Fair Housing & Civil Rights – Comprehensive Case & Doctrine Notes

Shelley v. Kraemer (Missouri, 1948) / McGhee v. Sipes (Michigan, consolidated)

• Citation: 334\,U.S.\,1\,(1948); decided May\,3,\,1948
• Core Issue – Whether state-court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constitutes “state action” violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14^{th} Amendment.
• Foundational Principles
– Private discrimination ≠ constitutional violation unless the state becomes involved.
– Judicial enforcement = state action; courts cannot hide behind “private contract” label.
– 14^{th} guarantees include the right to own, occupy, enjoy, and dispose of property free from race-based state interference.
• Facts (Shelley)
– 1911 covenant signed by 30/39 owners: bar non-Caucasian occupancy for 50 yrs.
– At least 5 parcels already Black-owned since 1882.
– 1945: Shelleys (Black) buy home unaware of covenant; Kraemers sue.
– Trial ct → covenant never valid ⇒ no enforcement.
– MO Supreme Ct reversed ⇒ ordered enforcement.
• Facts (McGhee)
– 1934 covenant; valid if \ge 80\% of block binds itself.
– 1944 sale to McGhees (Black).
– Neighbors sue; trial & MI Supreme Ct order eviction within 90 days.
• Petitioners’ Argument
– Enforcement = discriminatory state action ⇒ violates Equal Protection + Civil Rights statutes.
• Holdings
– Judicial enforcement of racial covenants = unconstitutional.
– Covenants themselves (as private promises) not struck down, but unenforceable.
– Courts cannot justify discrimination by saying they’d also enforce covenants against Whites in other scenarios.
• Outcome
– U.S. Supreme Ct REVERSED both lower-court judgments ⇒ Black families retain homes.
• Significance
– Landmark expansion of “state action” doctrine.
– Foundation for later FHA jurisprudence on judicial involvement.

Hamilton v. Svatik (7th Cir. 1985)

• Citation: 779\,F.2d\,383.
• Facts
– Hamilton (Black, \$20{,}000 income) refused apartment after positive phone call.
– Manager Svatik shows same unit to White tester; offers lease.
– Statements: “That’s my prerogative,” “don’t rent to them,” “only elderly/single men,” etc.
• Claims
– FHA § 3604 (no intent element).
– Civil Rights Act 1866 § 1982 (intent needed).
• Rulings
– Prima facie discrimination met.
– Excuses pretextual; intent clear.
– Damages:
• Compensatory \$12{,}500 (emotional) upheld.
• Punitive \$5{,}000 vs. Stephen upheld; \$2{,}500 vs. Eleanor reversed (no knowledge).
• Key Take-Away – Tester evidence + discriminatory statements powerful proof; punitive damages require knowledge/reckless indifference.

Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty (2d Cir.)

• Qualified Black buyer rejected by co-op after sudden rule changes (approval threshold 51\% \rightarrow 66.6\%).
• FHA prima facie elements satisfied: protected, applied, qualified, rejected, unit available.
• Even one race-motivated “no” vote violates FHA; burden on corporation to produce legitimate reason → failed.
• Appeals court reversed & remanded; warns that subjective excuses ("abrasive," "won’t fit in") often pretext.

Harris v. Itzhaki (9th Cir. 1999)

• Citation: 183\,F.3d\,1043.
• Allegations: eviction notices + statement “owners don’t want to rent to Blacks”; tester discrepancies.
• Standing – Broad under FHA; plaintiff is “aggrieved” even after moving.
• Summary-Judgment Reversal – Direct & circumstantial evidence (disparate info, fees, safety warnings) warrant jury trial.
• Agents – Unpaid “helpers” may be agents ⇒ discriminatory statements attributable to owner.

Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action v. Twp. of Mount Holly (3d Cir. 2011)

• Large-scale redevelopment replacing low-income, majority-minority homes with $ units (\approx200{,}000–275{,}000).
• Disparate-Impact Claim under FHA accepted.
• Stats: Black households 8\times, Hispanic 11\times more likely affected; only 21\% of minorities vs 79\% of Whites could afford new housing.
• Burden-shifting: once plaintiffs show gross disparity, township must prove no less-discriminatory alternative ⇒ factual issues → summary judgment improper.
• Intent claim dismissed; disparate impact survives.

City of Los Angeles v. Citigroup (C.D. Cal. 2014)

• Reverse-redlining theory – Citi targeted Blacks/Latinos with subprime loans ⇒ foreclosures ⇒ tax loss + municipal costs.
• Standing – Municipalities can sue: reduced tax + extra services = concrete injury.
• Continuing-violation doctrine tolls 2-yr statute.
• Both disparate-treatment & disparate-impact pled.
• Unjust-enrichment claim allowed (cost shifting to city).
• Motions to dismiss & strike DENIED → case proceeds.

U.S. v. Whitney (10th Cir. 2000)

• Cross-burning conspiracy; convictions under 18\,U.S.C.\,§241 & 42\,U.S.C.\,§3631(a) upheld.
• Conspiracy needs no overt act; agreement inferred from presence, statements, racial epithets.
• Co-defendants’ guilty pleas admissible for credibility; lack of cautionary instruction not plain error given strong evidence.
• Sentencing: minor-in-possession conviction counted; not plain error.

U.S. v. Hylton (D. Conn. 2013)

• Landlords refused sublease to Black tenant; direct racist statements (“too many black people,” “get good white people”).
• FHA § 3604(a,b,c) violations found; vicarious liability for spouse & management company (agency principles).
• Damages: Bilbos \$31,750, Wilson \$44,341.05; punitive \$15k & \$20k vs. Mr. Hylton.
• Injunctive relief (training/monitoring) to be crafted; attorneys’ fees forthcoming.

Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp (N.D. Ill. 2003)

• Neighbor detonated flash device, yelled slurs; “tried to blow her up.”
• Claims under § 1982, FHA §§ 3604 & 3617, plus state torts.
• Court: § 1982 protects right to use/hold property; FHA covers post-acquisition intimidation; standing satisfied; motion to dismiss denied.

Wells v. Rhodes (S.D. Ohio 2013)

• Drunk defendants burned cross with “KKK” & “N-word” on African-American renters’ lawn.
• Summary judgment for plaintiffs on § 1982, § 1985(3) conspiracy & FHA § 3617.
• Emotional distress testimony sufficient; damages phase remaining.

Statutory Cheat-Sheet

• Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, 1968)
– Purpose: eliminate housing discrimination & promote integration.
– Protected classes: race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, disability.
– § 3604: bars refusal, different terms, discriminatory statements, misrepresentation of availability.
– § 3617: unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with housing rights.
– Disparate-Treatment vs. Disparate-Impact theories.
• Civil Rights Act 1866 – § 1982
– Guarantees same property rights “as enjoyed by white citizens.”
– Requires intent; covers use/enjoyment (not limited to transactions).
• § 1985(3) – Conspiracy to deprive equal protection / privileges.
• 18 U.S.C. § 241 – Criminal conspiracy against rights (no overt act element).

Key Procedural Devices

• Motion to Dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6)): tests legal sufficiency, assumes allegations true.
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56): evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact; two-step burden-shifting often used in discrimination cases.
• Standing (Art. III): injury-in-fact, causation, redressability; cities & tenants both can qualify.

Comparing FHA vs. § 1982

• FHA – permits disparate-impact; broader standing; covers lenders, zoning, insurance; intent not always needed.
• § 1982 – intent essential; but protects post-acquisition use and enjoyment; individual defendants personally liable.

Disparate-Impact Framework (FHA)

  1. Plaintiff shows prima facie: neutral policy ⇒ significant, adverse, statistical disparity (> \text{‘gross’}).

  2. Burden shifts: defendant must prove legitimate, nondiscriminatory objective & that no less-discriminatory alternative available.

  3. Plaintiff can rebut by showing feasible alternative exists.

Common Evidence Themes

• Tester studies (Hamilton, Harris).
• Sudden rule or policy changes upon minority application (Robinson, Mt. Holly, Citigroup).
• Explicit racist statements – “smoking gun” (Hylton, Whisby-Myers).
• Statistical regression (Citigroup, Mt. Holly).
• Cross-burnings / violent intimidation (Shelley enforcement sought, Whitney, Wells).

Exam Tips (Based on Instructor Guidance)

• IRAC every distinct statutory issue; start with prima facie case.
• Cite precedent analogously:
– Judicial enforcement? → Shelley.
– Tester discrepancies? → Hamilton, Harris.
– Policy disparity? → Mt. Holly, Citigroup.
– Post-acquisition harassment? → Whisby-Myers, Wells.
• Know procedural posture: motion to dismiss vs summary judgment; standing requirements.
• Distinguish civil vs criminal: intent burden differs (§ 1982 civil vs § 241 criminal).
• Write clearly, avoid “data dump,” but include statutes, elements, remedies.
• Time: 90 min; anticipate 1 essay + 4 short answers.