International Trade – Week 5 Comprehensive Study Notes

Overview of International Trade

  • Week-5 focus: why nations trade, who gains/loses, and why governments still erect barriers.

  • Fundamental insight: even when barriers create inefficiency (deadweight loss), they persist for political, fiscal, and distributive reasons.

Core Definitions & Facts

  • Import: domestic purchase of foreign-produced goods/services.

  • Export: domestic sale of goods/services to foreigners.

  • Trade volume: Imports+Exports\text{Imports}+\text{Exports}; scales with country size.

    • 2022 world merchandise trade ≈ $22trillion=22×1012\$22\,\text{trillion}=22\times10^{12}.

Comparative Advantage (CA)

  • CA = ability to produce at lower opportunity cost relative to others.

  • Drives pattern of trade; exists at individual, firm, or national level.

  • Example:

    • Labour-abundant developing nations ⇒ CA in T-shirts (labour-intensive).

    • Capital-abundant Canada ⇒ CA in aircraft (capital/skill-intensive, e.g.
      Bombardier).

Model 1 – Canada Imports T-Shirts

A. Autarky (no trade)

  • Standard Supply (S) & Demand (D) intersect → P<em>dom=8,  Q</em>dom=4P<em>{dom}=8,\;Q</em>{dom}=4 (illustrative).

  • Surpluses:

    • Upper triangle: Consumer Surplus (CS).

    • Lower triangle: Producer Surplus (PS).

B. Free Trade (world price Pw=5P_w=5)

  • Domestic consumers can buy at 55.

  • Consequences:

    • CS expands; added triangle = "gain from trade".

    • PS shrinks (many firms exit).

    • Import volume M=Q<em>D(5)Q</em>S(5)=62=4M = Q<em>D(5)-Q</em>S(5)=6-2=4.

  • Winners/Losers:

    • Winners: domestic consumers (lower $P$, higher $Q$).

    • Losers: domestic producers (lower $P$, lower sales).

Model 2 – Canada Exports Aircraft

A. Autarky

  • Equilibrium: P<em>dom=100,  Q</em>dom=40P<em>{dom}=100,\;Q</em>{dom}=40.

B. Free Trade (world price Pw=150P_w=150)

  • Canada exports because P<em>w>P</em>domP<em>w>P</em>{dom}.

  • Consequences:

    • PS expands (yellow triangle = gain from trade).

    • CS shrinks (domestic buyers face higher $P$ & reduced availability).

    • Export volume X=Q<em>S(150)Q</em>D(150)X = Q<em>S(150)-Q</em>D(150) (gap between supply & domestic demand).

  • Winners/Losers:

    • Winners: domestic producers (higher $P$, larger output).

    • Losers: domestic consumers (higher $P$, lower $Q$).

World Trade Organization (WTO)

  • >100 member states.

  • Monitors, adjudicates, and disciplines unfair practices (tariffs beyond bindings, illegal subsidies, import bans, etc.).

Four Main Trade-Policy Tools

  1. Tariff – per-unit (specific) or ad valorem tax on imports.

  2. Import Quota – quantitative limit on imports.

  3. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) – health, safety, environmental standards, licensing, bureaucracy.

  4. Export Subsidy – government payment to domestic exporters (generally WTO-illegal).

Tariff Analysis – $2 on Imported T-Shirts

Pre-Tariff Benchmark

  • Same as free-trade case above: Pw=5,  M=4P_w=5,\;M=4.

Post-Tariff Outcome

  • Domestic price rises to P<em>T=P</em>w+2=7P<em>T=P</em>w+2=7.

  • New quantities: Q<em>S(7)=2.5,  Q</em>D(7)=3.5Q<em>S(7)=2.5,\;Q</em>D(7)=3.5 (illustrative), so Mnew=1M_{new}=1.

  • Fiscal effect: Government revenue R=t×M=2×1=2R = t\times M = 2\times1 = 2 (yellow rectangle).

  • Welfare decomposition:

    • CS ↓ (triangle lost + rectangle transferred).

    • PS ↑ (red expansion).

    • Government gains RR.

    • Deadweight Loss (DWL) = two tiny triangles flanking the tariff rectangle.

  • Incidence: Because world supply perfectly elastic, entire tariff borne by domestic consumers.

Import Quota – 1-Unit Limit on T-Shirts

  • Implemented by shifting the effective supply curve left until import gap =1.

  • Market price also rises to 77 (mirrors tariff result).

  • Distribution:

    • CS ↓, PS ↑, DWL exists.

    • Quota rents (green rectangle) captured by importers/license-holders, not government.

Non-Tariff Barriers & Export Restraints

  • Health/Safety inspections (e.g.
    Canadian Food Inspection Agency) impose cost & delays → de facto barrier.

  • Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) – exporting nation "voluntarily" limits sales (often under threat).

  • Export bans/controls – e.g.
    U.S. semiconductor ban to China (strategic, security driven).

  • Export subsidies – lower producer cost to gain market foothold; WTO discourages but loopholes persist.

Motivations for Protectionism

  1. Infant-Industry Argument – shield nascent sectors until competitive.

  2. Anti-Dumping / Counteracting Dumping – respond to foreign firms pricing below cost (e.g.
    U.S. 100 % tariff on Chinese EVs).

  3. Job Preservation – prevents layoffs & unemployment spikes.

  4. Wage/Labour Competition – buffer against countries with cheap labour.

  5. Environmental & Social Standards – penalize producers in nations with lax rules.

  6. Prevent Exploitation of Developing Nations – avoid unequal terms of trade.

  7. Curtail Offshore Outsourcing – keep “good Canadian jobs” onshore.

  8. Government Revenue – tariffs an easier tax base than income tax in some nations.

  9. Rent-Seeking & Lobbying – concentrated producer losses → powerful lobbies; diffuse consumer gains → weak opposition.

  10. Retaliation & Trade Wars – tit-for-tat escalation erodes trade gains.

Political-Economy Note: Compensation for Losers

  • In principle, government could redistribute tariff revenue or tax gains to those hurt by trade ("Pareto improvement").

  • Practically difficult: identifying losers, administrative complexity, imperfect take-up of programs (e.g.
    unemployment insurance).

Key Takeaways

  • Comparative advantage underpins gains from trade, but distribution is uneven.

  • Tariffs & quotas reallocate surplus toward producers (and government/importers) at consumer expense, while generating DWL.

  • NTBs and subsidies can mimic tariff/quota effects with different incidence.

  • Protection persists due to political power, revenue needs, strategic concerns, and retaliatory dynamics.

  • WTO provides rules but enforcement and loopholes leave room for continued barriers.

  • Understanding both economic models and political incentives is essential for informed trade policy analysis.