Officer-Involved Deaths and the Duty to Intervene: NYPD Case Study 2000-2019

Overview of Officer-Involved Deaths and Duty to Intervene Policy

• Officer-involved deaths (OIDs), specifically those involving multiple officers (MOIDs), have garnered significant public attention following high-profile cases such as those of Eric Garner and George Floyd.

• Proposals to address fatal police-civilian encounters generally fall into two categories:

  • External oversight: Post hoc reviews of body-worn camera footage, establishment of civilian review boards, and criminal prosecution.

  • Behavioral changes: De-escalation training for officers and "the talk" directed toward civilians.

• Active bystandership is another intervention strategy, ranging from civilian "copwatching" to formal departmental duty-to-intervene (DTI) policies.

• DTI policies require officers witnessing misconduct—particularly excessive force—to take action to prevent it or initiate corrective processes immediately.

• These policies vary by department in their legal and ethical articulations, ranging from employment-based liabilities to potential civil and criminal liabilities for failing to protect civilians from unjustified harm.

• When paired with peer intervention programs, such as the Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) program in New Orleans, DTIs may foster an organizational culture of active bystandership.

Evolution of NYPD Duty-to-Intervene Policy (2013–2016)

• The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is the largest in the United States and often sets national policy trends. It has been a focal point for use-of-force (UoF) investigations, including the Mollen and Knapp Commissions.

• In $2012$, NYPD stop-question-and-frisk (SQF) encounters were present in $14.2\%$ of cases, significantly higher than the national average of $1.4\%$.

• Initial DTI Policy ($2013$): Established that presence at a scene does not relieve any member of the obligation to ensure compliance with law and regulations. Members were required to intervene if force became clearly excessive. Failure to do so could result in criminal and civil liability.

• Revised DTI Policy ($2016$): This more restrictive version mandates that all members must intervene to stop excessive force. Crucially, it added requirements to:

  • Report the excessive force to the Internal Affairs Bureau Command Center.

  • Ensure or request timely medical treatment for the individual subjected to force.

  • Specify departmental discipline, including potential dismissal, for failure to intervene or report.

• The $2016$ revision restricts officer discretion more narrowy than the $2013$ version by identifying specific failure to act as "serious misconduct."

Determinants and Dynamics of Use of Force

• Police misconduct is defined as activities or behaviors violating ethical or legal rules, policies, or procedures, whether internal or external to the organization.

• Legitimate vs. Excessive Force: Use of force is not inherently misconduct; legal standards like Tennessee v. Garner ($471\,U.S.\,1\, (1985)$) permit fatal force under specific circumstances. Excessive force, however, violates constitutional and criminal law.

• Correlates of Use of Force:

  • Individual characteristics: Race, sex, age, education, years of experience, and prior problem behavior.

  • Situational factors: Whether civilians are armed. Research indicates Black civilians killed by police are more likely to be unarmed than white civilians.

  • Environmental factors: Concentrated disadvantage, firearm violence, proportion of Black residents, and citywide racial segregation.

  • Organizational factors: Departments led by Black chiefs report $50\%$ lower rates of fatal shootings than those led by white chiefs. Administrative policies and leadership can curb or counteract force trends.

Literature Review on DTI Effectiveness

• Current research on DTI impact remains limited and mixed:

  • Campaign Zero ($2016$) found DTI policies associated with a $9\%$ decrease in OIDs per capita among the $100$ largest departments.

  • The NOPD reported decreases in UoFs, citizen complaints, and disciplinary actions after implementing EPIC.

  • Jones-Brown et al. ($2021$) observed that DTI policies did not reduce MOIDs in the $30$ largest U.S. cities from $2008$ to $2018$; departments without such policies sometimes reported fewer OIDs.

  • A $2015$ NYPD Inspector General report found that bystander officers failed to intervene in a substantial number of encounters where excessive force was applied, suggesting a need for better training.

Study Methodology and Research Questions

• The study utilizes data from Fatal Encounters (FE) to analyze NYPD MOIDs across three distinct policy periods:

  • $T0$ (Pre-DTI): January $1$, $2000$ – July $31$, $2013$.

  • $T1$ (Initial DTI): August $1$, $2013$ – June $26$, $2016$.

  • $T2$ (Revised DTI): June $27$, $2016$ – October $25$, $2019$.

• Analytical Design: A nonequivalent dependent variables design (quasi-experimental) using frequency analysis and $t$-tests to compare means.

• Research Question $1$: Does DTI implementation change the percentage, annual rate, and average of MOIDs?

  • $H1$: DTI implementation will reduce MOID metrics.

  • $H2$: The greatest reductions will occur during $T2$ (most restrictive policy).

• Research Question $2$: What is the impact on the racial makeup of civilian fatalities?

  • $H3$: Black civilians will be overrepresented in MOIDs.

  • $H4$: DTI policies will reduce MOIDs involving Black civilians.

  • $H5$: The greatest reductions for Black civilians will be in $T2$.

Statistical Findings: Frequency and Annual Rates

• General OID Trends:

  • $T0$ (Pre-DTI): $231$ total OIDs; Rate of $6.5$ per $1,000$ officers.

  • $T1$ (Initial DTI): $45$ total OIDs; Rate of $1.27$ per $1,000$ officers.

  • $T2$ (Revised DTI): $49$ total OIDs; Rate of $1.34$ per $1,000$ officers.

• MOID Specifics:

  • $T0$ MOIDs: $85$ ($36.8\%$ of total OIDs); Rate of $2.4$ per $1,000$ officers.

  • $T1$ MOIDs: $17$ ($37.8\%$ of total OIDs); Rate of $0.48$ per $1,000$ officers.

  • $T2$ MOIDs: $34$ ($69.3\%$ of total OIDs); Rate of $0.94$ per $1,000$ officers.

• Hypothesis outcomes:

  • $H1$ (Reductions): Partial support; rates fell from $T0$ but rose between $T1$ and $T2$.

  • $H2$ (Greatest reduction in $T2$): No support; the greatest reduction occurred in $T1$.

• Significant $t$-test Results for MOIDs:

  • $T0$ experienced significantly fewer average MOIDs ($M = 6.44$) than the combined $T1$ and $T2$ periods ($M = 7.89$) ($t(210) = 5.35, p < 0.001$).

  • $T1$ had significantly fewer MOIDs ($M = 6.18$) than the combined $T0$ and $T2$ ($M = 6.97$) ($t(1.33) = 3.40, p < 0.05$).

  • $T2$ averaged the highest number of MOIDs ($M = 9.47$) ($t(110) = -12.86, p < 0.001$).

Analysis of Racial Disparities in MOIDs

• Overrepresentation ($H3$): Black civilians represented $49.7\%$ of victims in $T0$, $62.2\%$ in $T1$, and $59.2\%$ in $T2$, despite being only approx. $24\%$ of the NYC population. MOID victims were more likely to be Black (46.1\%$Source$) than non-Black (27.6\%Source).\n* Policy Impact on Disparity (H4$and$H5):\n * In T0$, Black victims were$62.4\% of MOIDs.\n * In T1$, this dropped to$37.8\%$(supporting$H4).\n * In T2$, Black victims rose back to$67.6\%$of MOIDs (failing to support$H5).\n* Rate Changes by Race:\n * T0$to$T1$: Annual rate of Black MOIDs fell by$79.2\%$. Non-Black victims fell by$81.1\%.\n * T1$to$T2$: Annual rate of Black MOIDs increased by$103\%$. Non-Black victims increased by$76.5\%.\n* t-test for Black MOID Victims:\n * T1$averaged fewer Black MOIDs ($M = 6.06$) than$T0$($M = 6.64$) or$T2$($M = 9.53).\n * T2$showed a significant increase in Black MOIDs compared to prior periods ($t(73.46) = -9.99, p < 0.001).\n\n# Theoretical Interpretations and Implications\n\n* Racial Bias and Perception: The "reactive" hypothesis suggests force is higher in areas where police control violent populations or difficult urban conditions. Conversely, implicit or overt bias may lead officers to equate Black civilians with danger, resulting in more officers called to the scene and a reduced likelihood of bystander intervention.\n* Public Pressure vs. Administrative Control: The significant reduction in MOIDs during T1$($2013-2016) coincided with the death of Eric Garner and the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement. This suggests public scrutiny may be as influential as administrative policy in altering officer behavior.\n* Culture of Loyalty: A DTI policy alone may be insufficient to counteract a police culture prioritizing "unquestionable loyalty" over public safety.\n* Sanctity of Life: As more departments adopt policies to protect life, evidence-based policymaking is critical. DTI policies show an "initial" impact, but more restrictive language (T2) did not correlate with continued improvement.\n\n# Limitations and Future Research Directions\n\n* Generalizability: Findings are specific to the NYPD, the nation's largest department (36,000+$$ officers), and may not apply to smaller agencies.

• Force Levels: The study focused exclusively on fatal encounters; the impact of DTI on lesser forms of force remains unexamined.

• Data Granularity: The FE dataset lacks specific situational details, such as whether force was legally justified or if DTI protocols were explicitly violated in each instance.

• Potential Variables: Future research should employ multivariate analyses to account for environmental, organizational, and situational determinants more comprehensively.

• Policy Recommendations:

  • Standardized reporting of all investigatory activities and interventions, as seen in the proposed George Floyd Justice in Policing Act.

  • Implicit bias training emphasizing the duty to intervene regardless of the suspect's identity.

  • Improved data availability to allow for evidence-based strategy development.