All Midterm #2 Notes

Strategic Situations & Institutional Solutions

Categorizing and Theorizing Strategic Situations

Intensity of Conflicts of Interest
- To what extent does your benefit equate to my harm?
Motives of Players
- To what extent can I trust you to not exploit me?

The Motives of Players: Classic Games

The Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Refers to prisoners cooperating with each other or ratting each other out
- Cooperate = don’t say anything
- Defect = rat partner out
- Preference ranking:
  - temptation>reward>punish>sucker
- We end up at “punish, punish” because the best payoff is temptation, so both players will try it
  - No incentive for either actor to change
  - Essentially, you should still cheat no matter what the other actor does

The Stag Hunt
- Two hunters in a forest can cooperate in order to take down a stag or they can take the opportunity to single handedly grab a hare
- Preference ranking:
  - reward>punish=temptation>sucker
- This game has multiple equilibrium
  - Your course of play can’t be optimized unilaterally
  - If the other player defects, you should defect
  - If the other player cooperates, you should cooperate

The Motives of Players: The Solution to “Bad” Incentives

How do you solve these games?
- Communication
  - Sharing information about intentions
    - Credible signals
- Iteration
  - Playing the game repeatedly with the same player over time
  - Prisoner’s Dilemma
    - Shadow of the Future
      - T>R>P>S
      - Σ E(p₁) + E(p₂) + … E(p_n) i.e Σ (T+P/2) + ?? + ??? + ????
    - Multiple Equilibria
    - Strategies
      - Reciprocity
- Coordinating expectations
  - Limiting uncertainty by creating a shared expectation about what everyone will do
  - Culture
  - Custom (trench warfare example)
  - Legal standards
- Incentivization
  - Using an external reward or punishment to move away from a worse decision/incentivize cooperation
  - External guarantee
  - Side-payments
- Preference re-ordering
  - Changing perception of what the payoffs are
  - Socialization
  - Norm-entrepreneurs

Foreign Policy: Navigating Strategic Situations Under Anarchy

Foreign policy is necessary for states because they find themselves in strategic situations under anarchy.

“No state is an island”

States have interests to pursue:
- Security
- Prosperity
- Quality of life
Strategic situation: “An actor cannot simply choose a course of action that produces its preferred outcome, because the choices of others also affect the final result”
- When do these occur?
  - Finite resources
  - Conflicts of interest
  - Shared interests
  - Physical proximity
Externalities: indirect effects of one actor’s behaviors on others
- Positive: what I do helps you
- Negative: what I do hurts you
Politics: collective decisions about who gets what, when, and how
Foreign policy: strategies, positions, and tools of influence, aimed by a state government at external actors, that attempt to manage the strategic situation to produce a favorable outcome
Grand strategy: overarching plan or statement of goals
- Belt and Road Initiative
- Containment
Statecraft: effort to alter the “...policies, actions, beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions, and/or propensities to act…” of other actors
- Threatening to attack
- Promising assistance

Conceptualizing Power

“My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl)
“Political power is a psychological reaction between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exert of the latter’s minds” (Morgenthau)
“...a state’s latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states. In international politics, however, a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states” (Mearsheimer)
Power is as power does.
Hard power
- Accomplishing change or control via coercion
  - Affected by:
    - Natural resources
    - Population
    - Economic size
    - Military size
    - Military technology
Soft power
- Accomplishing change or control via attraction or persuasion
  - Affected by:
    - Norm-production
    - Prestige
    - Legitimacy
    - Good will

Operationalizing Power

Composite Indicator of National Military Capabilities (CINC)
- Multiple dimensions
- Things related to it
- Sovereign states

State	Military spending	Military personnel	Iron and steel prod.	Energy consum.	Total pop.	Urban pop.	CINC Score
	Billions of current year USD	Millions	Millions of tons	Billions of coal-tons	Millions	Millions	Share of world’s resources

Tools of IR: Empirical Analysis

Empirical analysis: collecting, organizing, and examining data

Patterns
Purposes
- Description
- Characterization
- Evaluation of models and theories
Steps
- Operationalization
- Data collection
- Analysis

Data: pieces of information

Hypotheses: observable implication of a theory/model; posit a relationship between concepts

E.g. economic downturns increase the probability of foreign military crisis.

Implications: statement about the world which should be true if the model or theory is true

E.g. evidence of ancient marine life should be present in the sediment

Operationalization

Choices about
- What to measure
  - Direct measures
  - Proxies and indicators
  - Dimensions
- How to measure it
  - Level
  - Aggregation
  - Sources
- Levels of measurement
  - Binary
  - Qualitative
  - Ordinal
  - Continuous

Data Collection

Where do you get your data
- aggregators/repositories
- Monitoring agencies
- Watchdog groups
- Academics
- Private firms

Data Analysis

Summaries and central tendencies
- What does this data look like
  - Range
  - Average
  - distribution

Conceptualizing War

“We must define war in terms of violence. Not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war.”

“Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit whose agent the killer is.”

“War is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means.”

War

Lethal, largescale, sustained violence
Official, explicit policy of political unit(s)
Bargaining failure
- The outcome of a war is always worse the some solutions that were technically possible prior

Three E(U_War) Examples

Even odds
Uneven odds
Differing fixed costs
- Resolve
  - How willing an actor is to pay the costs of war in order to achieve what they want
    - Division of territory
    - Regime change
    - Defense of ethnic compatriots
    - Preventing human rights abuses

Even Odds

Outcomes
- A wins the war
  - A gets +1 and pays -.25
  - B gets +0 and pays -.25
- A loses the war
  - A gets +0 and pays -.25
  - B gets +1 and pays -.25
Probabilities
- Pr(win) = .5
- Pr(lose) = .5
E(U_A)

= Pr(Win) x A’s win payoff

+ Pr(Lose) x A’s lose payoff

+ Costs

E(U_A) = .5 x 1 + .5 x 0 + (-.25) = .25

E(U_B)

= Pr(Win) x B’s win payoff

+ Pr(Lose) x B’s lose payoff

+ Costs

E(U_B) = .5 x 1 + .5 x 0 + (-.25) = .25

Transfer equations into “policy space”
- A visual model used to illustrate conflicts of interest, ideal points for policy makers, explain compromises that emerge out of legislative politics
- See below

Uneven Odds

Outcomes
- A wins the war
  - A gets +1 and pays -.25
  - B gets +0 and pays -.25
- A loses the war
  - A gets +0 and pays -.25
  - B gets +1 and pays -.25
Probabilities
- Pr(win) = .75
- Pr(lose) = .25
E(U_A)

= Pr(Win) x A’s win payoff

+ Pr(Lose) x A’s lose payoff

+ Costs

E(U_A) = .75 x 1 + .25 x 0 + (-.25) = .5

E(U_B)

= Pr(Win) x B’s win payoff

+ Pr(Lose) x B’s lose payoff

+ Costs

E(U_B) = .25 x 1 + .75 x 0 + (-.25) = 0

E(U_A) = .6(1) - .4(0) -.25 = .35

E(U_B) = .4(1) - .6(0) -.25 = .15

Differing Resolve/Resolved B

Outcomes
- A wins the war
  - A gets +1 and pays .3
  - B gets +0 and pays .15
- A loses the war
  - A gets +0 and pays .3
  - B gets +1 and pays .15
Probabilities
- Pr(win) = .6
- Pr(lose) =.4
E(U_A) = .6 x 1 + .4 x 0 + (-.3) = .3
E(U_B) = .4 x 1 + .6 x 0 + (-.15) = .25

Three Reasons that War Occurs

Private information
Commitment problems
Issue indivisibility

Criteria for Identifying Wars

Sustained, open, active combat
Producing at least 1,000 battlefield deaths/year
Between organized military units
Involving at least 1 state

Categorizing War: By Type of Actors

Inter-State

Extra-State

Intra-State

State vs. State

State vs. Ext. Nonstate

State vs. Int. Nonstate

Subtypes:

Border conflicts
Pre-emptive
Preventative
Multilateral

Subtypes:

Colonial
Imperial

Subtypes:

Secession vs. control
Internationalized
Regional

A Separate Class of Wars

War which refines the concentration of power in the international system, and thus the state which takes on the global leadership role.
- Systemic war
- Major war
- Global war
- World war
- Hegemonic war
- General war
How do we explain a war that involves and affects the entire international system?
- Hegemonic stability
  - Long cycle theory
  - Power transition theory
  - Liberal hegemony
  - Shifts overtime in regards to which state has the most power

Hegemonic Stability Models

Shared assumptions
- Stability from leadership of hegemon
- Differential growth rates
  - Bigger states grow slower
  - Smaller states grow quicker
- Systemic war as “functional”
  - They happen because they provide order by clarifying the hierarchy of power and allowing the concentration of power in one state
Implications
- Diffusion of power increases the probability of systemic war
- Declining hegemons may engage in preventative

Describing & Characterizing War

How is war related to other variables?
- Regime scores
  - Positive score is good, negative is bad
    - -10 to 10
    - 6 is considered democratic
    - The dots on the scatter plot are wars

Explaining Peace Between Democracies

Models to explain the peace
- Normative and structural cases
  - Focuses on the DYADIC peace
    - A pair
  - Two interconnected logic
    - Leaders “export” their norms
      - Embedded in cultures and institutions that tell them how to bargain, handle problems, treat opponents
      - Democratic leaders are part of a process where conflict is solved through negotiation and small contests (like voting)
    - Checks and balances and transparency
- Selectorate theory
  - Focus on the DYADIC peace
  - Survival-motivated leaders
  - Accountable to W
    - Winning coalition = W
    - Selectorate = S
  - W/S determines types of goods provided
  - War winning is a public good
- Triangulating peace
  - The Kantian Tripod
    - Interdependence in this model can increase wealth of the middle class
    - In order for this to happen
      - Representative government
      - Economic independence
      - IGOs and international laws

Formal and Informal Institutions for Change

What are Institutions?

The rules, norms, and organizations that structure how countries and other international actors interact

Can be divided into formal and informal institutions

Formal Institutions

Formal institutions: established by treaties, agreements, or legal frameworks; officially recognized and have clearly defined rules and procedures

Examples and Characteristics of Formal Institutions:

International Organizations: bodies formed by treaties between countries; they have a formal structure and specific functions
- The United Nations (UN)
  - Promotes peace and security, human rights, and development
- The World Trade Organization (WTO)
  - Oversees international trade rules and disputes
Treaties and Agreements: legal documents agreed upon by countries to govern specific issues
- The Paris Agreement on climate change
  - Sets out targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
International Laws: laws created through treaties or conventions that countries agree to follow
- The Geneva Conventions
  - Set the standards for humanitarian treatment in war

Formal Institutions: Impact on World Politics

Predictability and Stability
- Formal institutions create predictable rules that countries follow, making international interactions more stable
Dispute Resolution
- They provide mechanisms to resolve conflicts, such as international courts or arbitration panels
Coordination
- They help coordinate actions on global issues, like trade, security, or the environment

Informal Institutions

Informal institutions: unwritten rules, norms, and practices that influence international relations; they are not legally binding but are widely accepted and followed by countries

Examples and Characteristics of Informal Institutions

Norms and Practices: shared expectations about appropriate behavior.
- The norm against using nuclear weapons, known as nuclear taboo
- Diplomatic practices
  - Holding regular summits and bilateral meetings
Informal Groups and Networks: less structured groups that influence decision-making
- The G7 (Group of Seven)
  - An informal group of major advanced economies that discusses economic policies
Cultural and Social Norms: shared values and beliefs that shape international behavior
- The norm of state sovereignty
  - Holds that states should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

Informal Institutions: Impact on World Politics

Flexibility
- Informal institutions can adapt more quickly to changing circumstances since they are not bound by rigid rules
Social Pressure
- Countries may follow informal rules due to peer pressure or the desire to maintain a good international reputation
Innovation
- They allow for creative and new approaches to global problems, often serving as testing grounds for future formal agreements

Interaction Between Formal and Informal Institutions

Complementary Roles: Formal and informal institutions often work together. Formal institutions provide the legal framework, while informal institutions fill gaps and adapt to changes
- The formal institution of the United Nations works alongside informal practices of regional diplomacy and conflict resolution
Dynamic Change: Informal institutions can lead to the creation of formal institutions when norms and practices become widely accepted and formalized
- The norm of human rights, initially an informal concept, led to the creation of formal institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Formal institutions provide the structure and rules, while informal institutions offer flexibility and adaptability. Together, they shape international relations and facilitate cooperation among countries.