Midterm Cases

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Background:

John Adams appointed William Marbury as “justice of the peace”, but he wasn’t officially commissioned while Adams was in office. Jefferson got into office, and Secretary of State James Madison refused to deliver Marbury’s commission. Marbury went straight to SCOTUS and asked it to issue a writ of mandamus (an extraordinary court order that commands a government official, agency, or lower court to perform a mandatory duty that they are legally required to do, like “we command”)

Constitutional Questions:

  1. Is Marbury entitled to his commission?

  2. Do the laws of the US provide a remedy to this violation of Marbury’s rights?

  3. Is this remedy a writ of mandamus from SCOTUS?

Decision:

Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that while Marbury was entitled to his commission, SCOTUS could not issue the writ. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act (which seemed to claim the court could issue writs in any case) unconstitutionally expanded the court’s original jurisdiction beyond what Article III of the Constitution permitted.

Article III states that SCOTUS has original jurisdiction over disputes between states and cases involving ambassadors, etc. Writs of mandamus to executive officials are not on that list.

So, if Congress passes a law that violates the Constitution, the law is void.

Significance:

Marshall’s opinion established judicial review (the power of the federal courts to strike down laws that violate the Constitution)


Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816)

Background:

During the Revolutionary War, Virginia seized land owned by Lord Fairfax, a British loyalist, and eventually granted it to David Hunter. Fairfax’s heir, Denny Martin, claimed the land was his under the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and Jay’s Treaty of 1794, which basically protected the property rights of British loyalists. Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hunter, and then made it to SCOTUS where they ruled in favor of Martin. Virginia’s court said NAH, and refused to comply.

Martin argues that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority”

Constitutional question:

Does SCOTUS have the authority to review and reverse state court decisions on questions of federal law, treaties, and the Constitution?

Decision:

Yeah! SCOTUS has appellate jurisdiction over state courts on federal questions. Supremacy clause states that federal law is the supreme law of the land. If each state's courts could interpret federal law differently with no check from above, the entire constitutional order would fall apart.

Significance:

The case established SCOTUS's supremacy over state courts on federal questions.


Eakin v. Raub (1825)

Background:

Pennsylvania court case, not SCOTUS. Eakin and Raub were fighting over land in Penn

Constitutional question:

Does the judiciary have the power to strike down legislation it finds unconstitutional, or is judicial review legit?

Decision:

Penn court property decision isn’t really important. Gibbon’s dissent is tho; he argued that courts don’t have the power to strike down laws. The Constitution doesn’t say courts can; the legislature is elected by the people, so the people have this power.

Significance:

Judicial review is still established today, but Gibbon’s side did point out the strong flaws in the language.


Baker v. Carr (1962)

Background:

Tennessee hadn’t redrawn state legislative maps since 1901, even though the population had shifted dramatically from rural areas to cities. Charles Baker, a city official, sued Carr (Tennessee Secretary of State), arguing this was unconstitutional.

Constitutional question:

Can federal courts hear cases that challenge how districts are drawn, or is redistricting something courts should stay out of?

Decision:

SCOTUS ruled 6-2, yes federal courts can hear cases about legislative apportionment. Justice Brennan stated that under the Equal Protection Clause, unequal districting has a legitimate claim.

Significance:

Established the political question doctrine as it exists today. Opened discussion for the federal court to have say in how districts are made.


Flast v. Cohen (1968)

Background:

Florence Flast filed a lawsuit against a federal funding program, specifically funds being allocated under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that were going to religious schools.

Flast argued this violated the Establishment Clause, prohibits the gov from making laws respecting the establishment of religious.

Constitutional question:

Does a taxpayer have the legal right to sue a federal spending program on the grounds it violates the Establishment Clause?

Decision:

SCOTUS ruled 8-1 that yes, Flast did have standing to bring the case. Chief Justice Warren wrote that the taxpayer must show a logical link between their status as a taxpayer and the legislation being challenged, and they must show a connection to their constitutional limitation (the Establishment Clause).

Significance:

Taxpayers can sue when they are challenging a spending program that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause.


Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

Background:

New York granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton an exclusive license to operate steamboats on NY waters, and in turn they licensed Aaron Ogden to run a steamboat ferry between NY and NJ. Thomas Gibbons ran a steamboat on the same route, but under a federal coastal trading license granted by Congress. Ogden sued Gibbons in NY courts to stop him from operating, and NY courts sided with Ogden. Gibbons appealed to SCOTUS.

Constitutional question:

Does Congress have the power to regulate navigation and interstate commerce?

Decision:

Chief Justice Marshall ruled in favor of Gibbons, and he said that under the Commerce Clause, navigation can be regulated. If commerce crosses state lines, it falls under federal jurisdiction. So New York couldn’t have a monopoly on waterways

Significance:

Established Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce as super broad; any economic activity that crosses state lines.


U.S. vs. E.C. Knight Co. (1895)

Background:

American Sugar Refining Company in the 1890s started buying up everyone, like every sugar company, including EC Knight. After this, they owned 98% of all sugar refining in the US. The federal government sued them under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which prohibited combinations in restraint of trade.

Constitutional Question:

Under the Commerce Clause, can Congress regulate manufacturing monopolies, or is it only for the actual buying and selling of goods across state lines?

Decision:

SCOTUS ruled 8-1 against the government, in favor of EC Knight. Chief Justice Fuller drew a distinction between manufacturing and commerce. Manufacturing = local activity. The fact that sugar would eventually be sold across state lines was considered too indirect a connection.

Significance:

The court made a loophole that allowed industrial monopolies to form largely unchecked by federal law. This was very different from the ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden, where there was not allowed to be a steamboat monopoly.


Stafford v. Wallace (1922)

Background:

Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 to regulate the meatpacking industry. The law gave the federal government the ability to regulate the rates and practices of meat packers and stockyards. Thomas Stafford, a meat packer, challenged the law as unconstitutional, saying that stockyards were local operations happening within a single state.

Constitutional question:

Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate stockyards since they happen within one state?

Decision:

Chief Justice Taft introduced what is known as the “stream of commerce”, stockyards are just a stopping point for commerce; therefore, it can still be regulated by Congress even though it’s in one state.

Significance:

Expanded federal regulatory power; The "stream of commerce" doctrine gave Congress a powerful new tool. Rather than asking whether a specific activity is local or interstate in isolation, courts would look at the broader commercial flow the activity was part of.


Champion v. Ames (1903)

Background:

Charles Champion was transporting lottery tickets across state lines; Congress had just passed the Federal Lottery Act of 1895, which made mailing tickets illegal. Champion argued tickets weren’t “commerce” and that Congress was overstepping its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate something that was a moral issue: gambling.

Constitutional question:

Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, and can it use that power as a tool to regulate morality and public welfare?

Decision:

Yes, they do. SCOTUS voted 5-4 in favor of the government, upholding the Federal Lottery Act. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, holding that lottery tickets are indeed articles of commerce and that Congress has broad authority to regulate items from moving in interstate commerce when it determines they are harmful to the public.

Significance:

Confirmed that Congress’s commerce power included the power to prohibit and regulate things. It established “federal police power”, the idea that Congress can use the Commerce Clause to address public health, safety, and even morality concerns.


Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

Background:

Congress passed the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916, which prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced in factories that employed children under 14, or that required children between 14 and 16 to work more than certain hours.

Roland Dagenhart, a North Carolina father whose two sons worked in a cotton mill, sued to block enforcement of the law, ironically arguing on behalf of his children's "right" to work.

Constitutional Question:

Under the Commerce Clause, can Congress prohibit the interstate shipment of goods made with child labor, as a way of regulating child labor practices within states?

Decision:

SCOTUS ruled to strike down the law. The court actually argued that, unlike in Champion v. Ames (where lottery tickets are harmful), the products being made here are not harmful; therefore, child labor was all a part of production, not commerce.

Significance:

Left millions of American children without federal protection; harsh reading of the 10th Amendment


Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S. (1935)

Background:

FDR’s New Deal included the National Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, which allowed industries to create “codes of fair competition”, so government-sanctioned agreements setting wages, hours, and prices within industries. The Schechter brothers ran a poultry slaughterhouse in Brooklyn and were convicted of violating the Live Poultry Code, which regulated hours and the practice of allowing customers to pick chickens. They challenged the law and code as unconstitutional.

Constitutional question:

Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power to the President and private industries by letting them write their own codes? Second, did the Commerce Clause give Congress the authority to regulate the Schechters' poultry business, which bought chickens from out of state but sold them entirely within New York?

Decision:

SCOTUS went against the administration on both questions. The NIRA was deemed an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Second, the chickens arrived from outside New York, but once they were there, they were deemed local, so Congress could not reach them.

Significance:

Killed the NIRA and cut down lots of New Deal legislation. Led to his “court-packing plan”, where he proposed to add six new justices to the Court; Congress said no.


National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)

Background:

Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, which guaranteed workers the right to organize unions and engage in collective bargaining, and prohibited employers from interfering with those rights. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created to enforce it. Jones & Laughlin Steel, one of the largest steel producers in the country with operations spanning multiple states, fired ten workers for union activities. The NLRB ordered them reinstated. Jones & Laughlin refused, arguing the Wagner Act was unconstitutional — that labor relations within a single plant were purely local and beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority, just as the Court had ruled in Schechter and Hammer v. Dagenhart.

Constitutional question:

Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate labor relations and collective bargaining within a manufacturing company, even though the actual labor takes place within a single state?

Decision:

Chief Justice Hughes upheld the Wagner Act. He said that Jones and Laughlin was not an isolated local business; they had mines, railroads, etc. A labor strike would have huge consequences for interstate commerce. So, the Court ruled that Congress can regulate any activity that has a “close and substantial relation” to interstate commerce.

Significance:

The decision signaled that the Court was abandoning its narrow, restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause that had blocked New Deal legislation for years. From this point forward, the Court largely deferred to Congress on Commerce Clause questions, allowing the federal government to regulate virtually any economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

Background:

Filburn was an Ohio farmer who, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, grew too much wheat over the federal government’s quota. However, he used the extra wheat on his own farm for his livestock and family. The government fined him anyway

Constitutional question:

Can Congress regulate the production of wheat that is grown and consumed entirely on a single farm and never enters interstate commerce at all?

Decision:

Apparently YEAH, they can. Justice Jackson wrote what would be known as the “aggregation principle”: if you aggregate the behavior of all farmers who grow wheat for home consumption across the country, the cumulative effect on interstate wheat prices is substantial. Filburn's homegrown wheat meant he bought less wheat on the open market; if millions of farmers did the same, it would significantly depress the price of wheat in interstate commerce.

Significance:

STRETCHED Commerce Clause power. The aggregation principle essentially means that Congress can regulate virtually any economic activity, no matter how local or small, as long as similar activities in the aggregate would substantially affect interstate commerce.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. (1964)

Background:

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a large motel in Atlanta, Georgia that explicitly refused to rent rooms to Black guests. The motel's owner challenged the law, arguing that Congress had no constitutional authority to tell a private business whom it must serve. The owner pointed out that his motel was a local business operating within Georgia, and that the 14th Amendment (which prohibits state discrimination) only applies to government action, not private businesses. The government defended the law primarily on Commerce Clause grounds.

Constitutional question:

Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination by private businesses that serve interstate travelers, even though those businesses operate within a single state?

Decision:

SCOTUS ruled to uphold the Civil Rights Act. The Heart of Atlanta was directly connected to interstate commerce; 75% of guests came from out of state. Racial discrimination, the Court held, substantially burdened interstate travel by Black Americans, who had to plan trips around where they would and wouldn't be served.

Significance:

It established that Congress can use its commerce power to address not just economic problems but profound social injustices, as long as those injustices have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


U.S. v. Lopez (1995)

Background:

Lopez, a senior at a San Antonio high school, brought a handgun to school. He was charged under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Lopez challenged the law, arguing that Congress had no constitutional authority to regulate gun possession near schools and that this was a purely local matter with no connection to interstate commerce. The government defended the law under the Commerce Clause, arguing that gun violence in schools affects the educational environment, which affects economic productivity, which affects interstate commerce.

Constitutional question:

Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the power to prohibit the possession of firearms in school zones?

Decision:

SCOTUS struck down the Gun-Free School Zones act, for exceeding the Commerce Clause. Rehnquist laid out three categories of activity Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate commerce (roads, waterways, airways), (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Gun possession near a school, he said, is a non-economic, local criminal activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce.

Significance:

First time the Court put limits on the Commerce Clause in 60 years.