Can God Allow Suffering?

This chapter explores various views and arguments regarding the existence of God in light of human suffering. The arguments presented are independent and may not align with views from other chapters.

Scenario: A hypothetical visit to the country of Nornia reveals a contradiction between external wonders and internal suffering. This serves as an analogy for the world, prompting reflection on the nature of God.
Thesis: The existence of suffering in the world suggests the nonexistence of a maximally powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect God.
Key Arguments Addressed:
- Suffering enables appreciation of good things (Section 4).
- Suffering is necessary for valuable character traits (Section 5).
- Suffering is permitted for free will (Section 6).
- God’s reasons for allowing suffering may be hidden from us (Section 7).

Basic Argument:
- Premise AS1: There is suffering in the world.
- Premise AS2: If there is suffering in the world, then God does not exist.
- Premise AS3: Therefore, God does not exist.
- Definition of Suffering: Includes any pain or discomfort experienced by living beings, both physical and emotional.
Explanation of AS2:
- A perfect God (termed an "omnibeing") should be:
- Omnipotent: Maximally powerful, able to prevent suffering.
- Omniscient: All-knowing, aware of all suffering.
- Omnibenevolent: Morally perfect, wishing to prevent suffering.
- Consequential Logic: An omnibeing would prevent any suffering detected since it possesses the power and willingness to do so. Therefore, suffering indicates the absence of such a deity.

Acknowledgement of Implicit Beliefs: Some believers may accept a God that lacks omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence.
Argument from Pointless Suffering (PS):
- Premise PS1: There exists pointless suffering in the world.
- Premise PS2: If pointless suffering exists, then there is no omnibeing.
- Conclusion: Therefore, there is no omnibeing.
Main Observation:
- While suffering may sometimes lead to good, many instances of suffering seem entirely without purpose. Even if some struggles yield character or appreciation, cases exist where suffering serves no identifiable purpose (e.g., extreme poverty, genocides).

Defense Explanation:
- The claim suggests suffering is necessary for appreciating good things. Human beings learn to appreciate pleasure through the existence of contrast (suffering).
Counter Arguments:
- If God wanted us to appreciate pleasure, he could design a system where pleasure continually increases without accompanying suffering.
- Excessive Suffering: Not all suffering contributes to appreciation (e.g., severe chronic pain lacks appreciation utility).

Defense Explanation:
- Certain character traits (e.g., courage, empathy) develop through adversity and suffering; thus, God permits suffering to cultivate such traits.
Counter Arguments:
- Examples exist where suffering does not strengthen character (e.g., PTSD from war, victims of torture). Significant suffering may lead to breakdown rather than growth.

Defense Explanation:
- Free will necessitates the possibility of doing wrong; thus, allowing suffering is integral to freedom of choice.
Counter Arguments:
- This defense cannot account for non-human-caused suffering (natural disasters, diseases).
- God could intervene to prevent extreme suffering while still allowing for free will.
- The concept of divine foreknowledge conflicts with human free will (e.g., if God knows all actions beforehand, true freedom may not exist).

Defense Explanation:
- Proponents claim that God’s reasons for allowing suffering are beyond human understanding and may lead to a greater good not presently visible.
Counter Arguments:
- This view is unconvincing; similar reasoning applies to human rulers (e.g., the ruler of Nornia analogy refutes belief in omnibenevolent rulers).
- The argument for disbelief asserts that skepticism towards the reasoning of God is consistent based on observable suffering in the world.
Argument for Disbelief:
- Premise DB1: One should not believe that suffering is necessary for unknown greater goods (in Nornia).
- Premise DB2: If this is true in Nornia, it holds for the actual world and an omnibeing.
- Conclusion DB3: Thus, belief in hidden reasons for suffering is unfounded.

The chapter concludes that the nature of suffering observed in the world does not align with the existence of an all-encompassing, perfect God. Attempts to reconcile suffering with divine reason are inadequate, and skepticism is warranted regarding the attribution of suffering to a higher purpose.

Can the Appreciated Goods Defense, Character Building Defense, and/or Free Will Defense be effectively combined to counter objections raised against each?
Does the belief in a divine reward in heaven provide a sufficient response to the Argument from Pointless Suffering?
Can the argument be defended that suffering is justified based on deserved punishment, considering the implications for innocent suffering?
How might one defend the Hidden Reasons Defense against comparisons between the universe and specific cases like Nornia?

Significant historical roots of the Argument from Suffering trace back to Epicurus and include discussions by philosophers such as David Hume, J. L. Mackie, John Hick, Alvin Plantinga, and Nelson Pike. Additional resources provided for further study include notable philosophical investigations into the problem of evil.

Combining these defenses could suggest that suffering plays a multifaceted role in human experience.
For instance, suffering could create opportunities for character building (Character Building Defense) while also making the good more appreciated (Appreciated Goods Defense).
However, this becomes complex when examining suffering that appears purposeless or excessive.

Does the belief in a divine reward in heaven provide a sufficient response to the Argument from Pointless Suffering?
- This belief could be seen as a counterargument, suggesting that what seems pointless in this life may have a greater significance in the afterlife.
- However, critics may argue that this does not address the immediate injustices and suffering faced in the present world.
Can the argument be defended that suffering is justified based on deserved punishment, considering the implications for innocent suffering?
- One could argue that suffering is a consequence of moral actions that merit punishment.
- Yet, this raises ethical concerns about innocent individuals experiencing suffering without direct accountability for their actions.
How might one defend the Hidden Reasons Defense against comparisons between the universe and specific cases like Nornia?
- Defenders might argue that the divine perspective encompasses a broader understanding of good and evil than human reasoning can grasp.
- The analogy of Nornia could be positioned as inadequate in fully depicting the complexity of divine reasons for permitting suffering on a universal scale.