National People's Congress Study Guide on Demographic Crisis

Letter from the Chairpersons

Filip V.C. Anescu and George Q. Platt, acting as the Chairpersons of the National People's Congress (NPC) at MUN4ALL $3.0$, welcome delegates to this inaugural committee. They emphasize that the committee offers a unique opportunity to engage with a complex sociopolitical context at a national level. The chairpersons express appreciation for the dedication shown during the application process and urge delegates to read the study guide thoroughly to prepare for an engaging debate. Participants are encouraged to research their representative's past actions, current stances, and proposed solutions while maintaining a focus on cooperation and active participation. The letter stresses that delegates should not be intimidated and should actively voice their opinions using their placards during the sessions.

Introduction to the Committee

The National People's Congress is defined as the highest organ of state power within China’s system of people’s congresses. While it is vested with unified state power, it operates under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is constitutionally enshrined as having the "leading role" in the state system. The NPC establishes a division of labor between itself and inferior state organs, forming a unified state apparatus. Its powers include amending the constitution, enacting legislation, overseeing inferior organs, and electing or removing leaders of those organs. Because the full Congress typically meets only once a year for a session lasting $10$ to $14$ days in the Great Hall of the People, it delegates most powers to its permanent organ, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC).

The NPCSC consists of approximately $170$ legislators and meets bi-monthly to ensure continuous state power. The annual spring sessions of the NPC often coincide with the meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Together, these are known as the "Two Sessions," serving as the primary deliberative bodies where state officers review past policies and present future plans. Despite its formal power, the NPC is often characterized as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the CCP, as the party controls the nomination and election of deputies through a system of provincial-level congresses. In $2026$, the NPC consists of $2,878$ members, making it the largest legislative body in the world. Members serve five-year terms on a part-time, unpaid basis, though Standing Committee members often work full-time with a salary and are barred from holding concurrent executive or judicial positions.

Overview of the Topic

The One-Child Policy was introduced in $1979$ to curb rapid population growth, which the government identified as an obstacle to economic modernization. Formally adopted by the Fifth National People’s Congress in September $1979$, the policy restricted most urban families to one child, while offering some exemptions for ethnic minorities and rural families. Enforcement relied on a mixture of financial incentives, social pressure, and penalties, including fines, loss of benefits, and in extreme cases, forced abortions and sterilizations. Compliant families received better housing, education, and employment opportunities. It is estimated that the policy prevented approximately $400 \times 10^{6}$ births.

While the policy achieved its primary goal, it resulted in significant demographic challenges, including a skewed sex ratio, a shrinking workforce, and an aging population. The NPC's role was largely framework-setting and symbolic, providing the legal legitimacy for the CCP and State Council to enforce the policy. Notable legal milestones include the Population and Family Planning Law of $2002$, which formalized penalties. As the demographic crisis worsened, the NPC amended the law in $2015$ to permit two children and again in $2021$ to allow three children per family.

Key Terms

The One-Child Policy refers to the family planning restrictions in place from approximately $1979$/$1980$ to $2015$. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the average number of children a woman is expected to have; China's TFR currently sits at roughly $1.0$-$1.2$, well below the replacement level of $2.1$. Population Ageing in China has seen the country transition into a "super-aged society" faster than most nations, driven by falling fertility and rising life expectancy. The Dependency Ratio measures the number of children and elderly per $100$ working-age individuals; this ratio is projected to nearly double between $2015$ and $2050$.

The "$4$-$2$-$1$ Family Structure" describes a demographic fact where one child is potentially responsible for two parents and four grandparents. The Sex Ratio Imbalance resulted in a peak of $118$ boys born for every $100$ girls, leading to a "marriage squeeze." The Hukou System is the household registration system that ties social services and pensions to a person's registered residence, often disadvantaging migrant workers. "Empty Nest" Elderly (的瀃老䀀) refers to rural elderly left behind by children migrating for work. The Silver Economy is the emerging sector catering to elderly consumption, such as senior housing and medical technology. The Social Maintenance Fee (礰䀒搐养费) was the fine for exceeding birth limits, abolished in $2021$. Finally, the Demographic Dividend refers to the economic boost from a large working-age population, while the Demographic Deficit refers to the drag caused as that same cohort ages out of the workforce.

Past Actions and Timeline

The evolution of China's population policy is marked by several key dates: In $1979$, the One-Child Policy was launched. In $2013$, a "Selective Two-Child" pilot allowed couples where one parent was an only child to have a second birth, but uptake was low. In $2015$, the Universal Two-Child Policy was announced, but birth rates resumed falling shortly after due to economic constraints. Between $2016$ and $2021$, enforcement of birth limits was quietly abandoned and fines were phased down.

In $2021$, the Three-Child Policy was enacted alongside the abolition of the social maintenance fee and the introduction of "supportive measures" like tax deductions and housing support. That same year, family policy was officially linked to national demographic strategy in the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan. In $2022$, China recorded its first population decline since the Great Leap Forward famine. In $2023$, India surpassed China as the most populous country. In $2024$, the Standing Committee passed a retirement-age reform to be phased in starting in $2025$, raising the age for the first time since the $1950$s. In $2025$, national cash subsidies were introduced ($3,600$,\text{yuan} per child per year for three years) and maternity leave was expanded to $158$ days, yet births fell to a record low of approximately $7.9 \times 10^{6}$.

Current Situation

China's population has fallen for four consecutive years, currently standing at roughly $1.405 \times 10^{9}$. Deaths consistently outnumber births, and the birth total of $7.9 \times 10^{6}$ in $2025$ is the lowest since $1939$. The TFR remains between $1.0$ and $1.2$, placing China alongside low-fertility societies like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Conversely, the elderly population (aged $60$+) reached approximately $23\%$ of the total in $2025$. Projections suggest that by $2050$, the over-$65$ cohort will make up nearly one-third of the population. The working-age population has been shrinking since $2012$, losing several million people annually.

While retirement-age reforms seek to raise the age to $63$ for men and $55$-$58$ for women over a fifteen-year period, experts question if this is sufficient. Pro-natalist policies have largely failed because the primary barriers to childbearing are economic: high housing and childcare costs, an intense labor market, and a shrinking number of women of prime childbearing age (which has decreased by roughly one-fifth over $20$ years). Rural elderly remain under-covered by pensions, and the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly still places the primary burden of care on individual families, which is increasingly unsustainable under the $4$-$2$-$1$ family structure.

Legal Framework

The legal architecture of China's demographic management consists of several pillars. The Population and Family Planning Law ($2001$, amended $2015$ and $2021$) provides the statutory basis for family limits and their subsequent relaxation. The $2021$ amendment notably removed all "social maintenance fees." The Civil Code ($2021$), specifically its Marriage and Family Book, introduced a $30$-day "cooling-off period" for divorces in an attempt to stabilize birth rates. The Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly ($1996$, revised $2012$, $2018$) legally obligates children to support their parents, codifying filial piety.

The Social Insurance Law ($2011$) establishes the urban and residents' pension schemes, though rural coverage remains limited. The newest addition is the $2025$ Retirement-Age Reform, which gradually increases statutory retirement ages to improve the actuarial solvency of the pension system. Finally, the Five-Year Plans (currently the Fifteenth Plan, $2026$-$2030$) set political priorities for eldercare financing and fertility-friendly infrastructure, although these are often aspirational rather than binding statute.

Points to be Addressed

Delegates must consider several critical questions regarding future legislation. How can the NPC balance pro-natalist incentives against their historical failure to raise fertility rates? What reforms are necessary to reconcile the legal obligation of eldercare with the reality of single-child households? The solvency of the pension system must be addressed without causing public backlash, and rural-urban disparities in healthcare and social benefits under the hukou system must be mitigated.

Delegates should also determine if childcare and housing should be integrated into family planning law rather than treated as separate portfolios. Long-term consequences of the sex ratio imbalance, such as the large cohort of unmarried men, may require legislative attention. Additionally, the committee must find ways to turn the "silver economy" into a functional infrastructure rather than just a slogan. Finally, the distribution of the burden of elder support between families and the state, potential immigration policies to offset the labor shortage, and the adequacy of the $3,600$,\text{yuan} subsidy must be evaluated.