Hobbes's Theory of Representation: anti-democratic or proto-democratic?- Reichman

Study Notes: David Reichman, "Hobbes' Theory of Representation"

Reichman argues that Hobbes’ political theory is more democratic than usually acknowledged.
The common reading of Leviathan is too narrow, focusing mainly on Hobbes’ theory of authorization and neglecting the broader, more flexible democratic possibilities in his theory of representation.

Traditional interpretations treat Hobbes’ theory of representation as a legal fiction, where individuals authorize a sovereign to act on their behalf.
This view overlooks how Hobbes’ concept of representation could support forms of popular politics beyond mere legal authorization.
Reichman argues that focusing only on authorization obscures the more dynamic possibilities in Hobbes’ political thought.

Though Hobbes allows for individual resistance in cases of self-preservation, Reichman notes that in practice, such resistance is almost always futile.
The power of the sovereign is such that individual acts of resistance are unlikely to meaningfully impact the state.
This highlights the importance of institutional forms of political participation and representation as alternatives to individual resistance.

Reichman commends Hobbes for attempting to ground political order on a stable foundation, one not dependent on the fluctuating will of a multitude.
Hobbes was correct to seek a solid basis for popular politics, even if his specific model gave the sovereign too much independence from those it represents.
Hobbes’ effort represents an early move toward conceptualizing modern representation, where popular sovereignty does not require direct democracy.

Reichman identifies a key gap: Hobbes does not show how individual views could influence the state after the sovereign is authorized.
In Hobbes' model, once representation is established, the sovereign acts independently of the ongoing will of the people.
Reichman suggests that introducing a mechanism whereby individual perspectives can inform state action would improve Hobbes' theory—limiting representative independence without turning representatives into mere delegates.

Hobbes sought to reconcile popular sovereignty with a unified state through representative authorization rather than through direct popular rule or an artificial collective identity.
Reichman sees this as a valuable framework because it avoids the problems of trying to forge a collective identityfrom diverse individuals.
However, he argues that a greater responsiveness to individual views would make this reconciliation more democratic and more suitable for modern political theory.

Reichman’s essay offers a more democratic interpretation of Hobbes, arguing that his theory of representation can support representative democracy more than traditional readings suggest.
The challenge is to build on Hobbes' strengths—the grounding of authority in popular authorization—while adding mechanisms for individual voices to shape state action.
This approach shows that Hobbes’ thought provides useful resources for rethinking modern democracy and representation.