Post-Invasion Iraq: Theory, Demographics, and the Early Occupation
Post-Invasion Theory and the Expectation of Democracy
Ideological Assumptions of Advocates:
Many advocates for the invasion of Iraq were political scientists who held a "rosy" vision of the post-Saddam era.
Their belief was rooted in the aftermath of , viewing capitalism and democracy as having triumphed globally with no viable ideological alternatives.
The operative theory was that removing a dictatorship would naturally result in the emergence of a pro-US democracy with a capitalist economic system.
The Miscalculation of Identity:
The theoretical expectation of a smooth democratic transition underestimated the power of identity-based attachments, specifically religion and ethnicity.
Rather than adopting a national Iraqi identity or a "citizen of the world" perspective, many individuals identified as Shias or Kurds.
This led to groups fighting for a government that served their specific community's interests rather than universal liberal ideals comparable to those envisioned by John Locke.
Pragmatism vs. "Ancient Hatreds":
The reversion to subnational identities was not a result of "ancient hatreds" or "primordial ties" inherent to the Iraqi people.
Instead, it was a modern, pragmatic behavior rooted in immediate concerns for safety and certainty.
Smaller networks based on shared language, holidays, and religious texts provided a sense of security that the collapsing national state could not offer.
Comparative Historical Transitions to Democracy
Global Examples of Democratization (Late 20th Century):
The Philippines (): Removal of the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship.
South Korea: Transition from military dictatorship to a multi-party democracy during the same period as the Philippines.
Chile: The end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship.
Eastern Europe: Cases of democratization following the fall of the Soviet sphere.
South Africa: The end of apartheid and the commencement of democratic rule.
Mexico: Movement away from the single-party dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
The World War II Model (Germany and Japan):
President George W. Bush frequently cited the success of post-WWII reconstruction as a template for Iraq.
In November , Bush argued that because the US and its allies remained steadfast, Germany and Japan became democratic nations that no longer threatened the world.
In August , Bush referenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt, stating that bringing freedom to Japan was the best way to ensure stability.
In December , he reiterated that defeating fascism allowed former adversaries to build strong democracies, implying the same could be achieved in Iraq.
Scholarly Critique of the WWII Analogy:
Leading scholars of Japan and Iraq argued that Germany and Japan were not models that could be easily emulated.
National Unity: Germany and Japan possessed a sense of shared national identity and political cohesion that had existed for decades prior to their authoritarian periods.
Ethnic and Religious Homogeneity: These nations did not face the deep internal fractures present in Iraq.
Demographics and Social Cleavages in Iraq
The Governance of Saddam Hussein:
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a cohesive state capable of administering territory and defending borders, unlike Afghanistan under the Islamic Emirate.
However, the system was "top-heavy," concentrating authority within the Sunni Arab minority.
Total population at the time of invasion: approximately people.
Ethnic and Religious Distribution:
Sunni Arab Minority: Roughly to people. This group was generally favored by the regime for top government, military, and security positions.
Iraqi Shias (Arab): The solid majority of the population, estimated at to .
Iraqi Kurds (Non-Arab): A minority comprising about one-fifth ().
Other Communities: Includes a small number of Christians. An example of an influential individual from this group was Tariq Aziz, an Arab Christian who served as Saddam Hussein's Foreign Minister.
Definitions of Identity Groups:
Ethnicity: Defined by biological descent and mother tongue. Native Arabic speakers are Arabs; native Kurdish speakers are Kurds.
Religion (Confessional/Sectarian): Defined by shared faith and practices. Iraq is over Muslim.
Global Context vs. Iraq Context:
Sunnis Globally: Approximately people (the majority of Muslims worldwide).
Shias Globally: Approximately people.
Iraq Context: In Iraq, the global minority (Shias) is the domestic majority, while the global majority (Sunnis) is the domestic minority.
The Autocratic Manipulation of Cleavages:
Saddam Hussein deliberately stoked grievances and insecurities among the Shia majority and Kurdish minority to maintain power within the Sunni Arab clique.
This identity-based walling off distinguished Iraq from other regimes (like those in Panama or Haiti) where the ruling clique was not separated from the population by inherited identity.
The Initial Phase of the Occupation
Declaration of the End of Combat:
On May 1, , President Bush declared the end of major combat operations from the deck of an aircraft carrier.
While he did not literally say "mission accomplished," a banner with those words was displayed behind him.
This speech was perceived as a premature victory that failed to recognize the brewing instability on the ground.
Security Breakdown and Looting:
Following the fall of the regime, large-scale looting occurred in Baghdad, a city of over people.
Government ministries were attacked while fewer than two US brigades were in isolated positions, unable to maintain order.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly dismissed reports of chaos, referring to them as "the sky is falling" rhetoric.
Military Planning Failures:
General Jack Keane, acting Army Chief of Staff, later admitted that war plans drafted by Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks did not include adequate provisions for securing the population or addressing a potential insurgency.
General Tommy Franks issued guidance for commanders to prepare for a massive troop withdrawal, aiming to reduce forces to a single division (roughly troops) by September .
More than troops were initially told to prepare to leave, creating a power vacuum.
The Appointment of L. Paul Bremer III
Selection for the CPA:
The Bush administration's strategy shifted toward handing responsibility to a civilian authority.
L. Paul Bremer III was recommended for the position by Scooter Libby (Vice President Dick Cheney’s Chief of Staff) and Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense).
Bremer was a businessman and managing director at Kissinger and Associates.
Qualifications and Limitations:
Bremer was described as the "right kind of conservative" and a diplomat who had worked for Henry Kissinger.
However, he lacked practical experience in the Middle East, did not speak Arabic, and had little knowledge of the region.
Despite this lack of experience, he was officially announced as the presidential envoy to Iraq by President Bush and became the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) after a "two-week crash course" on Middle Eastern politics.