Imperial nationalism and NATO expansion: notes from Kuzio (2023) and Mearsheimer (2022)
Introduction to the themes
Themed section: Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Kuzio 2023) and accompanying analysis by Mearsheimer (2022) on the Ukraine war.
Two complementary lenses: historical imperial-nationalist narratives in Russia and contemporary strategic debates about NATO and Western policy.
Abstract (Kuzio 2023)
Core claim: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is rooted in two interlocking ideological shifts:
Revival of Tsarist imperial nationalism and White Russian émigré nationalism that deny the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Revival of Soviet-era discourse around the Great Patriotic War and Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists).
Definitions and terms:
A Ukrainian nationalist in Soviet/Russian context = someone who seeks Ukraine’s future outside the USSR/Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian identity (as opposed to Little Russians).
The Russian World is the core project of Russia’s alternative to the EU’s Eastern Partnership within the Eurasian Economic Union.
Contemporary framing: Ukrainian nationalists are labeled Nazi regardless of language or political belief if they reject Little Russian identity. Putin’s denazification goal is framed as genocidal and aimed at eradicating an “anti-Russia” nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.
Keywords and framing: denazification, genocide, Russian imperial nationalism, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin.
Publication details: Accepted 2022; DOI provided; affiliations with National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.
Introduction (Kuzio 2023)
The February 24, 2022 invasion is driven by imperial nationalism and revived Soviet-era discourse portraying Ukrainian nationalists as Nazis; this holds irrespective of language and challenges narratives of regional language divides.
Denazification policy has been most intense in Donbas and other Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine; war crimes and destruction tied to this logic.
Putin’s long-standing obsession: to reassemble “Russian lands” and bring Ukraine back into the Russian World; this was touted since he returned to the presidency in 2012.
From the mid-2000s, Russian media and political discourse dehumanised Ukrainians and denied Ukrainian nationhood, laying groundwork for war crimes and genocidal acts under denazification; a basis for these policies is a dehumanising narrative that legitimates violence.
Long-run process of dehumanisation includes portraying Ukraine as artificial or US puppet; justification for intervention rests on civilizational paternalism and control over Ukraine’s fate.
The article juxtaposes scholarly neglect of imperial nationalism with the urgency to study imperial-nationalist roots of 2014 Crimea annexation and 2022 invasion.
War crimes and genocide framing: Western legal analyses label certain acts as genocidal, while Ukrainian prosecutions and ICC investigations pursue accountability.
Key claim: an imperial-nationalist trajectory, fused with Soviet nostalgia and White émigré revival, underpins both the ideology and the practical conduct of the Russian state in Ukraine.
Why did scholars dismiss nationalism in Russia? (Kuzio 2023)
Before 2014–2022, many scholars treated nationalism in Putin’s Russia as a temporary or instrumental phenomenon rather than a structural driver.
Notable omissions: the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalism and White Russian émigré nationalism, and their impact on the dehumanisation of Ukrainians.
Noted gaps in major works post-2014 crisis (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2016; Laruelle, 2020) for overlooking imperial nationalist currents and Ukraine-denying narratives.
The 2014 Crimea crisis and subsequent hybrid warfare highlighted the crisis in Russian studies and demanded renewed attention to imperial nationalism over two decades of Putin’s rule (Kuzio 2020, 2022b, 2022c).
Consequences and evidence cited include: war crimes in Ukraine, large-scale destruction, deportations, filtration camps, and other atrocities.
The argument emphasizes the need to foreground imperial nationalism as the driver, rather than seeing it as a marginal or temporary instrument of Kremlin policy.
The broader claim: neglect of this nationalist axis has led Western scholars to misread the causes and dynamics of both the 2014 and 2022 interventions.
‘RED-BROWN’ to ‘RED-WHITE-BROWN’ Russian imperial nationalism (Kuzio 2023)
Historical arc:
The 1993 coup attempted to unite red (Soviet-aligned) and brown (far-right nationalist/fascist) elements; its failure pushed those groups to the margins temporarily.
From the mid-1990s, Russia shifted foreign and security policy away from a liberal frame toward a nationalist one, asserting the right to protect Russophones abroad and declaring Eurasia as its exclusive sphere of influence.
The 1996 election cycle saw Tsarist-White émigré lines gain influence through figures like Primakov and the ascendance of Eurasianism, reinforcing an idea of Russia at the center of Eurasia.
The “red-white-brown” alliance (post-2000) fused: great-power nationalism (red), Tsarist imperial nostalgia (white), and White émigré nationalism (brown).
Dugin as a leading ideologue: advanced a nationalist, anti-Ukrainian, imperial program and influenced Kremlin discourse since 2014, with calls that framed Ukrainians as killers and threats to Russia.
Territorial revanchism: Putin’s earlier talk of New Russia and Black Sea Lands tied to restoration of territorial claims in southeastern Ukraine; Crimea annexation broad public support among Russians (84–86%).
Strategic miscalculation by Russia: invasion of 2022 aimed at occupying Kyiv quickly, but an underestimation of Ukrainian resistance and logistical constraints led to an expanded, protracted conflict.
Military capacity and aims: the invading force (~1.75 imes10^5 troops) could not realistically subdue a country as large as Ukraine; the plan shifted to a broader Donbas/southern Ukraine control and a land corridor; the broader aim included destroying the Ukrainian economy and sovereignty.
The section also notes: Crimea annexation support and the broader claim that Ukraine became a “US puppet state” in the Kremlin’s narrative.
Integration of Tsarist imperial and Soviet nationalism (Kuzio 2023)
Fusion of two parallel ideological streams:
Tsarist imperial nationalism: denial of Ukrainian existence, elevation of Eastern Slavs into a pan-Russian whole, and the dream of a unified “Russian World.”
Soviet-era discourse: reimagining Ukrainian nationalists as Nazis; the rehabilitation and expansion of White émigré writers and generals (e.g., Ivan Ilyin) who denied Ukrainian nationhood.
Re-Sovietisation and Stalinisation: a shift in Russia’s internal culture and external posture, elevating the Great Patriotic War to a quasi-religion, and praising Stalin’s legacy.
Ivan Ilyin and White Russian émigrés: Putin’s admiration and revival of their works, promoting a narrative of Russian unity and a common Eastern Slavic destiny.
Russian World Foundation (2007): aimed to unite the three eastern Slavs; reunification of domestic and émigré Russian Orthodox Church wings reinforced imperial nationalism.
Consequences for policy and pedagogy: re-education through school reading lists and state offices; increased territorial revanchism toward eastern and southeastern Ukraine.
De-Stalinisation vs. de-communisation in Ukraine: Ukraine passed decommunisation laws in 2015 to break with Soviet symbols and narratives; Russia opposed and criticized these laws.
The Great Patriotic War cult and the Stalin cult: Stalin’s veneration served as a tool for legitimising autocracy and militarised foreign policy; a tool for legitimising aggression against Ukraine.
Western conspiracies: the regime continued to portray Western intelligence as pulling strings in protests and color revolutions; a conspiratorial frame that blamed the US, Poland, and the EU for disrupting Russian unity.
Zion/anti-Ukrainian framing: Zelenskyy (a Jewish-Ukrainian president and Russian-speaking), accused as a Nazi due to support for Ukrainian identity and NATO/EU membership; a rhetorical strategy to tag Ukrainian leadership as Nazis.
The section concludes by arguing that these strands contributed to Russia’s sustained belief in the necessity of denazification and the erasure of Ukrainian national identity.
Putin in 2022 as the Dugin of 2014 (Kuzio 2023)
Three reasons given for the escalation in 2022 vs. 2014:
Imperial nationalism had come to dominate Putin’s mindset by 2022, aligning with Dugin and other imperial nationalists who had argued similarly in 2014.
Ukraine’s drift away from Russia’s sphere of influence toward a Western alignment presented a direct challenge to Russian strategic interests.
COVID-era isolation exposed Putin to White Russian émigré literature and possibly furthered his ideological resolve; the 2021 essay on Russian-Ukrainian unity is seen as an ideological blueprint for invasion.
Soft power and domestic politics: Russian soft power in Ukraine declined; pro-Russian parties and identities in Ukraine collapsed post-2014, shifting Ukrainian politics and strengthening resistance.
The Orthodox Church and religious influence: Moscow’s religious control over Ukraine’s parishes (roughly 40% of Russian Orthodox parishes) was central to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the maintenance of a “Russian World” influence.
The consolidation of power within Russia post-2020: constitutional changes making Putin effectively president for life, and a broader cult of war surrounding symbols like the “Z” tattooed on tanks, as well as traitor-focused rhetoric reminiscent of Stalinist purges.
The section argues that Russia by 2022 had become a fascist-leaning regime, with Dugin’s earlier calls to exterminate Ukrainians mirrored in state policy and propaganda.
Conclusions (Kuzio 2023)
Core conclusion: Russia’s invasion is a product of two intertwined phenomena—Tsarist imperial nationalism and Soviet-era denazification discourses about Ukrainian nationalists.
The narrative that Ukraine is a US puppet state has been reincarnated to fit modern geopolitics; denazification, war crimes, and genocide are framed as consequences of a long dehumanisation process in Russian media and politics.
Russia’s imperial nationalism abroad reflects an evolution toward a fascist-style regime domestically.
Putin’s 2022 discourse echoed Dugin’s 2014 rhetoric; Western scholars largely missed this linkage, underestimating the depth of nationalist currents.
Impacts on Ukrainian-Russian sentiment: long-standing stereotypes of Ukrainians as Little Russians persisted; the invasion produced a stark reality where Ukrainian resistance and Western support reshaped the region’s political landscape.
Consequences for Western scholarship: the necessity of reevaluating Russian-Ukrainian dynamics, acknowledging long-standing nationalist mythologies, and rethinking how Western policy interacts with imperial nationalist ideologies.
Measured outcomes described include: failed capture of Kyiv, heavy Russian casualties, damage to Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, shifting EU/NATO dynamics, and shifting public attitudes in both Ukraine and Russia.
Quantitative snapshots and trends referenced: broad public opinion shifts in Russia (e.g., Levada Center data) and Ukrainian public opinion shifts over time; Crimea annexation support; and the scale of war damage and displacement (economic, human, and infrastructural).
Final exhortation: Western scholars should reassess attitudes toward Russian-Ukrainian relations; the long-term effects of the war will include enduring Ukrainian anti-Russian sentiment and a transformed regional security order.
The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War (Mearsheimer 2022)
Core argument: The United States bears principal responsibility for causing the Ukraine crisis, though Putin initiated the war; Western allies largely follow Washington’s lead.
The central claim: Washington’s push for Ukraine to become a Western bulwark—through EU integration, democracy promotion, and NATO membership—created an existential threat perception in Moscow that helped trigger the conflict.
The conventional wisdom (Western view) is that Putin has imperial ambitions to conquer and absorb Ukraine, erasing it as an independent state; Mearsheimer challenges this interpretation.
Evidence against pure imperial conquest:
Putin has publicly stated Ukraine should have sovereignty and that Russia would not occupy Ukrainian territory in the long term; he emphasizes a desire to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Western-leaning threat rather than to annex all of Ukraine.
In his July 2021 essay and subsequent 2022 statements, Putin argued for Ukraine’s sovereignty and stressed that Russia cannot tolerate Ukraine joining NATO; he framed threats as coming from a Western-aligned Ukraine rather than a desire to incorporate Ukraine into Russia.
The real cause (Mearsheimer’s claim): The American-led effort to integrate Ukraine into the West, particularly NATO, with three prongs: EU integration, establishment of a pro-Western liberal democracy, and NATO membership.
Bucharest 2008 warning and red lines:
NATO’s Bucharest Summit stated Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members; Putin reacted with outrage, warning that Ukraine’s NATO membership would be existentially threatening and would cause it to fall apart without Crimea and eastern regions.
Burns memo to Rice highlighted that Ukrainian NATO entry would be a direct challenge to Russian interests; Merkel and Sarkozy opposed flexible approaches but U.S. pressure prevailed.
The 2014 crisis and beyond:
U.S.-led response after 2014 doubled down on the strategy, effectively making Ukraine a de facto NATO member through training and weapons provision.
Joint exercises (Sea Breeze 2021, Rapid Trident 2021) and long-term military-structure support increased Ukraine’s capabilities and interoperability with NATO.
The two key claims about NATO and deterrence:
NATO expansion was not designed to contain Russia in the 1990s; instead, the West aimed to spread liberal order eastward; post-2014, Ukraine became a de facto NATO partner.
Moscow viewed NATO expansion into Ukraine as an existential threat and sought to deter it by force.
Escalation risks and the possibility of nuclear use:
Two explicit risk scenarios highlighted by U.S. intelligence and commentary: (1) Russia uses nuclear weapons to prevent Ukrainian and Western gains if Moscow perceives a strategic collapse; (2) NATO forces or Western troops become increasingly involved, potentially triggering a broader confrontation.
The calculus of escalation is shaped by perceptions of existential threats, with Putin’s frame that neutralization of Ukraine is essential to Russia’s security.
Outcomes and prognostications (Mearsheimer):
The war represents an unmitigated disaster; the likelihood of a negotiated peace in the near term is low because both sides are committed to victory and believe compromise would be a victory for the other side.
A possible neutral Ukraine would be unacceptable to the United States and to NATO’s eastern flank; Ukrainian ultra-nationalist forces complicate any potential compromise.
If the West continues to push to weaken Russia, it raises the risk of escalation into broader conflict, including nuclear; conversely, if Russia gains control of significant territory, the constraints on Western intervention could alter the balance of power in Europe but the conflict risks remain high.
Economic and global implications:
The war has already produced major economic shocks and potential food-security crises globally; long-term deterioration of East-West relations and stability in Europe is expected.
Jamie Dimon’s warning of a global economic “hurricane” underscores the broad destabilising effects beyond Ukraine’s borders.
Final assessment (Mearsheimer): The central misstep was the West’s insistence on expanding NATO and integrating Ukraine into Western security structures; this misread Moscow’s security concerns and provoked a costly conflict. The tragic conclusion is that a different Western posture—one more attentive to Moscow’s red lines and security fears—might have avoided or mitigated the war.
Connections and implications across the two analyses
Shared themes:
Imperial nationalism and the denigration of Ukrainian nationhood play a central role in Russian discourse and policy, influencing both rhetoric and conduct.
Western policy decisions around NATO expansion and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic alignment are presented as key external drivers of the conflict, albeit interpreted differently by Kuzio and Mearsheimer.
Differences in emphasis:
Kuzio foregrounds domestic Russian nationalist ideologies (Tsarist imperialism, White émigré influence, Stalin cult) as primary drivers of aggression and as structural features of the regime.
Mearsheimer emphasizes strategic-security calculations tied to Western expansion and NATO, arguing external policy decisions created an existential threat perception in Moscow.
Real-world relevance:
Understanding the invasion requires integrating historical narratives (imperial nationalism, dehumanisation, denazification discourse) with contemporary security dynamics (NATO expansion, security guarantees, and alliance commitments).
The analysis has ethical implications for how scholars describe national identity, aggression, and the responsibilities of great powers in shaping regional stability.
Formulas and numeric references (selected):
Invading force size: 1.75 imes 10^5 troops.
Ukrainian population: 4.5 imes 10^7 (roughly 45 million).
Potential occupation target forces (theoretical): on the order of 8 00{,}000 for a complete occupation, illustrating logistical constraints.
Crimea annexation public support: approximately 84 ext{-}86 ext{ extperthousand} of Russians.
Displacements and casualties cited in Kuzio: millions displaced or affected; specific figures include deportations of circa 3 000000 Ukrainians, including 2.5 imes 10^5 children, with thousands of other abuses.
Economic impact estimates for Ukraine: the World Bank projects ∼-50 ext{ percent} GDP decline in 2022; reconstruction costs approaching ext{one trillion dollars}.
Ethical and practical implications:
The portrayal of Ukrainians as Nazis and the denigration of Ukrainian nationhood have severe humanitarian and ethical costs, including justification for war crimes and systemic violence.
Western policy considerations about alliance expansion must balance deterrence with avoiding unnecessary escalatory dynamics that could lead to broader conflict.
Quick reference: key actors and terms
Taras Kuzio (author): foregrounds imperial nationalism, Soviet-era denazification discourse, and White émigré revival as drivers behind the invasion.
Alexander Dugin: ideologue associated with the red-white-brown nationalist current advising on Ukrainian policy.
The Russian World Foundation (2007): organizational move to unite the eastern Slavs under a Russian World narrative.
Great Patriotic War cult: re-sacralization of WWII to justify aggression and legitimize state actions.
Denazification: framed as both a policy objective and genocidal project to erase Ukrainian identity.
NATO and Bucharest 2008: pivotal moment when Ukraine and Georgia were promised future NATO membership, a red line for Russia.
Levada Center (Russia): public opinion data cited to illustrate domestic support for military actions.
Definitions: Little Russians vs. Great Russians; pan-Russian nation concept; Ukrainian nation as an existential threat to Russia.
Legal/ethical references: Independent Legal Analysis of the Genocide Convention (2022) referenced to frame certain actions as genocide; ongoing investigations by Ukrainian prosecutors and international bodies.
Summary takeaways
Kuzio’s synthesis: the invasion is best understood as a culmination of long-running imperial-nationalist ideologies fused with Soviet-era narratives—and not solely a reaction to Western actions.
Mearsheimer’s argument: the proximate cause is Western/NATO expansion and Ukraine’s integration into Western political structures, driven by American leadership, which Moscow perceived as existentially threatening.
Both perspectives converge on the importance of framing and perception: security decisions are filtered through historical narratives about Ukrainian nationhood, Western encroachment, and Russia’s self-concept as a great power.
The ethical imperative for scholars: reassess assumptions about nationalism, imperial ambitions, and Western responsibility to avoid misdiagnosing the causes and to inform more effective and responsible policy.
References (selected from the transcript)
Kuzio, T. (2023). Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 30–38. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12875.
Related works cited include Kolstø & Blakkisrud (2016); Laruelle (2020, 2022); Motyl (2016); and a range of contemporary analyses on nationalism, imperialism, and the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2022). The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War. (HorizonS Summer 2022 excerpts). Note: presentation delivered at the European University Institute; referenced to wider debates about NATO expansion and Western responsibility.
Note: Throughout these notes, numerical references are presented in LaTeX-style formatting as requested, with numbers embedded in … when appropriate for clarity in a study context. Examples include troop counts, population figures, and public opinion percentages that help quantify the scale and scope of the discussed issues.