Good and Evil Slideshow Notes
Week 3- 9/8
Good result= positive result
Bad Result= negative result
Positive result= what increases the welfare or wellbeing of one or more persons; a positive experience for one or more people
In a word: Happiness
Negative result= what decreases the welfare of one or more people; a negative experience for one or more people
In a word: Suffering
“happiness is worth pursuing for its own sake. It is valuable in its own right. it is intrinsically valuable”. (FOE, Ch. 1)
The goodness of happiness (positive experience) stands on its own. We don’t need to add anything else to happiness to make it worth having or pursuing.
Likewise with suffering:
The badness of suffering(negative experience) stands on its own. We don’t need to add anything else to suffering to make it mad.
However, understanding how these experiences interact can deepen our moral insights, highlighting the importance of both joy and pain in shaping human experience.
a lot of pain and suffering is a means to an end, serving as catalysts for growth, resilience, and ultimately, a greater appreciation for the moments of joy that punctuate our lives.
Utilitarianism
Takes these as its two fundamental axioms
The Good= Positive experience
The Bad= Negative experience
There might be other ways to define the good and the bad, for instance, in Buddhism, the good is nirvana, which is not necessarily equivalent to what you and I mean by happiness.
What about as a Christian? The good is the glory of God, happiness comes from him. Suffering is the means to the end(glory of God). In addition, other cultures may define good and evil in different contexts, often influenced by spiritual beliefs, societal norms, or philosophical teachings, such as in ancient Greece where virtue was seen as the highest good, emphasizing the importance of living a life of moral excellence.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
First person to articulate, formally, the principles of, and motivation for, utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873): Expanded on Bentham's ideas and introduced the concept of qualitative distinctions between pleasures, arguing that some forms of happiness are more valuable than others.
“The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number”
a fundamental principle of utilitarianism, emphasizing the importance of maximizing overall happiness and minimizing suffering in ethical decision-making.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900): Critiqued traditional moral values, proposing the idea of the "will to power" where good and evil are subjective concepts shaped by individual perspectives and social contexts. This emphasized the importance of personal value creation in defining one's own morality.
Week 3- 9/10
An action is morally right if and only it does more to improve the overall wellbeing than any other action you could have done in the circumstances
Accordingly, an action is morally wrong if and only if it does not do more to improve the overall positive utility than any other action you could have done in the circumstances
This perspective aligns with consequentialism, which assesses the morality of actions based on their outcomes rather than inherent qualities.
It challenges us to consider the consequences of our choices and how they contribute to the greater good, highlighting the fluid nature of moral assessments.
To determine whether any particular
Example: Smoking in a restaurant. Right or Wrong?
Units of positive utility= Hedons (Greek word for pleasure)
Units of negative utility= Dolors (Greek word for Pain)
Imagined scenario:
when smoking, cigar smoker receives 20 hedons and no dolors. Each patron experiences 5 dolors from inhaling the smoke. When not smoking, cigar smoker experiences 6 dolors. each patron experiences no dolors.
When they smoke: Balance = 75 dolors vs 20 hedons, for 55 dolors.
When they don’t smoke: balance= 6 dolors
Moral Verdict: Morally wrong. In this scenario, the pleasure derived from smoking does not outweigh the associated pain, leading to the conclusion that indulging in such behavior ultimately contributes to a net negative experience.
We are imagining that the smoking has these results in this one restaurant for that one time. so, our moral verdict here is limited to smoking a cigar in a restaurant with those patrons( who have those particular reactions to the smoking) at that time. In that particular situation smoking would be wrong, according to utilitarianism.
Act utilitarianism:
were using the results of that one particular action and nor that general type of action, to determine the moral status of that particular action. Based on emotion, it can be argued that the immediate reactions of the patrons, such as discomfort and irritation, further reinforce the view that smoking in this context exacerbates the negative impact, overshadowing any fleeting sense of pleasure the smoker may experience.
Rule utilitarianism:
conforms to a rule or law. Warns us against the very dangerous consequences
Moral Flexibility
of act of utilitarianism (FOE, ch 9, pp. 1300-131, 4th Ed; 134-135, 5th Ed)
It may be that, in one situation, stealing causes more positive than negative. In that case, stealing would be morally right, according to act utilitarianism. in another case the results ay differ, with more negative than positive
Same with lying, loving, even killing.
bottom line: for utilitarian, no type of action is absolutely (without exception) right ot wrong. It all depends on the specific results in the specific situation.
First Advantage:
Second Advantage:
AN OBJECTIVE, QUASI-SCIENTIFIC way to determine right and wrong.
if we all agree that producing more well-being is the rigt thing to do, and that producing more suffering is the wrong thing to do
Third Advantage:
The utilitarian method is impartial, in the sense that it treats everyone equal.
“The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other..” (Sidgwick, 1880)
We call this the
Impartially Requirement,
believed by utilitarian to be essential to any correct moral theory
Note: For classical utilitarianism, one persons welfare counts more than another’s, only when it is more quantitively.
Week 4- 9/15
However, possible strange implications of this impartiality? E.g., the pleasure of a sadist?
Sadist: A person who derives pleasure from inflicting pain or suffering on others, raising ethical concerns about the valuation of pleasure in utilitarian calculations.
On the utilitarian approach, would the death of a 6 year old person be more wrong than the death of a 85 yr old person? If so, why?
The utilitarian perspective often prioritizes the potential future contributions of individuals, suggesting that the premature death of a 6-year-old may be considered more wrong due to the loss of a greater lifespan ahead. Additionally, it raises questions about the impact on family and society, as the death of a child may have a more profound emotional and social ripple effect compared to that of an elderly person.
Week 4- 9/17
But how do we measure the amount if positive utility (hedons) and the amount of negative utility (dolors), so we can take the balance?
Measurement Problem
This difficulty, of measuring accurately the amount of positive experience and negative experience that results from an action.
What is needed is a way “to translate our seemingly disparate desires and aversions into a common currency”
Self Report:
another possible way to measure positive and negative utility.
Simply ask the person how much happiness or suffering they receive from the experience- that is, how many hedons or dolors
“who could be a better judge” Steven Pinker
Might have problems with accuracy
1-100 scale
If these appraches dont solve the measurement problem we could dabble in science fiction and imagine the…
Hedometer: some device, attacjed to each person’s head, that would meaure precisely their hedons or dolors experienced by that person at that moment
see Gilbert, p. 71, “The happyometer”
Or Edgeworth, “the hedonimeter” (Two selves, p.378)
That would solve the measurement problem.
Thus measuring hedonix and doloic quantity seems rather difficult. Is this problem so intractable that it deals a fatal blow to utilitarianism
the “Argument from Value Measurement”
(FOE, p.142 4th ed; 146 5th ed) captures this fatal blow
Utilitarianism is true only if there is precise unit of measurement that can determine the value if an actions results.
There is no such unit of measurement.
Therefore, utilitarianism is false.
It’s not that big of a problem, since virtually all cases, we can approximate the quantities well enough for an appropriate moral verdict.
Bentham, TML, p.202
Week 5- 9/22
This verdict means only this particular act of adultery is morally right. It does not mean or imply that adultery generally is morally right or wrong or that any other instances is right or wrong
This is what we referred to earlier as the moral flexibility of utilitarianism.
Counter-Intuitive Verdict Challenge.
Prediction Problem
here may be what plagues the entire utilitarian approach called
“If the rightness of an action depends on all of it’s results, and these haven’t yet occured, then how a=can we know whether the action is the right one to do. (FOE, p.124 4th ed; 128 5th ED.
A Posteriori
Meaning: Only after the action has been preformed,
Week 5- 9/24
Either of these two possibilities may seem rather odd, since they raise these questions:
Can an action be morally right and wrong at the same time?
The False Happiness Objection:
(see FOR, pp. 36-37, 4th Ed; 35-36, 5th Ed)
Mary’s husband does not know that Mary is unfaithful. He’s happy, but only because he does not know the truth.
Is his happiness therefore false, and so should not count as much?
Peaks/Valleys Theory of Pain/Pleasure:
Each instance of pleasure/ happiness depends for its existence on a previous (and equal) valley if pain
To put it in another way, a revised newton’s third law: For every pain there is an equal and opposite pleasure.
Hedonic Adaptation: The psychological process where people quickly return to a stable baseline level of happiness after major positive ot negative life events.
Hedonic Adaptation to a positive experience is when the positive experience fades to the extent that I return to my baseline happiness before the experience.
Similarly, hedonic adaptation to a negative experience is when the negative experience fades to the extent that I return to my baseline happiness before the experience. (ex. stubbing your toe)
Types of Pleasures and Pains
An Earned Pleasure (Hard Hedon):
A pleasure whose existence depends necessarily on a previous (or simultaneous) valley of pain/suffering
usually, with these, the greater the previous pain, the greater the subsequent pleasure.
An example of this is when someone endures a challenging workout regimen, pushing through physical exhaustion and discomfort, only to experience the satisfying sense of achievement and euphoria that follows their success. Similarly, in artistic pursuits, an artist may face intense frustration and self-doubt during the creation process but ultimately finds immense joy and fulfillment upon completing their masterpiece.
Earned Pleasures include two types:
Effort pleasures: The previous valley of negative experience is arduous labor/work toward a goal.
Privation Pleasures: The previous valley of negative experience is the suffering from a certain privation, such as thirst or hunger, or cold or heat.
Week 6- 9/29
Pure Pleasure:
A pleasure whose existence does not depend on a previous valley of pain/suffering.
Non-adaptive pleasures (either hard or happy), or, the same thing:
Heavenly Hedons
Positive experiences that make me happier generally after I have has them (i.e., they raise my baseline to a level of greater happiness)- and this may be because I continue to derive pleasure from them…
Necessary Suffering: A negative experience that is necessary for a peak of pleasure (=earned pleasure)
Could there be valleys of suffering/ pain that do not create equal and opposite peaks of pleasure?
If so, we’ll call these instances of
Gratuitous Suffering (A “Damn Dolor) Where something just sucks, period.
Doubly Damned Dolors:
“People adapt to some negative experiences completely but show protracted or only partial adaptation to others.” (Lyubormirsky, p 206)
(e.g., loss of a child or spouse, divorce, paralysis…)
How can I tell whether an instance of suffering/pain is necessary or truly gratuitous?
One way: If I could choose not have the pain in the first place- if I could control having it or not, I would choose not to have it. This pain would be gratuitous.
Does a “silver lining” always demonstrate that the suffering is not gratuitous?
Or, are silver linings merely effects that we can use to soften the sting of sufferings that we’d rather not have in the first place.
Week 7- 10/6
In Hobbes’ “state of nature” You want to take advantage of others (out of your own self-interest), but you want more that they don’t take advantage of you (also our of your own self-interest).
As a self-interested person, I also do not want to be deprived of the common goods that benefit me and everyone else
Thus, it is rational for me (and you, and every other individual) to agree to be my governed by laws/rules that limit my freedom to harm you (or the common good) and prohibit you from harming me (or the common good).
And to ensure that everyone follows the laws - i.e., promises to do what they contracted to do, it is rational for all of us to agree to be governed by a central power (Hobbes’ Leviathan) who punishes those of us who don’t cooperate with the rules.
“when a covenant [=contact] is made, then to break it is unjust [=wrong]: and the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant, and whatsoever is not unjust, is just”
“Moral rules are nothing more than these special rules of cooperation”
2,100 years before Hobbes, we see Plato anticipate, fairly exactly, these last few arguments from Hobbes:
“They say that to do wrong is good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arises laws and mutal covenants” -(Plato, Bk2, The Republic)
This means that, according to social contract theory, each one of us legislates moral law that is each one of a moral legislator.
Possible moral laws derived from the social contract (would we all agree to these rules in our social contract?)
Stealing is wrong
Killing is wrong
Assault and battery us wrong
Love is right
Keeping one’s promises is right
For the common good
A “Commons” =
A mutually beneficial resource whose existence depends on the actions of these who benefit from it
example: public goods: i.e. public library, public health, democracy
The Fragility of the commons=
its existence depends on the actions of those who use and benefit from it.
E.g., immunization, final exams week, democracy, expo markers, etc
we define the following types of actions in a commons:
The Defect action=
That action, x, such that, if enough people do x, the commons will be destroyed. (No one can benefit anymore)
The Cooperative action=
That action x, such that, if enough people do x, the commons will survive.
Most cooperative actions will require a small self-sacrifice from the cooperator
e.g. paying taxes picking up after your dog, or wearing a mask, taking the recycling out; etc. (Therefore, often the defect action benefits me more…)
A current cooperative action for the commons known as our earths climate:
“Going Green”
e.g. bringing ones grocery bag to the food market
other current cooperative actions, for the public health, during a pandemic: wearing a mask or a vaccination.
Week 8 - 10/13
Most agree that the social contract would include these laws:
It is wrong to defect in a commons
it is right to cooperate in a commons
Why? Because as self-interested persons creating the social contract
But what if it does not feel like its is in my own self-interest, my benefit, to do the cooperative action
What if it does not feel like i consented to do the cooperative thing?
Am I then freely choosing to cooperate or being forced/coerced to do so?
Dilemma of the Commons
[very similar to the traditional “prisoners dilemma” (FOE, pp. 196-198) other names: Each-We Dilemmas; Contributor’s Dilemmas; etc]
I cooperate, and enough others cooperate:
Commons survives, we all benefit (+8 for me)
I cooperate, and enough others defect:
Commons crumbles, and Im the “Sucker” (-10 for me)
I defect, and enough others cooperate: I free ride (+10 for me)
I defect, and enough others defect: Commons destroyed, and we all worse off (-8 for me)
Defection is the most rational thing to do, not just for me, but for each indivuidual in the commons
Here’s the dilema:
If everyone does what is most rational for each to do so, i.e. defect, then the commons is destroyed and everyone is worse off.
In a commons, what is individually rational is collectively irrational
On the theory of “multi-level selection” in sociobiology you and I have inherited, from the natural selection, both the inclination to defect and the inclination to cooperate. Theyre both “natural”
But if we both natural, what ought I do (morally), in a commons, defect or cooperate?
Thus, sociobiology can explain only why I have both motivations, but cannot answer the moral question, should I defect of cooperate?
We commit the “naturalistic Fallacy” if we infer automatically that since the inclination to cooperate is natural, it is morally right to cooperate. (Same with :..That since selfishness is natural, it is right to defect.)
Certain emotions have been selected for, that help discourage defection and encourage cooperation.
“The other-condemning emotions- contempt, fear, and disgust- prompt one to punish [defectors]. The other praising emotions- gratitude, moral awe- prompt one to reward [cooperators]… And the self-conscious emotions- guilt, shame, embarrassment- prompt one to avoid [defecting.]” (Steven Picker, from The Blank Slate, 2002)
10/15
Should we then leave cooperation up to “individual choice” in these, or any commons??
If I have the opportunity to free ride, and benefit myself, and not ger caught by the legal law, why shouldn’t I?
Free Rider Problem
Namely: IF I have the opportunity to free-ride (defect when everyone else cooperates), and defection is in my own best interest, is there a moral REASON why I should cooperate instead?
If I defect and enough people cooperate then I benefit doubly
I benefit from the commons, and I enjoy that added benefit of not having to make the small sacrifice entailed by cooperating. This is: Free Riding
Examples: Vaccination, taxes, running race, Dave the fisherman, group project, not taking safety measures during covid, potluck, etc.
In fact, the unique benefit enjoyed by the free-rider, namely defection and the commons, exists only because enough other people are cooperating in that commons.
This benefit is necessarily unilateral
Is it wrong or right on utilitarian grounds?
Remember free-riding is, by definition, a case where the free-rider benefits by defecting, but no one else gets hurt (since the commons survives).
Thus, it is probably morally right on strict utilitarian grounds.
Or could free-riding be wrong for the reason that, if everyone did what the free-rides does, then the commons would be destroyed?
In other words, it is wrong for the free-rider to defect because it would be bad for all of us if we all did what they did.
or is free riding wrong because the free-rider is being selfish?
Because the benefit enjoyed by the free rider is necessarily unilateral. She benefits only on condition that no one else (or very few others) benefits in the same way. She is a
HEDON HOARDER
To derive the wrongness of free-riding, social contract theory would have to argue:
I (and all of us) consented not to defect in the social contract; we agreed to cooperate
It is morally wrong for any of us not to do what we agreed/consented to do. Therefore, it is morally wrong for me to defect (=free ride).
(this is a different version of the “consent argument,” FOE, p 207)
is there ac contract or agreement between all of us, to which you and I are consented (FOE, Ch.14)
To explore this, we’ll explore three kinds of consent
Physical Consent-
A physical action. I agree in writing, and sign the agreement; or a handshake; thus creating a contract; or blood
to what extent does this act create an obligation for me to keep the contract?
Tacit Consent (aka “implied”, Passive” consent):
agreeing/consenting silently or passively. (FOE, p.213, 4th Ed; 223, 5th Ed) Examples... organ donation (By choosing not to not go along with it, have you tacitly agreed to it?)
Hypothetical (or imagined) Consent:
I would have consented/ agreed in an imagined context for agreement
Week 9 10/20
Since Hobbes, two main interpretations of this hypothetical agreement
Hobbes: What we would agree to, situated and being the people as we are now
John Rawls (1971): What we would agree to, if we were all free and equal rational beings, who come to this agreement in the “ORIGINAL POSITION” from “behind the *veil of ignorance*.”
This is the union of different rational beings in a system of common laws… if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole…” (TML, p. 259)
Would Washington D.C. legislate better legal laws for our country (=Federal Laws) if they legislated from behind the veil of ignorance?
This approach would likely lead to more equitable laws, as lawmakers would have to consider the needs and rights of all citizens without bias towards their personal circumstances.
Does the social contract even exist?
if not, the theory collapses: there are no moral laws
The Social Contract exists fictionally, in our imagination and that is sufficient for the creation of moral law.
“The social contract is hypothetical but nevertheless binding; it is a fiction, bit a very useful fiction.” (Vaughn, 2015)
Can moral judgement be factually true or false?
10/22
Golden Rule
The golden rule requires that we place ourselves in the shoes of another, consenting to rules/laws behind Rawls’ veil requires us to place ourselves in the shoes of all those people who would be affected by the rule/policy. What sort of rule would I consent to were it possible that I could be any one of the people affected by it?
Do unto others as you would have the do unto you.
Or (equivalently)
Do not do unto others as you would have them not do unto you
Step one: Identify who is using the golden rule
Step two: Identify the action in question
Step three: Decide whose shoes (=whose mental space) I should place myself in
Step four: Being “In their shoes:, would I want to be treated in the way that action would affect me?
Step Five, Moral Verdict: If no, action is morally wrong. If yes, action is morally right.
Week 10- 10/27
What is it exactly to put myself in their shoes?
Is it what I want were I in their shoes as me? (In which case my job is to put myself in their shoes… that is, still be me)
or
Is it in fact what they want, as them? (In which case my job is to try to empathize with how they feel; and be them)
If #1:
I may want something different from what the actual person wants (e.g. surprise birthday parties); or masochist?
If #2:
I may have no clue what it is like to be in their shoes. (e.g. mental illness)
(Tom petty: “you don’t know what it’s like, to be me…”)
In both cases the Golden Rule might fail
Perhaps the best version of the Golden Rule is a “sweet spot” somewhere in between #1 and #2, such as Derek Parfits version:
“We ought to treat others only in ways in which we would rationally be willing to be treated, if we were going to be in these others people’s positions, and would be relevantly like them.” (Parfit, p.324)
10/29
Marquis neutral on whether the fetus is a person with a right to life; he argues that the moral status of abortion should not depend on that question.
Then what about the prediction problem? Since we do not know for sure whether the person who the fetus will be, will live (on balance) a happier or more miserable life, how can we judge that killing it will cause more harm then good?
The Samaritan Argument
Week 11- 11/3
To make the demands( that is, morally requiring that you let the violist use your body) would demand Good Samaritanism as tge moral standard. Thompson argues that this is too high a moral standard, and also that no legal law should be based in requiring good samaritanism
But, she goes on, we should expect morally and legally, “Minimally Decent Samaritanism”
IN the legal domain, the moral requirement of “minimally decent samaritanism” finds expression in “duty to Save” legal laws ( that vary quite a lot in their details, and are very interpretab;e)
Much of it depends on how large a sacrifice is required in order to save the other life.
Thompson concedes that, under certain conditions, due to the minimally decent Samaritan moral requirement, the pregnant woman does have a moral duty to support her fetus for the nine months; so, morally wrong to abort.
What if everyone did that?
Moral law (rightness and wrongness) must be discoverable/known a priori, with no regard for the results of the action.
The moral law, to be “pure” and true, must derive from our “pure reason”
Triuths in math/logic are discoverable a priori by our reason/ rationality. Whereas, truths in the empirical sciences are known a posteriori by observation
According to Kant, in this same respect, morality is more like math/logic than the sciences
Autonomy - “Self governing”
Kant’s sense of autonomy
Each one of us is self-governing morally
Meaning: the moral law, which guides my behavior can be derived from the exercise of my own rationality(=reason).
(Contrast to Social Contract, and later, Divine Command Theory…)
Here is Kant’s test to determine whether a particular action is morally right or wrong:
An act is morally acceptable if and only if its maxim is universal
“Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time that it should become a universal law”
How we determine this. The four steps
IDENTIDY MAXIM: Identify your maxim - formulate it clearly (a description of the acrion in question, plus the intention behind it)
UNIVERSALIZATION: What if everyone did that? Imagine a world in which everyone supports and acts on your maxim
EVALUATION: Can the goal of my action be achieved in sich a world? Can I will that everyone perform my maxim without contradiction?
DERIVATION: If I cannot, then the action is morally wrong; if I can, then it is morally permissible
Step 4 Derivation: A lying promise is morally wrong.
So the categorical imperative:
I have a moral duty not to make a false promise
In Kant’s own words:
“Were it to be a general rule to take away his belongings from everyone, mine and thine would be altogether at an end. For anything I might take from another, a third party would take from me” (Kant, Foundations of Morals)
Kant is not a utilitarian!!!
Universalied Utilitarianism:
An action is morally wrong just in case, if EVERYONE DID IT, there’d be more negative than positive. And morally right just in case, If EVERYONE DID IT, there’d be more positive than negative
Lets see how Kant’s reasoning demonstrates that free0riding in a commons in morally wrong.
This illustrates Kant’s point that Universalization can Fail (In step 3) in TWO senses; namely, in Kant’s words
*”Some actions are such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived