AQA Law 2 - Voluntary Manslaughter

Understand the partial defence of loss of control (s. 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009)
Understand the partial defence of diminished responsibility (s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957)
Apply the law of these two defences to scenario-based situations

Provocation: Originally a common law defence recognized in the Homicide Act 1957, it has been replaced by the defence of loss of control under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
The defence of diminished responsibility remains in the Homicide Act 1957, modified by the Coroners and Justice Act.
Both defences are exclusive to murder charges, serving as partial defences, meaning defendants are not fully acquitted.
A successful defence reduces the murder charge to voluntary manslaughter.
Voluntary Manslaughter: The defendant committed an unlawful killing and possessed mens rea for murder but provides reasoning for reduced culpability.
Significant because judges have discretion in sentencing for voluntary manslaughter, whereas murder mandates a life sentence (mandatory\ life\ sentence).

Definition: A partial defence to murder, yielding voluntary manslaughter upon successful argument.
Legal Provision: Section 54 (1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specifies conditions:
- (a) D's acts resulted from a loss of self-control.
- (b) This loss had a qualifying trigger.
- (c) A reasonable person of D's age and sex would have acted similarly under the circumstances.

Prosecution must disprove the defence once suggested. Evidence must extend beyond mere assertion; it requires a "sufficient evidence" threshold to be put before the jury.

Requirement: Total loss of self-control; partial loss is inadequate.
Timing: Under s. 54(2), the loss of control does not need to be sudden. This is a significant change from the old law of provocation, allowing for a "slow burn" reaction (often relevant in domestic abuse cases).
Jury decides if the defendant truly lost self-control, with reference to personal life experience.
Definition Interpretation: R v Jewell (2014) defined loss of self-control contextually as losing control over actions amid considered judgment. R v Gurpinar (2015) reaffirmed this definition.
Exclusion: A "considered desire for revenge" (s. 54(4)) precludes the defence. If D acted out of a pre-planned vendetta, the defence fails.

Specific triggers under s. 55:
- (3) Fear of serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identified person.
- (4) Things said or done (or both) which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character AND caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
- (5) A combination of both triggers.
Fear of Serious Violence: Requires subjective fear. R v Dawes (2013) clarified that a defendant cannot rely on this trigger if they incited the violence as an excuse to use violence themselves.
Things Said or Done: High threshold established - words must significantly offend and justify loss of control (R v Zebedee, 2012).
Excluded Matters:
- Sexual infidelity cannot be classified as a qualifying trigger alone (s. 55(6)(c)).
- However, R v Clinton (2012) established that if sexual infidelity is part of a context where other qualifying triggers are present, it can be considered as part of the overall circumstances.

Under s. 54(1)(c), a jury assesses whether a person of similar demographics would react similarly in the same scenario.
The "normalcy" benchmark excludes personal circumstances affecting self-control capacity (like personality disorders or extreme temper).
Factors that can be considered: Age and sex. Other circumstances of the defendant (e.g., a history of abuse) are relevant to the gravity of the provocation but not to the expected level of self-restraint itself.

Set forth by s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009:
D must suffer from an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognized medical condition that substantially impairs D’s ability to do one or more of the following:
1. Understand the nature of D's conduct.
2. Form a rational judgment.
3. Exercise self-control.
It must also provide an explanation for D's acts.

Responsibility lies upon the defendant to present sufficient evidence to prove diminished responsibility on the balance of probabilities. This is a reverse burden of proof.

Defined in R v Byrne (1960) as a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would termed it abnormal.

Must arise from a recognized condition within WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) or the DSM.
Examples: Depression, PTSD, Schizophrenia, Battered Woman Syndrome, or Asperger's Syndrome.

Jurors determine "substantial" impairment. R v Golds (2016) clarified that "substantial" means more than merely trivial or minimal; it should be an impairment of consequence.

Under s. 2(1B), the abnormality must be a significant contributory factor in causing the defendant to act as they did. It does not have to be the sole cause, but it must be more than an incidental factor.

Intoxication alone is not a recognized medical condition for this defence.
Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (ADS): If D has a recognized medical condition of ADS, it can form the basis of the abnormality (R v Wood, 2008).
Dual Role: If D has an abnormality AND is intoxicated:
- The jury must ask if the abnormality alone would have caused the impairment regardless of the drink (R v Dietschmann, 2003).

Loss of Control: Focuses on the objective reaction to a trigger (Section 54/55).
Diminished Responsibility: Focuses on the defendant’s internal mental state

R v Jewell (2014): Defined loss of self-control contextually as losing control over actions amid considered judgment.
R v Gurpinar (2015): Reaffirmed the definition of loss of self-control provided in the Jewell case.
R v Dawes (2013): Clarified that a defendant cannot rely on the trigger of fear of serious violence if they incited the violence as an excuse to use violence themselves.
R v Zebedee (2012): Established a high threshold for the 'things said or done' trigger; words must significantly offend and justify loss of control in circumstances of an extremely grave character.
R v Clinton (2012): Established that while sexual infidelity is excluded as a qualifying trigger on its own (s. 55(6)(c)), it can be considered as part of the overall circumstances if other qualifying triggers are present.

R v Byrne (1960): Defined abnormality of mental functioning as a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal.
R v Golds (2016): Clarified that 'substantial' impairment must be more than merely trivial or minimal; it should be an impairment of consequence.
R v Wood (2008): Confirmed that Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (ADS) can form the basis of the abnormality if it is recognized as a medical condition.
R v Dietschmann (2003): Addressed the 'dual role' of abnormality and intoxication; the jury must determine if the abnormality alone would have caused the impairment regardless of the intoxication.