Lecture 4.4: A Theory of Consciousness
The Historical Neglect of Consciousness in Analytic Philosophy
Galen Strawson's Critique of Analytic Philosophy:
Galen Strawson famously stated: "To deny the existence of conscious experience, that is the great silliness, the greatest silliness in the history of philosophy, the greatest silliness of the whole history of human thought."
Strawson argues that this denial dominated analytic philosophy throughout the second half of the twentieth century.
The lecturer adds a correction to Strawson, suggesting that this trend actually occupied the first half of the twentieth century and continued through nearly the entire century.
Reasons for the Philosophical Neglect:
While Strawson views the denial as "complete silliness," there were methodological reasons for this stance.
Philosophical Movements: Groups such as the logical positivists, behaviorists, and figures like Ludwig Wittgenstein were hesitant to discuss the "existence" of consciousness.
Restricted Definition of Existence: These thinkers often restricted the use of the word "exist" to things that could be collectively referred to, observed, tested, or publicly discussed. Because consciousness was viewed as private and not amenable to collective observation, they avoided attributing "existence" to it in a formal sense.
Global Workspace Theory (Bernard Baars)
Core Definition: Proposed by Bernard Baars, Global Workspace Theory suggests that the primary function of conscious states is for different parts of the brain to broadcast representational contents publicly.
The Broadcasting Mechanism:
The brain is viewed as being composed of various modular parts that handle specific tasks.
When information needs to be available to other parts of the brain for action or deliberation, it is "broadcast."
Example of Pain: If a person feels pain (e.g., saying "ow"), the specific part of the brain sensing damage in the arm broadcasts that content to the rest of the brain. The "feeling" of pain is essentially the way that information is made public within the brain's internal architecture.
In contrast: Information handled by the liver or kidneys might be managed by a small, isolated part of the brain and does not requires a global broadcast.
Limitations of the Theory:
Critiques (notably mentioned as related to Kim's views) suggest this theory explains the access part of consciousness (making information available for rational deliberation).
It does not explain the phenomenal part of consciousness (the qualitative "feel").
Functionalist Theories and the Gap in Phenomenal Consciousness
Machine Functionalism:
Explains consciousness in terms of information processing for the sake of rational deliberation and action.
Critique: A computer can process information perfectly well without there being "anything it is like" to be that computer.
Causal Theoretical Functionalism:
This theory focuses on the causal relationships that psychological terms (predicates) have with one another (e.g., how the predicate "belief" relates to action, or how "desire" relates to other internal states).
Critique: While this may explain access consciousness, it fails to explain phenomenal consciousness—the actual experience or "what it's like" to be a subject. A system could fulfill all causal relationships defined by the theory without being phenomenally conscious.
Higher Order Thought Theory (HOT)
Definition: Higher Order Thought theory posits that to be conscious is to be aware of one's own perceptions.
Orders of Thought:
First Order: A simple thought or perception.
Higher Order (Second Order): A thought about a thought.
Third Order: A thought about a thought about a thought.
The Higher Order Thought theory is essentially a third-order theory focusing on the reflexive awareness of mental states.
Critique:
The theory characterizes the accessibility of a conscious state for higher-order deliberation and judgment.
It fails to define what makes the underlying perception "conscious" to begin with. It describes the availability of the state rather than the intrinsic nature of the phenomenal experience.
Representationalism
Definition: This theory suggests that phenomenal qualia (the qualitative properties of experience) are not properties of the mind's functions, but rather properties of external objects in the world that are represented in our experience.
Conceptual Examples:
Redness/Blueness: The "redness" or "blueness" in an experience is simply the representation of actual redness or blueness existing in the external world.
Pain: Pain is defined as a representation of tissue damage. The representation is considered "true" if tissue damage exists and "false" if it does not.
Critique of the Pain Definition:
The lecturer notes that psychological pain exists without associated tissue damage.
A preferred definition might be that pain is a representation that "something is bad," rather than specifically representing physical tissue damage.
Relationship to Physicalism:
Representationalism is favored by physicalists (such as Jaegwon Kim) because it allows them to explain qualia in physical terms.
Under this view, qualia are found "out there" in the physical world rather than being mysterious non-physical properties inside the brain.
Terminological Oddity:
In epistemology, this view is actually a form of Direct Realism (the idea that perception puts us in direct touch with qualities in the world).
In contrast, traditional "Representationalism" in perception theory suggests we see our own internal representations rather than the world itself.
Benefits and Costs:
Benefit: Once the story of what is being represented is told, there is no need to provide a further account of the "subject" of consciousness. There is no "self" that needs to be represented in every experience; we simply perceive the world.
Cost: The theory does not explain why a physical brain gives rise to representations of qualia, nor does it explain what a representation is or how it can exist without a phenomenal component.
Alternatives to Physicalism: Panpsychism and Emergentism
Panpsychism:
Proponents: Baruch Spinoza, Bertrand Russell, and modern proponent Galen Strawson.
Core View: It is a form of monism which asserts that there is only one fundamental kind of substance: physical stuff. However, this physical stuff has intrinsic aspects that include conscious experience at the most fundamental level.
The Electron Example: An electron possesses its own fundamental conscious experience. While it does not have complex thoughts, there is "something it's like" to be an electron. Human consciousness is viewed as the result of combining a massive amount of this fundamentally conscious material.
Emergentism:
Proponents: John Stuart Mill, C. B. Broad, and C. Lloyd Morgan.
Core View: Phenomenal consciousness is something "over and above" the physical basis from which it naturally emerges.
Dependency: Consciousness depends entirely on the physical brain (no brain means no consciousness), but the nature of the conscious state (qualia) is more than, and different from, the physical state itself.
The Chalmers Project:
David Chalmers is currently working on a project that seeks to combine elements of emergentism and panpsychism.