Islamist Extremist Inspired Radicalization in France: Analyzing Recruitment Methods in Mosques, Prisons, and Online

Introduction

France has witnessed extensive Muslim resettlement in the last 50 years, mainly North Africans (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia).
Integration remains a question.
France's history of colonization in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia has deep roots.
French Muslims are primarily of Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian descent, and these ethnic groups are often characterized as the "Muslim population" in French political discourse and legal principles.

Table 1. Origins of the Muslim Population in France

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN | POP.
Algeria | 1,750,000
Morocco | 1,000,000
Tunisia | 400,000
West Africa/Indian Ocean | 350,000
Turkey | 400,000
Converts | <100,000
Asylum Applicants/Undocumented Aliens | 350,000
Asia | 150,000
Other | 150,000
TOTAL | 4,650,000

Factors Prohibiting Integration

Socioeconomic problems, cultural issues, and political tensions.
Islamist radicalism is seen as a reaction to these problems, emerging in the early 1990s as radical leftist ideology faded.
It is rooted in three primary Muslim populations throughout France: a minority of first-generation Muslims, a larger number of the second-generation, and converts.

Sources of Radicalism

Internal: Reaction of disaffected youths from the banlieues (outskirts of major cities).
External: Transnational terrorist networks (Al-Qaeda, ISIL, GIA).
Recruits feel disconnected from both their parents' countries of origin and French society.

Characteristics of French Jihadist Networks

Influenced/led by Al-Qaeda and ISIL.
Complex interpersonal relationships within France and globally.
Less centralized than other Western networks.
Few French networks claim a home base.
ISIL's rise has frightened French citizens and politicians.
France has the largest number of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.
Between April 29, 2014, and March 12, 2015, there were 3,142 reported cases of radicalization to French authorities.
9% of those reported have left to fight in Syria.
Every region has been affected, except Creuse.
25% of those reported are minors, 35% are women, and 40% are converts.
Younger individuals have a higher proportion of women and converts.

Figure 1. Cases of Reported Radicalized Individuals by Department

Analysis of radicalization methods and their efficacy is imperative given the large number of foreign fighters and attacks on French soil.

Government Response

The French government launched a plan to "fight against radicalization," including new legislation to combat violence.
New legislation awards power to administrative apparatuses, unlike past judicial measures.
Revised approach reflects similar laws in the UK and the Netherlands.

Perspective on Radicalization

Dr. Pierre N’Gahane: Radicalization has nothing to do with religion; it concerns conversions to radicalism, driven by histories of failure, identity searches, and vulnerability.
Jihadist discourse offers a "solution kit."
Psychiatrist Serge Hefez: Jihadist discourse separates the pure from the impure and offers structure during adolescent crises, providing an artificial identity, identity gap more than a need for religion.

Identity and Belonging

Government view: Jihadist discourse fills an identity gap more than a need for religion.
France's youth experiences frustration and a feeling of not belonging.
The Islamic State offers an area to reconstruct their identity and rebuild their community.

The Jihadist Phenomenon

The success of the 9/11 attacks broadened jihadists' mindsets and allowed them to think in more global terms, which included planning increasingly wide scale attacks.
The attacks’ success highlighted the United States’ vulnerability and signaled to jihadists that the “imperial” powers were not as invincible as they appeared.
The United States’ response to the attack: launching the global war on terror and the media’s portrayal of Islamist groups as a monolithic threat, added fuel to the fire.

French Values and Norms

France maintains a commitment to laïcité (secularism), relegating religious life to the private sphere.
Laïcité developed into a political principle following the French Revolution to both ensure religious freedom and freedom from religious interference in the public sphere.
Even before it was legally ratified in 1905, the French had resolutely adopted it as a national ideology that is uniquely French.
Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État (‘Law of 9 December 1905 Concerning the Separation of Churches and the State.’)
Secularization is a cultural process rather than a particular school of thought.
There remains a discrepancy between the political implementation of secularism, termed laïcité, and the cultural process of secularization.
Radicalization occurs in the face of secularization, with strict guidelines either discouraging religious adherence or promoting new religious zeal.
Radicalized prison inmates are often identified by their long beards (Les Barbus).

Fundamentalism

Radical fundamentalists frame their debate within a Western framework, striving to express their identity within the public sphere while recognizing its secular nature.
Emerging radical fundamentalism within France is more interested in gaining influence within society than in political power.
There is a belief that individuals who return to Islam will allow society to regain its commitment to religion.
Radicals are more concerned with influencing society than the state, using religious dogma to appeal to individual religious needs.
France struggles to manage open religiosity using its strict secular framework.
Young recruits adhere to individualism and other norms that characterize Western society.
The belief that individuals can reconstruct a society based on a religious foundation is adhering to the Western value of individualism.
Traditional tools of laïcité are ill-equipped to deal with social ties that form within radical groups.
Radical recruiters target the youngsters from the banlieues.
Olivier Roy refers to the current fundamentalism as “neo-fundamentalism” that is “a common intellectual matrix that can nevertheless be manifested in various political attitudes."
Important unifier between movements is viewing their dogma as the true path to Islam.
Radical Muslims recognize that in the West, Islam is not defined by its territorial boundaries, manipulating communitarianism to create a pseudo-community outside the nation-state.
The State uses laïcité to ban any form of religious expression in the public sphere.
Examples of radicalization are viewed as representing the disintegration of France’s social fabric and as examples of communitarianism.

Reestablishing Territoriality

France's main tool to combat threats of radical fundamentalism and zealous religious revival.
Camel Bechikh expressed his desire to develop a “patriotic Islam,” allowing French Muslims to maintain their religious identities while remaining loyal to Republican values.

Response to Charlie Hebdo Attacks

Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, in February 2015, the French government announced its intention to reform the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) and to create a better represented council that meets twice annually.
France entered into a state of shock and the attacks promoted the creation of an “Islam of France”.

An Overview

This paper aims to address the growing threat of Islamist radicalization in France to determine if there is a form of radicalization that is particularly effective.
By examining recruitment in mosques, prisons, and online in individual chapters I will establish if there is a single most effective method of radicalization.
Alexandre Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz define radicalization as a process by which an individual or group embraces extreme religious, political, or social beliefs that justify using violence to attain their goals.
The US Department of Homeland Security has a nearly identical definition.
The Swedish Security Service (Säpo) offers two possible interpretations, “a process leading to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society” and “a process that leads an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims."
The importance lies in the fact that each sector possesses unique qualities that may prove more appealing to those who are predisposed to radicalization.
The paper offers a critical analysis of government policies and issues surrounding radicalization in each sector as well as concludes that prison radicalization has proven to produce the most dangerous and violent radicals.
Mapping out a brief history of radicalization in France, including the evolution of radicalization tactics since the early 1990s and government responses is important when studying radicalization.
Data was obtained from the Western Jihadism Project database, which houses an archive of jihadist publications and related materials, both online and in print.
The French dataset contains 695 individuals of French descent or who became naturalized prior to the age of sixteen.
Today there are three primary means of radicalization: in mosques, prisons, and online.
The second chapter discusses the role of mosques in inspiring extremism. There have, over the years, been several mosques that have become known as incubators of radicalism.
The chapter also discusses individuals who were radicalized in mosques, as well as radical imams and trends in imam radicalization.

Mosques in France

There are currently 2,200 mosques in France, while less than ten percent have had links to radical figures throughout a twenty-five year period.
Islam is currently the second-largest religion in France, with an estimated 5 million adherents, 1,555 mosques, 2,147 places of worship, and 1,300 imams.
Historically, initiatives aimed at forming imams in France have received little funding, have been carried out without state support, and have largely been funded by overseas benefactors in Muslim-majority countries.
Despite the estimated 5 million Muslims living in France there are only five private initiatives that provide imam training. As a result, France relies on foreign imams who are trained abroad for supplying its mosques, with the majority coming from Morocco, Turkey, and Algeria.

Relevancy of Laïcité

The radical secular fundamentalism that is currently on the rise within France cannot be ignored using the precept of laïcité.
Republican values must focus on enforcing laïcité as a means for creating tolerance, rather than as a force that targets religious dogma.
Creating a “patriotic Islam” may discourage radicalization if Islam is offered a place in French society without focusing on religious dogma, but rather "the rules of the game."

Structure of Thesis

Following the discussion on mosques is the issue of prison radicalization, which examines case studies of prison radicalization and analyzes trends in this form of recruitment and extremism.
The final analysis concerns online radicalization, as well as how it allows women to become more involved in the jihadist cause.
A final conclusion will determine if there is a radicalization method that warrants exceptional government attention, as well as include current governmental policy and its effectiveness.

Radicalization in France: A Brief History

France was one of the first European countries to encounter jihadism following a December 1994 attack on French soil.
The 1994 plane hijacking was meant to prompt negotiates for releasing Algerian prisoners.
The next year, Paris experienced a series of bombings later known as the Paris Metro Bombings, resulting in eight deaths and over 100 injuries.
The attacks signaled a shift in terrorist aims, revealing an evolution in France’s Islamism from local revolutionary movements to global jihad.

The Armed Islamic Groups (GIA)

The Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) was an active Islamist organization that adopted a violent, militant discourse in 1992 after the military government banned the Islamic Salvation Front.
The GIA transitioned into the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1995 after Osama Bin Laden financed the group’s creation out of London.
The GIA turned into a self- defeating enterprise after it carried out a series of extremely violent attacks on Muslims in Algeria.
The group is also known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), signaling a merger of several North African groups into one.

Jihadist Networks

Between 2003-2004 France was spared from the homegrown terrorism scares that took place throughout Europe.
France’s participation in the war in Afghanistan and its ban of the hijab in public schools has rendered it a new target for jihadists.
In August 2009 Ayman al-Zawahiri stated: “France is the one who fought Islam and Arabs in Algeria, and France is the one who supplied Israel with a nuclear reactor, and France fights Muslims in Afghanistan, and France fights hijab, and France will pay for all her crimes, Allah-willing.”

Fatwa from Al-Zawahiri

Issued a fatwa on July 28, 2010 that encouraged French Muslim women to oppose France’s ban against wearing the niqab in public spaces: “Every single woman who defends her veil is a holy warrior … in the face of the secular Western crusade."

Letter from Osama Bin Laden

Wrote a “Letter to the People of France,” contending that France’s policies regarding Muslims and Islam were the reasons Al-Qaeda threatened French security and “why your security is being threatened and your sons taken hostage."

Structure of Jihadist Networks

Some actors hold leadership positions while others play secondary roles.
Subsequent network analysis revealed complex personal relationships, both within and outside of plots.

Globalization as a Tool of Radicalization

Globalization has changed the paradigm of the religious community in France because it has created transnational religious communities, which are formed on the Internet.
Radical fundamentalists have used globalization in their goal to divorce Islam from any sociological, political or anthropological references in order to form a “pure” religion.
Fundamentalism in Western Europe is occurring as a born again movement that rejects any cultural or familial heritage.
Radicals were raised in the banlieues, economically disenfranchised areas on the outskirts of France’s major cities, and even those Muslims who were not raised in a religious household are subject to indoctrination.

Examples of Terrorists

The 1994 terrorist attacks in Marrakech were carried out by Redouane Hammadi and Stephane Ait Idir, two unemployed French Algerian Muslims from the poor Cité des 4000 district in La Corneuve, a Paris suburb.
In 1995 the deadly train bombings were perpetrated by a group of radicalized French Muslims led by Frenchman Khaled Kelkal, who was radicalized in prison.
The Beghal Network’s leader, Djamel Beghal, is an Algerian who married a Frenchwoman and became a French citizen.
Convicted terrorist Kamel Daoudi immigrated to France with his family as an infant and was raised in a middle- class suburban neighborhood.
Slimane Khalfaoui, who was arrested in 2002 for planning a bombing in Strasbourg, grew up in Montfermeil, an impoverished Parisian suburb.
Two French prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Nizar Sassi and Mourad Benchellali were raised in the poor suburbs of Lyon, which witnessed considerable youth riots in the early 1980s.
Recruiters often target these young men and present their situations within a framework that blames Western values for the individual’s, and society’s woes.
Roy also identifies a pattern in radicalization in France. His model includes a middleman from the Middle East who makes contact with a local group of young men who are often involved in petty crime, and adds modern radicals often believe that salvation occurs through faith rather than theological study.

Embracing Globalization

Many radicals embrace globalization as a means to rebuild the ummah (religious community) on purely religious grounds, using agents of globalization, such as the Internet and television.
In Jihad vs. McWorld Benjamin Barber contends that Islamic tribalism and religious fundamentalism are colliding with modernization and globalization.
Jihadists use technology and the Internet, western media tactics, and a globalized economy.
Anwar Al-Awlaki was perhaps the most well known Western terrorist because of his use of the Internet to brand himself as a user-friendly Al-Qaeda personality, repackaging al-Qaeda’s convoluted message.

Statistics and Structure

In 2013 there were 152 reported terror attacks that occurred in the five major European Union states. The majority (63) occurred in France.
In 2013, there were 535 arrests made related to terrorism, the majority of arrests occurred in France (225).
French authorities made 139 arrests on Islamist terrorism grounds in 2006, 91 in 2007, 78 in 2008, and 37 in 2009.
According to Europol, notes an increase in religiously related terror attacks since 2011, while the number of separatist movements has declined.

Government Reactions

After a report was published that more than seven hundred Frenchmen were believed to be fighting in Syria, Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve promised a series of measures to combat radicalization within the French population.
In July 2014 Cazeneuve proposed an “anti-jihad bill,” which contained proposals to stop potential jihadists from leaving France to fight in Syria and Iraq.
France has also agreed to provide military support to the Iraqi government in order to fight the ISIL.
Since the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, the government has proposed extensive new measures related to monitoring radicalization online.
Manuel Valls has called for more university classes to teach Islam, and has argued for increased imam training in France in order to ensure that imams receive a “Republican” education in addition to a religious one.

Conclusion

France’s history with its Muslim population is complex and fraught with tension, as well as assuming a public- private religious divide.
ISIL’s rise and the Charlie Hebdo attacks have heightened existing unease, with terror networks capitalizing on members of the Muslim community’s feelings of disenfranchisement.
Al-Qaeda and ISIL have used globalization to diffuse their messages to a global audience, which has allowed French Muslims to become a part of a transnational movement.

Chapter One: Radicalization in Mosques

In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks France has proposed a new set of reforms to prevent future radicalization.
France has outlined plans to create a “dialogue forum,” drawn from Islamic associations, leading intellectuals, and prominent figures in France’s Muslim community.
Minister Bernard Cazeneuve believes Imams with “only be recruited if they have obtained the new training diploma in the fundamental principles of the Republic."
Generally two principal ways that mosques are involved in radicalization.

Trends in Mosque Involvement

Radical imams radicalize their mosque attendees, who often go on to form their own groups.
Radical groups form among mosque attendees even if their imam is moderate.
The following research affirms that there continues to be issues of radicalization in France’s mosques.
There is a trend of self-declared imams and leaders who indoctrinate their fellow mosque attendees.
Their connection to foreign organizations is perhaps the most worrying trend.

Mosque Rings

There are ten known cells that have developed in mosques serving as case studies to better understand patterns in mosque radicalization.
Each cell had a leader—whether a formal imam or self-declared leader—who influenced and recruited others.
Their members were involved in various plots, from jihad recruitment, to foreign fighting, to plotting domestic attacks.
In March 2015, National Front vice president Florian Philippot argued that, “sadly,” mosques “are usually the places of radicalization” and supported Marine Le Pen’s suggestion to stop mosque construction. Less than a month later the leader of the French Council of the Muslim Faith and rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, Dalil Boubakeur called on the number of mosques in France to be doubled.

Mosque de la Rue Archimède

The mosque’s cell was founded by Christopher Caze and Lionel Dumont, both converts, in 1993.
Dumont converted to Islam in 1992 while completing French military service in Somalia from 1992-1993.
Caze went to Bosnia in the early 1990s then returned to France, converted, and began to use the mosque for recruiting other Muslims for jihad, when Dumont returned in 1993 he began attending the mosque.
Dumont and Caze met in Bosnia while Caze was being mentored by London Finsbury Park imam Abu Hamza.
The group became active in 1996 and was responsible for several robberies, a murder, and an attempted domestic attack.

Mosquée Bilal

Khaled Kelkal, who was made famous for the 1995 Paris Metro Bombings, returned from prison and began attending the mosque headed by the fundamentalist preacher Mohamed Minta.
Together with his childhood friend Karim Koussa the pair developed a radical GIA cell and often watched GIA videos together.
Other Islamists in the Mosquée Bilal connected them with the radical Algerian Ben Ali Boualem Bensaid, who was eventually implicated in the 1995 bombings.
The Mosque became a symbol throughout the 1990s as an example of radical rings in Mosques.
Following the 1995 attacks authorities cracked down on the ring, which caused images of mosques as potential radicalization hotbeds.

Centre Islamique des Alpes-Maritimes (CIAM)

The CIAM is located in Nice.
Its members were involved in the 1995 Christmas GIA plot.
The cell was formed to succeed the dismantled 1995 Metro Bombing cell.
The ring served as an example of cultural associations’ involvement in extremist causes.

Mosquée Omar

The Mosquée Omar had a radical religious leader Mohammed Hammami who called for violence against women and jihad, as well as making anti-Semitic comments.
Virgile Willie Brigitte converted in 1998 and attended the Omar and Abu Bakr mosques where he made contact with radial Algerian Salafist preachers. Brigitte was involved in the Sydney rugby plot, had ties to Al-Qaeda, and was involved in the Forsane Alizza kidnapping.
Several mosques attendees traveled to Pakistan and planned to set off a liquid bomb.
The attendees at Mosquée Omar were involved in distinct plots. Their numerous plots and country affiliations demonstrate the diversity of mosque radicalization.
Radicalization in mosques with a radical imam without a singular agenda also allows attendees to use their extremist views to contribute to differing radical causes.

Mosquée Mantes la Jolie

Mosquée Mantes la Jolie is best known for its group of attendees that went on to participate in the 2003 Casablanca bombings.
Bachir Ghoumid, who was recruited by Bentizi, helped to plan the attacks, as did Fouad Charouali who said Bentizi “captivated [his] heart.”
While it is unclear if these men were radicalized prior to their mosque attendance, their receptiveness to radical ideas demonstrates a pre-disposition to radicalization and receptiveness to extremist doctrine.

Moquée Adda’wa

The mosque served as a meeting center for those who were part of the Buttes-Chaumont group in Paris’s 19th arrondissement.
Farid Benyettou, a self-taught preacher, Preached jihadist views in several mosques following the 2003 Iraq invasion, encouraging youths in mosques to join.
Its use as a recruitment and meeting center, demonstrating the function of mosques in radicalization.

Mosquée de la Reynerie

All ten members of the cell in Mosquée de la Reynerie were involved in Iraq jihad recruitment in Toulouse, and were arrested in 2007.
The group was led by convert Olivier Correl, who had established a communal farm in Arriège that adhered to sharia law. He frequently traveled to the mosque.. He targeted impressionable young youths, who were then sent to radical madrasas in Egypt where they connected with networks in Syria that would take them to Iraq.
One of its attendees Thomas Barnouin was a convert who began attending Mosquée de la Reynerie because Mosquée d’Albi was not radical enough for him.

Mosquée de Trappes

Many members of the Ansar al-Fath group attended the Trappes mosque. Houdoux was also suspected of connections to the GSPC.
The group intended to recruit individuals to go to Iraq and intended to recruit individuals to go to Iraq, they were expected to use their expertise to carry out attacks on French soil.
The case of Mosquée de Trappes demonstrates the ability of groups that formed in another radicalization sector (prison) to continue their practices in an established location.

Mosquée Essalam du Ront-Point de La Conte

The cell, which was active from 2007-2011, was located in Southern France.
Its members established a terrorist training camp in the forest in Corbières and were training to go wage jihad abroad, but the group also displayed no intentions to carry out domestic attacks.
Two of the eight group members, Aresene Atonovic and Khaled Harakate, regularly attended the mosque.
There were no known ties to outside networks, except for training mujahedeen to fight in Iraq.

Mosquée de Lunel

Currently, there are seventeen fighters from the town of Lunel in southern France fighting with Al-Qaeda or ISIL and allegedly attended a mosque in the town’s suburbs.The French Council of the Muslim Faith considered a Lunel mosque leader’s remarks to be “completely unacceptable” for refusing to condemn the town’s young men from becoming foreign fighters.Three of the men took their wives abroad, one of whom gave birth in a war zone. Bernard Cazeneuve believes that the members were “recruited and indoctrinated, and who also recruited and indoctrinated several other French youngsters from Lunel.”

Trends in Mosque Radicalization

There is no indication that radicalization in mosques is decreasing. Rather, the recent arrests in conjunction with the Lunel mosque demonstrate that mosques continue to serve as points of radicalization. There is also an increased shift in recruiting fighters to serve abroad.
There is an additional overall trend of radical figures (who are usually not official imams) recruiting others, and it appears that the majority of members harbored extremist tendencies before becoming involved in extremist cells.
There is also a pattern of connections to foreign organizations, giving an increased incentive to carry out successful attacks if networks receive funding, support, or guidance from larger networks.
Mosque rings in the early 1990s were more likely to carry out successful domestic attacks.
Today, attempted domestic attacks have been thwarted, and there is a renewed emphasis on training and recruiting foreign fighters.
Nevertheless, mosques are likely to attract those that already possess radical beliefs making it nearly impossible to reverse the radicalization process.

Individual Mosque Radicalization

Within the dataset there are eighteen Frenchmen who were radicalized in mosques while not being part of a larger group. Of these, five were radicalized in the United Kingdom. This indicates transnational aspects of globalization that jihadists can capitalize on to strengthen networks and connections between countries.

Radical Imams

There are seventeen radical imams that have been convicted in France since the early 1990's including Adel Mechat, Nourredine Merabet, Chellali Benchellali , Abdelkader Bouziane , Imam Yahia Abdelkader Cherif, Reda Ameuroud, Farid Benyettou, Lastly and Omar Hamimi

Trends in Imam Radicalization

The majority of radical imams are Algerian. France has a strict deportation policy, and as a result, foreign imams are immediately expelled from France if found in violation of French norms and laws.
There appears to be an increase in radical imams in the early 1990s, and then again in 2004-2005. - Since then, there have been few reported cases., this trend suggests providing them with civic training.

Institutional Problems

Mosque radicalization should be viewed as a quantitatively large threat, both in terms of recruitment and cell network cohesion.
The Charlie Hebdo attacks rattled the entire nation and have prompted many to ask: what went wrong?
When imams are born and educated overseas they absorb the country’s political, religious, and cultural beliefs. Most federations are only interested in teaching their country’s branch of Islam, which does not account for the multitude of variations within branches and between countries. As a result, instruction overseas is not in accord with France’s own values.
Instruction overseas is not in accord with France’s own values. Many imams born abroad often speak little to no French when they arrive in France, which can alienate the younger generations of Muslims. Mohammed Chirani believes French Language sermons lead to lower cases of radicalization among Muslims.

Uniform Curriculum

The multitude of schools abroad and the lack of regulation for training in France means that there is little uniform curriculum between the schools. France’s Islamic institutions are dominated by those whose origins primarily trace back to Algeria and Morocco.
There are only six universities in France that offer courses in Islamic studies and theology. There is hope for more imams and prison chaplains to be trained in France, who would receive education in French republican values.
The government needs to acknowledge that Islam is no longer a religion of immigrants.
Florian Phillipot’s suggestion to stem mosque building will deny Muslims the agency they so desperately need.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by the previous ten case studies, mosque radicalization continues to threaten French national security.
The cases of foreign fighters that were radicalized in Lunel’s mosque disprove any claims that mosque radicalization is on the decline, with the rise of ISIL, there is likely to be an increased number of foreign fighters leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq.
The government should continue its initiatives to train imams domestically while remaining faithful to the principle of laïcité.
Leaders must actively denounce jihad and attacks on French soil, and more mosques need to be constructed in order to better serve the number of Muslims.

Prison Radicalization

Prison radicalization has been a contentious topic since the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014. In response France made controversial expeirments among its 2,500 prisoners, by isolating twenty inmates that it considered to be radical Islamists.
Prison radicalization is quantitatively serious and should be treated as such.
The data shows that prison radicalization has more likelyhood to cause violant attacks then mosque or online, people predisposed to criminality are more likely to commit violent crimes as Islamist radicals.

Problems with the Current Prison System

In each French prison there is an officer that collects intelligence data. Until the year 2000 the data reflected the “fundamentalist-radical model,” where radicals exhibited the same signs as fundamentalists, and were thus treated in similar ways.
Equating fundamentalism with radicalism overlooks that radical fundamentalists are not creating communities that are traditional in structure. Therefore it is impractical to rely on a methodology that can no longer correctly analyze current issues. Also ignores the Prison’s reluctance to acknowledge some prisoners have religious rights.

Cases of Prison Radicalization

In the 1990s and early 2000s, many networks that were formed in prison went on to carry out attacks on French soil. Post-2005, many radicalized prisoners were released and met their future accomplices outside of the prison walls. There are twelve organized plots stemming from those radicalized in prison, two more than the number of plots organized by radical groups in mosques.

1995 Paris Metro Bombings

On July 17, 1995 a bomb exploded in the Paris metro, killing eight people and injuring over 100.
Was the first terror attack on the capital since the department store bombing in 1985.
The Parisian's unerved and the metro attack unnerved nation and reminded Parisians of terror attacks.

Khaled Kelkal

During the 1990's Khaled Kelkal and several of his assistants in the 1995 Metro bombings were radicalized in prison.
In 1993 Kelkal was recruiting by the GIA - Upon his return to France he became infamous for assassinating Imam Sahraoui. - He fled evading arrest before leaving a bomb near the Paris-Lyon TGV train.
Was killed by gendarmes on September 29, 1995.

Ansar al-Fath /Safe Bourada

Safe Bourada led another recruiting ring while imprisoned, where he acted as an informal imam and was responsible for the conversion and subsequent radicalization of several inmates.
In 1998 Bouarda was sentenced to ten years in prison for providing funds, arms, and logistical support for the 1995 bombings.
While in jail he recruited several inmates who were serving time for petty theft inmates to form the terrorist group Ansar al-Fath and were rearrested in 2005.
The rise of Safe Bourada challenges Marc Sageman’s “leaderless jihad” theory.

Tolouse Scooter Shootings

The trio, all radicalized in prison, was responsible for the 2012 Toulouse Scooter Shootings, President Nicolas Sarkozy commissioned a study on radicalization in prisons and former Minister of Justice Rachida Dati called for more Muslim prison chaplains and increased intelligence gathering.

Sylla Cell and the Nice Recruitment Ring

Omar Diaby, who was imprisoned for assault and murder, led the Nice recruitment ring from 2011-2012.
Three members of the Sylla cell, including its leader Ibrahima Sylla, were radicalized in prison operating from 2006-2013 they plotted to attack public figures. - Upon Sylla’s release from Fleury-Mérogis prison in 2012, prison authorities noted that he had become extremely radical, yet no action was taken to follow up.
Highlights the ineffectiveness of monitoring for terror suspects.

Sarcelles Kosher Shop Attack and Belkacem Escape Plot

In January 2012, Jérémie Felix Lois-Sidney, a.k.a. James, participated in the Sarcelles Kosher Shop attack, becoming exposed to radicals while for attempted murder charges in the mid-2000s.
while in prison he was mentored by his cellmate Mohammed El-Ayouni and was granted temporary release from prison, from which he never returned.

Returning Foreign Fighters

Prison authorities fear a new threat: returning foreign fighters who will be imprisoned and spread their radical ideology.
A French government stated there are nearly 1,200 Frenchmen fighting in Syria and Iraq and it shows no signs of abating and the number was at an all-time high

Additional Prison Networks

the Chechen Network, was arrested on December 12, 2005 after Ouassini Chérifi recruited him while