Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers Notes

Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers

Introduction

Refugee views on humanitarian aid and problems are poorly understood.
Spontaneous repatriation processes are difficult to research due to returnees dispersing under unstable political conditions.
The 'politics of space,' through which refugees understand the dynamics of flight, return, and settlement, needs more exploration.
Donor pressure can lead the UNHCR to make policy decisions that don't align with realities on the ground and may jeopardize refugee safety.
There's increasing concern about the plight of refugees post-repatriation, but long-term monitoring systems are lacking.
The international community and UNHCR's approach often appears confused, dictated more by donor pressure than by established principles or detailed local knowledge.
The data in this article comes from the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, obtained through research under the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.
The article discusses 'Relief' and 'Repatriation' and methodology challenges faced by outside observers and aid workers.
It focuses on food aid and community services, showcasing their interlinkages and suggesting policy changes.

Framework and Field Methodology

Camp access is controlled via UNHCR or NGOs, affecting how visitors are perceived as labeled and linked rather than independent.
Visitors are introduced to camp leaders, which raises questions about the leaders' roles, links to the old regime/military, and ability of people to speak freely.
The inability to situate refugees reflects a wider ignorance within the international community about political processes, which hinders finding durable solutions.
Oversimplification through dichotomies is common, such as: top-down UN/government vs. bottom-up NGOs, refugees (genocide perpetrators) vs. people inside Rwanda (righteous).
Concepts like 'local NGO' or 'civil society' should be analyzed critically in context, not taken at face value, as they may serve political or economic agendas.
NGOs may enhance state control rather than reflect independent civil society.
It's important to investigate Rwandan NGO operations before April 1994, considering their connections to the Habyarimana government and alignment with 'Hutu Power' extremists.
Civil society should be understood in its historical formation, not programmatically as an agenda for change.
The nature of Rwandan civil society in exile is unclear, with writings often being programmatic rather than sociological analysis.
The concept is broadened to include various groups, but this lacks sociological analysis. Some argue exiled NGOs are linked to 'Hutu Power' extremism.
NGOs historically lacked political analysis and a common political approach, working within the system without addressing the root causes of poverty.
After 1990, a polarization emerged: new-generation NGOs aligned with democracy/human rights, while traditional NGOs remained loyal to Habyarimana.
It's important to determine how many moderate Hutu from the 'new generation' NGOs survived the massacres and are represented within exiled NGOs.
The Collectif des ONG, representing 21 Rwandan NGOs, presents itself as neutral but supports collectives linked to Hutu Power, indicating it may not be as neutral as it claims.
It is important to research power struggles within NGOs following the flight into exile.
Ordinary Rwandan citizens may challenge leaders, and struggles for social justice intensified in the early 1990s.
Camps are complex in terms of authority structures, with political alignments reshuffling, and innocent refugees striving to erase the stigma of being murderers challenging dangerous leaders.
More research is required to clarify the political space beyond the 'united front' and to identify real/new moderates and their influence.
Understanding camp life complexities requires focusing on one camp per region, using interviews and conversations with diverse refugees.
In Lumasi, the spread of actors and situations was widest, while Mugunga had more pre-arranged meetings. Research built up a picture of how refugees judged the humanitarian effort and perceived the 'international community'.

Humanitarian Assistance Perceived

Camps were chosen with significant social diversity. Lumasi reflected Rwanda's north-south divide and distinction between 'early' (experienced) and 'late' (inexperienced) arrivals.
Lumasi was politically quiet, so assessments distinguished between 'ordinary' people's views and leaders' views. Mugunga was suitable to understand leaders' views better.
In Mugunga, views on food distribution were a common exception, as residents who had suffered hunger were outspoken about improvements.

Food distribution mechanisms

Food aid is a means of survival and a political weapon, which was visible in the early days of exile when distributions were hijacked by leaders and the military.
Lumasi refugees highlighted food aid diversions, including actions by 'experienced' refugees who knew how to play the system, targeting refugees from south Rwanda.
CONCERN stamped out diversions by appointing its distributors, distributing directly to beneficiaries.
The transition to fair distribution at lower levels of secteurlcellule organization took time but succeeded. Vulnerable northerners also benefited.
War widows from Muvumba outlined three stages of experiences: lack of food/shelter/blankets in Benaco, unfair distribution by commune leaders and secteur leaders, and fair share after CONCERN appointed its distributors.
Refugees were concerned about the regional identity of food distributors and loaders, and imbalances causes frustration. Southerners generally failed to snap up available jobs.
There are historical reasons for this north-south divide and animosity, which has been a social marker more divisive than ethnicity itself. In the build-up to the genocide, the divide gained momentum.
The killings in Butare started after Habyarimana's plane was shot down, when northern presidential guards and Interahamwe came south 'to give the example'.
The ferocity of ethnic killings in the Kibungo/Bugesera region had been preceded by in-migration involving landless, unemployed youngsters from the north.
In the mono-ethnic refugee camps, the north-south divide has become amplified, as many southerners blame northerners for the genocide of 1994.
A second unresolved problem relates to information flow, especially informing refugees about WFP's food pipeline discontinuities. Agencies that publicized alternative explanations were praised.
CONCERN was praised for fair food distribution, but some refugees felt it didn't do enough to inform the population about the reasons behind the 1995 food shortages and poor quality.
In Mugunga, initial food distribution occurred at the prefecture level, with massive diversions. Distributing agencies expanded the number of distribution points to enable better distribution to sectors and individual cellules.
WORLD VISION relied on prefecture leaders which earned them a good reputation with leadership but disheartened more vulnerable groups. The situation improved following UNHCR's registration exercise in Goma in January 1995.
Individuals and groups agreed registration significantly reduced food diversion. Meetings held to explain the food pipeline shortages appear to have had little effect on refugees' understanding of the supply problems.
Effective communication necessitates a better understanding of political structures that vary between camps and alternative structures emerging through community mobilization.

Community services

After the genocide, rebuilding refugee society was essential but controversial among extremist leaders.
The main question is: who should take the lead in community reconstruction, refugees or foreign agencies? Also, which programs should be prioritized?
Women from Muvumba discussed unaccompanied minors, praising foster families, but the Rwandan woman representing NPA deplored the absence of the orphanage.
NPA's expatriate workers indirectly defended the leader's position, citing the total breakdown of community relations, but also planning 'to move towards development'.
A Rwandan community worker recalled warning UNHCR that the newcomers from Burundi had been spoilt by handouts, which suggests using 'own resources' is a first important step in community reconstruction.
Social reconstruction should be a priority in crisis response. Emergency-oriented expatriates often fail to recognize self-initiatives at the height of an emergency.
Christian Outreach mobilized refugees in Musuhura, strengthening community reconstruction through women's groups, credit programs, job creation, and assistance for youth.
Interference by previous commune leaders diminished, and new leaders were less likely to interfere with community-based initiatives.
These examples show that community mobilization for non-political purposes is a feature of camp life, supporting initiatives that promote self-reliance and help identify responsible leaders.
UNHCR-Geneva must consider capitalizing on self-initiatives that surface early on in a refugee crisis, strategizing to bolster their dynamic role in community reconstruction.
Mugunga also had self-help initiatives from women, often within pre-existing organizational frameworks. Recognition and support was needed, although there were key differences with Ngara.
Mugunga was much more politicized chan Lumasi and appeared politically tense, and UNHCR-Goma had not developed the commitment to Community Services that was manifest in Ngara; its camp administration remained top-down.
Mugunga refugees felt UNHCR saw them as a problem to get rid of, so empowerment through community services was not something in which the organization could be much interested.
Representatives of women's associations made a number of recommendations:
- Value and support initiatives that develop human resources
- Actively support reflection groups where refugees explore and solve problems
- Forge contacts with international organizations for financial/informational support
- Initiatives that release small credits to collective enterprises are worthy of recognition and support at an early stage of emergency response.
- UNHCR-Geneva must raise its interest in self-help and give “community services” a higher profile.
- UNHCR should understand that working through refugees’ own resources must inevitably lead to important financial savings.
- UNHCR may be reluctant to give high priority to community services because of how poorly informed it is about camp politics.

Repatriation

'Community services' rank low in international crisis responses, which leaves refugees feeling powerless.

UNHCR as seen by refugees (mainly from Mugunga)

UNHCR's claim to neutrality was challenged in the context of salary structures. Cuts in 'salaries' paid to skilled Rwandan refugees were interpreted as outright sympathy with Kigali and a desire to force the refugees back to Rwanda.
The distinction between assisting with voluntary repatriation (allowed) and facilitating direct information on conditions in Rwanda (not allowed) made it sound to Refugees as if UNHCR was aligning itself with Kigali.
The refugee perception that UNHCR (or any other UN agency) is not neutral but allied to the new Rwandan government is a view held by leaders and intellectuals as well as the refugee population at large.
UNHCR's decision to do away with the 'salaries' of commune leaders, paid as camp assistants, was again interpreted in terms of a political conspiracy between Kigali and the UN. So was WFP's poor performance in early 1995.
Terminating the services of CARE-Deutschland was also used by refugees to support the hypothesis that UNHCR orchestrated an international conspiracy against them.
Memisa staff were hurt by the arrogant top-down approach adopted whenever HCR takes decisions. Specifics being Memisa had received word that its hospital would close on 1 July 1995; a decision taken by UNHCR 'without prior consultation'. Rwandan Memisa staff also stressed that UNHCR-Goma had a habit of 'hiding behind Geneva' as if no decision was ever made in Goma itself.
The killer-image effect may have caused UNHCR to marginalize especially refugee intellectuals.
Refusal to grant refugees proper refugee status was interpreted as a means to Pressurize refugees into a premature return to Rwanda.
It's equally important that UNHCR must accept that refugee leaders and followers are sceptical about its claim to neutrality. The ambivalence surrounding UNHCRs political position has stimulated the growth of disinformation in the camps. There is a great need, both within the camps and within UNHCR and all aid organizations, for accurate, timely information regarding political developments that aim to resolve the crisis.

UNHCR's need for political information

UNHCR's ambivalent attitude towards repatriation has been all too visible to Refugees. The succession of contradictory messages is understood by refugees to stem from the combination of two forces: firstly, the humanitarian workers' ignorance regarding Rwandan politics; and secondly, their frustration over the inability to bring squalid camp conditions under control.
When UNHCR proclaimed it had negotiated with Kigali and received assurances for a safe passage home, Refugees read the situation differently: UNHCR claimed to have received assurances only because the 'international community' could not cope with the horrific situation in Goma, where tens of thousands were dying of cholera.
UNHCR also overestimated the unity of the new Kigali regime, and its eagerness and capacity for reconciliation.
Hardliners in the RPF expertly exploit that guilt of the international comunity regarding not preventing the genocide, says Twagiramungu.
Mgr Christophe Munzihirwa warned UNHCR that Kigali did not want the Refugees back.

That hardliners in the Rwanda government do not want the Refugees to return is hardly surprising given the country's poor capacity for absorbing more people. Although 750,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu died in the genocide and war, the land available per capita has not increased, since approximately the same number of Tutsi have returned from the diaspora. Land pressures caused enough problems before the genocide, so why would hardliners want to return to highly dangerous population levels?

Guilt dictated reason regarding Rwanda’s adjustments in the first year the RPF took power.
Only in the second half of 1995 and Zaire set its ultimatum for the return of Refugees, did aid agencies begin to voice concern over the Refugees' right to reclaim property, over the arbitrary nature of many arrests.
MSF warned that conditions for repatriation were not in place in Rwanda due to retaliation and a weak judicial system.
UNHCR also criticized Kigali for its lack of transparency and established no real information system.

There is an information problem within UNHCR and the interational community, and contradictory statements arose from differen organizations on intimitation. UNHCR was too slow to develop concerns and information needed to build trust.
Better intelligence needs to be gather to prevent escalation of conflict.
Better intelligence would enable UNHCR to better pursue its primary objective of repatriation with justice and dignity.

Conclusions

Humanitarian agencies deal with refugees, struggling to identify who speaks for the majority and often failing to situate those claiming to represent them. They adopt a learn-on-the-job approach rather than investigating the political scene.
Agencies unknowingly employ killers and ringleaders known to victims, which is unacceptable. Hard political questions cannot be ignored.
An informed light must be shed on terms like NGO civil society, and democracy.
There must be an undersatnding of the dynamic of political life in camp, which requires an understanding of the international community and framework through which retugees percieve flight and return.
The recommendation is for the UN to set up within the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs an integrated intelligence unit which would study and monitor political processes - this is only through gathering detailed valid rapid data that the UN can have an informed body sufficiently informed to help and negotiate terms conducive to human dignity.