazine, February 1947 (pp. 97-107).
- "Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years" by McGeorge Bundy, 1988.
Unless otherwise specified, references are made to Stimson’s article and findings.

There were critics of the decision to use atomic bombs, who proposed alternate strategies that they believed could have mitigated loss of life.
Analysis of such alternatives highlights their potential ineffectiveness compared to using atomic bombs.

By mid-1945, the Japanese military numbered approximately 5 million men.
A conventional invasion (without nuclear weapons) was projected to result in:
- 1 million U.S. lives lost.
- A significantly higher number of Japanese casualties.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), prior to the bombs being dropped, communicated to close associates that the atomic bomb would:
- “save many American lives”
- “make an invasion of Japan unnecessary” (Bundy 90).

An incendiary bombing raid in Tokyo on March 9, 1945, resulted in a death toll exceeding that of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
This particular raid decimated roughly one-fourth of Tokyo's area and structures in a single night.
Cumulatively, incendiary raids throughout March 1945 caused fatalities comparable to both atomic bombs combined.
The response from Japan remained defiant; even after the bombings, there were attempts to carry on fighting, including an attempted coup against Hirohito's order to surrender.
Major General Curtis LeMay noted that incendiary bombings contributed to shortening the war and preserving American lives.

Dropping the bomb over an uninhabited area with a Japanese observer was considered but deemed ineffective by high-level committees and scientific advisors.
Concerns included:
- Potential failure of the bomb (being a dud).
- Risk of the Japanese shooting down the delivery aircraft or capturing American prisoners in the area.
- If the demonstration did not lead to surrender, it would lose the element of surprise needed for maximum psychological impact.
Leo Szilard, a scientist involved in the Manhattan Project, emphasized:
- “You can't demonstrate a bomb over an uninhabited island. You have to demolish a city.”
- Though not advocating for urban destruction, he recognized the gravity of the decision to use it against a populated target.

Japan showed mixed signals regarding surrender prior to the atomic bomb usage:
- By July 1945, Japan made tentative peace proposals to the Soviet Union, which included retaining occupied territories.
- These proposals were vague and not seriously considered by the Soviet government.
The Potsdam Declaration issued in July 1945 demanded unconditional surrender, which Japan promptly rejected:
- Prime Minister Suzuki's response, mokusatsu (meaning “to kill with silence”), expressed ongoing resistance.
- Japan’s Foreign Minister stated the commitment to fight was for the “survival and honor of the homeland.”

Questions arose regarding whether the atomic bomb was dropped to demonstrate power to the Soviet Union:
- Documents from Stimson and others involved in the decision-making indicate that this was not a primary factor in the decision.
McGeorge Bundy’s assessment (director of NSA 1961-66) concluded:
- “There is literally no evidence whatever that the timetable for the attack was ever affected by anything except technical and military considerations.”
- The evidence indicated that the decisions and timings were not influenced by a desire to intimidate the Soviet Union or demonstrate power.

The primary objective of the American leadership was to end the war quickly and minimize further loss of life, thwarting criticisms of their decision-making process concerning the bomb's use.