Legislative

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

  1. RULES ON APPROPRIATION AND RE-ALIGNMENT

  1. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

  2. The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.

  3. There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.

  4. REQUISITES FOR A VALID TRANSFER OF FUNDS

  1. There must be a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

  2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and

  3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an existing item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

  1. OPERATIVE FACT

  • As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects.

  • However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply.

  1. Implied Limitations on Appropriation Measures

  1. Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose.

  2. The sum authorized must be determinate, or at least determinable.

  1. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON APPROPRIATION MEASURES

  1. All Revenue, Appropriations or Tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application and private bills shall originate in the House of Representatives.

  2. The exclusivity of the prerogative of the House means simply that the House can initiate the passage of a revenue bill, such that the House does not initiate one, no revenue law will be passed.

  3. But once the House has approved a revenue bill and passed it on to the Senate, the Senate can completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by amendment by substitution, and come out with one completely different from what the House approved.”

  4. Disbursements of discretionary funds must only be for a public purpose to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

  5. Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit.

  1. LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS

  1. Three post-enactment measures exercised by the Congress:

  1. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. This is exercised when Congress asks the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments for budget purposes. Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation.

  2. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under Sec. 21, Art. VI - the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

  3. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

  1. The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.

  2. The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

  1. upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; and

  2. upon the expiration of one (1) Congress.

  1. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (Contempt Powers) - It was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of Representatives, the contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the said Congress.

  1. Legislative Inquiry v. Oversight Function

IN AID OF LEGISLATION

OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS

Who may appeal?

Any person

Department Heads

Who may be summoned?

Anyone, except the President and the members of the Supreme Court

No one. Each House may only request the appearance of the Department Heads

Subject Matter

Any matters for purposes of pending legislation

Matters related to the Department only

Obligatory Force of Appearance

Mandatory

Discretionary

  1. Three limitations to the power of each House of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?

  1. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;

  2. It must be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure of a House of Congress conducting such inquiry; and

  3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry shall be respected.

  1. Inquiry in Aid of Legislation v. Question Hour

INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION

QUESTION HOUR

Relates to?

Relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Pertains to the power to conduct a question hour

Purpose

To elicit information that may be used for legislation.

To obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

Nature of attendance

Attendance is compulsory.

Attendance is discretionary.

Persons required to attend

Any person

Only Department Heads

Who conducts?

Committees

Entire Body

Subject Matter

Any matter for the purpose of legislation.

Only matters related to the Departments.

Basis

Grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process (the power of inquiry) being coextensive with the power to legislate.

Congress merely seeks to be informed on how Department Heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued.

  • Is an Executive Order requiring all Executive Department heads to secure the consent of the President before appearing in Question Hour valid?

    • The requirement to secure presidential consent, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For unlike inquiries in aid of legislation under Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution where such appearance is mandatory, under Sec. 22, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

  • Will your answer be the same for appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation?

    • Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary by order of the president to invoke the privilege on her behalf.

  • The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

  • Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation.

    • The requirement of securing prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress applies only to Cabinet Members and not to other public officials and only when either House of Congress conducts a Question Hour and not in cases of inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter should be untrammeled because it is co-extensive with the power to legislate.

  • RIGHT TO PRIVACY

    • With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right.

    • While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.

    • Right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions.

  • RIGT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

    • However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies.

    • Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.

  1. POWER OF IMPEACHEMENT

  1. Impeachable Officers

  1. President;

  2. Vice-President;

  3. Members of the Supreme Court;

  4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

  5. Ombudsman.

  1. Grounds for Impeachment

  1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;

  2. Treason;

  3. Bribery;

  4. Graft and Corruption;

  5. Other High Crimes;

  6. Betrayal of Public Trust

  1. Steps in the impeachment process

  • INITIATING IMPEACHMENT CASE

  1. Verified complaint filed by any member of the House of Representatives or any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any member thereof;

  2. Inclusion in the order of business within 10 session days;

  3. Referred to the proper committee within 3 session days from its inclusion;

  4. The committee, after hearing, and by majority vote of all its members, shall submit its report to the House of Representatives together with the corresponding resolution;

  5. Placing on calendar the Committee resolution within 10 days from submission;

  6. Discussion on the floor of the report; and

  7. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the committee or override its contrary resolution.

  • TRIAL AND DECISION IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

  1. The Senators take an oath or affirmation;

  2. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of Senate.

  1. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term ―to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress‘ taking initial action of said complaint.

  2. The ‘initiation’ takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary-General of the House.

  3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.

  4. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. It means that the decision of the House Justice Committee will be subjected to a plenary vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.

  5. Applicability of impeachment and quo warranto as remedies to remove an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected official.

Act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election

Act or omission committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed/ elected official

An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.

On the contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed DURING THE INCUMMBENCY of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.