In-Depth Notes on Socially Conscious Moral Intuitionism

Moral intuitions are proposed to be trustworthy due to their generation from a social and cognitive practice that functions effectively.
Overview of initial arguments and the presented criticisms by Backes, Eklund, and Michelson (BEM).

Critique 1: Do social factors enhance epistemic credentials?
- Response: Yes, social engagement allows for the critique and modification of intuitions, enhancing their reliability.
Critique 2: Does the view address the reliability of moral intuition practice?
- Response: The Trustworthiness Criterion sets a sufficient condition for relying on cognitive practices, and BEM's criticisms do not challenge its validity.
Critique 3: Existence of a moral intuition practice?
- Response: It can be argued that such a practice exists, and it is characterized by shared moral discussions and evaluations within a community.

Conditions for a cognitive practice to be deemed trustworthy include:
1. Socially Well-Established: Must be recognized and practiced within a community.
2. Deeply Entrenched: Participation in the practice should be habitual.
3. Sophisticated Evaluative Methods: Critical evaluation processes must be in place.
4. Practical and Theoretical Achievements: Should yield both practical outcomes and theoretical insights.
5. Internal Harmony: Outputs must be consistent within the practice.
6. External Harmony: Should align with external standards and critiques.
When these conditions are met (i-vi), practices can provide epistemic trustworthiness.

Initiatives should not concentrate solely on individual cognition.
Communal practices provide deeper and richer epistemic validation, compared to solitary cognitive practices.
The case of a solitary individual (the 'solipsist') was contrasted with that of a scholar in a community, highlighting the benefits of social practices.

Albert, a scientist with a novel method, lacks social validation for his practice, regardless of its reliability.
The lack of societal engagement raises questions about the responsibility of exercising his findings.
Reliance on socially validated practices (e.g., Alice in the example) is deemed more epistemically responsible due to their established credibility.

Trustworthiness signifies reliance that is warranted and can support endeavors in moral inquiry.
Reliability refers to producing consistently accurate outputs but is not the sole determinant of trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness includes a broader inquiry into the social cohesion and validation of cognitive practices.

The challenge concerning the reliability of moral intuitions does not negate the focus on their trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness is viewed as sufficient for considering moral intuitions as epistemically valid.
Progress in normative ethics does not demand the complete eradication of possible skepticism—rather it acknowledges trustworthiness even amid potential inaccuracies.

The moral intuition practice is characterized by activities engaging community discourse and moral reasoning.
Critiques from BEM speculating the absence of a rich, reflective environment for moral intuiting are addressed by highlighting community influence.
Example practices are drawn from various domains to relate to the moral intuition practice validating diverse cognitive processes in social contexts.

Good operational conditions include:
- Awareness of ambiguities and relevant non-moral facts.
- Development with empathy and critical reflection on moral issues.
- Continual adaptation and engagement in moral dialogues.
Emphasizes that a rich moral intuition practice can evaluate and develop social morals responsibly.

An effective socially conscious moral intuitionism encompasses trustworthiness as an epistemic achievement.
Different perspectives (individual and social) add depth to our understanding of moral intuitions and their implications in moral philosophy.