Kevin P. Phillips: The Emerging Republican Majority

Biographical and Professional Context of Kevin P. Phillips

• Background: Kevin P. Phillips was born in New York City in $1940$. He attended Colgate University as a National Merit Scholar, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and graduated Magna Cum Laude with High Honors in Political Science.

• Education: In addition to his undergraduate work, he earned a First Class Certificate in Economics from the University of Edinburgh and received an LL.B. from Harvard Law School ($1964$), where he was awarded the Bureau of National Affairs Prize.

• Political Career:

  • Administrative Assistant to U.S. Representative Paul A. Fino (R.-N.Y.) from $1964$ to $1968$.

  • Special Assistant to John N. Mitchell (Nixon Campaign Manager) during the $1968$ Presidential campaign.

  • Principal voting patterns and trends analyst for the Nixon organization.

  • Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States (as of $1970$).

Thesis of the Emerging Republican Majority

• Defining the Shift: The election of Richard M. Nixon in November $1968$ signified more than a narrow victory; it marked the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new political era.

• Nature of the "Conservative" Revolt: Phillips argues that contemporary anti-establishment politics must be "conservative" because the established interests are now "liberal."

  • The revolt is centered in the South, the West, Middle America, and the "alienated lower middle class."

  • The goal is to overthrow the "obsolescent 'liberal' ideology" of the current Establishment.

• Critique of 1960s Policies: Phillips asserts that the "environmental manipulation, social boondoggling, community agitation and incendiary promises" of the $1960\text{s}$ failed to serve the nation effectively compared to the vitality of Middle America.

Comparative Analysis of Political Upheavals: 1932 vs. 1968

• The Tide of Protest: The aggregate anti-Democratic vote in $1968$ (Nixon plus Wallace) totaled $57.00\,\%$ of the electorate, representing an epochal rejection of Democratic liberalism.

• The 1928-1932 Parallel: The Democratic collapse in $1968$ followed the party's greatest landslide ($1964$, $61.00\,\%$ of the vote), just as the Republican collapse of $1932$ followed the GOP landslide of $1928$.

• Data from Chart 1 (Share of Total Vote):

  • 1928: Republican ($58\,\%$), Anti-Republican Left ($40\,\%$).

  • 1932: Republican ($42\,\%$), Anti-Republican Left ($60\,\%$).

  • 1964: Democratic ($61\,\%$), Anti-Democrat Right ($39\,\%$).

  • 1968: Democratic ($43\,\%$), Anti-Democrat Right ($57\,\%$).

Regional Metamorphosis of the Republican Party (1932–1968)

• GOP Base Shift: The Republican Party transitioned from an orientation toward the establishmentarian Northeast (Yankee/Industrial New England, Pennsylvania, Michigan) to the "rising insurgency" of the South, the West, and middle-class suburbia.

• Democratic Base Shift: Conversely, the Democratic power base moved into the Northeast, the traditional seat of the nation's economic, social, and cultural elite.

• Data from Chart 2 (Republican Share of Two-Party Vote):

  • 1932: Northeast ($48\,\%$), Heartland/West ($43\,\%$), South ($19\,\%$).

  • 1952: Northeast ($56\,\%$), Heartland/West ($58\,\%$), South ($48\,\%$).

  • 1964: Northeast ($32\,\%$), Heartland/West ($39\,\%$), South ($49\,\%$).

  • 1968: Northeast ($46\,\%$), Heartland/West ($53\,\%$), South ($53\,\%$).

• The "Geopolitical Fluke" Rejection: Phillips argues the $1964$ Goldwater candidacy was not a fluke but a precursor to the Southern and Western shift confirmed in $1968$.

Detailed Demographic Trends (1960–1968)

• Gender: Men spearheaded the anti-Democratic trend, while women remained more supportive of the status quo (Democrats).

• Race: The Democrats lost heavy support among white voters but increased support among non-whites. The new majority is described as "white and conservative."

• Vocation: Democrats lost ground across almost all groups, with the greatest losses occurring among farmers.

• Education: Democrats gained among the "college-educated elite" but slipped significantly among the "high-school-educated middle spectrum."

• Religion:

  • Nixon gained sharply among Catholics leaving the Democratic Party.

  • Nixon lost a bloc of conservative Southern/Border Protestants to Wallace in $1968$, identifying a key opportunity for recapture in $1972$.

The Impact and Role of George Wallace

• A "Way Station": Wallace is viewed not as a permanent third-party fixture but as a catalyst for conservative Democrats in motion toward the GOP.

• Vote Diversion: Wallace split the conservative electorate. Phillips estimates that three-quarters or more of the Wallace electorate would have preferred Nixon in a two-party contest.

• Geographic Limitations: Wallace's strength was concentrated in the Deep South and areas of conservative Southern Democratic tradition (Delaware Bay to Nevada). He failed to reach unionized areas like Scranton, Fall River, or Duluth.

• Inverse Relationship: Data shows that states where Humphrey was strongest (e.g., D.C. at $82\,\%$, Rhode Island at $65\,\%$) were the states where Wallace was weakest (D.C. at $0\,\%$, Rhode Island at $4\,\%$).

Historical Cycles in American Politics

Phillips identifies four cycles of roughly $32$ to $36$ years each, typically dominated by one party with a brief $8$-year interregnum:

1. 1828–1860: Jacksonian Democracy (Interregnum: Whig generals Harrison and Taylor).

2. 1860–1896: Post-Civil War Stalemate (Interregnum: Grover Cleveland).

3. 1896–1932: Industrial Republicanism (Interregnum: Woodrow Wilson).

4. 1932–1968: New Deal Democratic Cycle (Interregnum: Dwight D. Eisenhower).

5. 1968–Present: The beginning of a new Republican era.

Sociopolitical and Ethnic Dynamics of Voting

• Ethnic Cleavages: American politics is driven more by ethnic and cultural animosities than by income. Phillips cites New York (Irish vs. Jews) and Wisconsin (various European settlement patterns) as examples.

• Yankee vs. Southern Migration:

  • Yankee Column: New England → New York → Northern Ohio/Indiana/Illinois → Michigan.

  • Virginia/Carolina Column: Virginia/Kentucky → Southern Indiana/Illinois → Missouri/Arkansas.

• The Negro Revolution: Democratic alignment with the "Negro socioeconomic revolution" alienated the white middle class and the South, serving as the primary cause for the New Deal coalition's collapse.

The Geographic and Demographic Future

• The Sun Belt Ascendancy: Political power is shifting from the stagnant Northeast to the booming "Sun Belt" (Florida, Texas, Arizona, California) and suburbia.

• Decline of the Big City:

  • New York City presidential vote: $3,081,000$ ($1960$) → $2,591,000$ ($1968$).

  • Chicago presidential vote: $1,674,000$ ($1960$) → $1,433,000$ ($1968$).

  • Detroit presidential vote: $743,000$ ($1960$) → $598,000$ ($1968$).

  • Boston presidential vote: $292,000$ ($1960$) → $225,000$ ($1968$).

• New Battlegrounds: Quadrennial presidential politics will now pivot on California, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, as the GOP can afford to lose New York, Michigan, and Massachusetts.

Political Strategy and the 1972 Outlook

• Negro Voting Rights: Phillips argues that maintaining Negro voting rights in the South is essential for the GOP, as it forces white Southern conservatives to abandon the Democratic Party as Negroes gain local party influence.

• The Liberal Elite Strategy: The GOP should not court the "Liberal Establishment" (Wall Street, silk-stocking districts, Manhattan's East Side), as these groups are increasingly Democratic. Nixon won only $38\,\%$ of the vote on Manhattan's East Side and $44\,\%$ in Scarsdale.

• Coalition Structure (Map 47):

  • GOP Core: Plains and Mountain States ($61$ electoral votes), Outer South ($50$ electoral votes), Deep South/Arkansas ($53$).

  • Key Battlegrounds: Ohio-Mississippi Valley ($93$), Pacific/California ($60$), Non-Yankee Northeast ($59$).