Bertrand Russell: Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description
The Linguistic and Epistemological Distinction in ‘Knowledge’
The Niggardliness of English: The English language is often criticized for using the single word ‘know’ to cover two distinct concepts that other languages distinguish with separate terms. - French: Connaître (knowing things) vs. savoir (knowing truths). - German: Kennen (acquaintance with things/places) vs. wissen (knowledge of facts). - Example: An English speaker might say they both "know London" and "know that London is foggy." In German, one would kennen Berlin but wissen that Berlin is damp.
Epistemological Consequences: Failing to heed this distinction — knowing things (people, places, objects) versus knowing about them or knowing that they possess certain qualities — has led to misguided assumptions in epistemology. - One such assumption is the view that all knowledge consists of the presence of certain items, such as ‘ideas,’ to the mind.
Bertrand Russell's Contribution: While Russell (1872–1970) was not the first to note this distinction, he was the first to provide a precise account of it and demonstrate its centrality to the theory of knowledge.
The Reduction Principle: Russell’s central conviction is that all knowledge is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance. This is equivalent to the principle that we cannot make judgments about things without knowing what it is we are judging about.
The Nature of Knowledge by Acquaintance
Definition of Acquaintance: We have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.
The Directness of Sense-Data: In the presence of an object, such as a table, one is acquainted with the sense-data that constitute its appearance: its color, shape, hardness, and smoothness. - These are things of which one is immediately conscious through seeing and touching. - Completeness of Acquaintance: While one can know truths about a specific shade of color (e.g., "this color is brown"), such statements do not increase the knowledge of the color itself. One knows the color "perfectly and completely" simply by seeing it; no further theoretical knowledge of the color itself is possible.
Narrowness of the Domain: Following the tradition of British empiricism, Russell takes a narrow view of what we can be strictly acquainted with. He restricts objects of acquaintance to "subjective things" or "private experience." - These include sense-data, concepts (universals), and potentially one's own self.
The Scope of Acquaintance: Sense-Data, Memory, and Introspection
Sense-Data: The most obvious example of acquaintance. Without moving beyond sense-data, our knowledge would be restricted to what is currently present to our senses.
Memory: We have immediate awareness of what we remember, even though it appears as past rather than present. - Memory is the source of all knowledge concerning the past; without this immediate knowledge, no past could be inferred.
Introspection (Self-Consciousness): This is the awareness of being aware. It is the source of all knowledge regarding mental things. - Examples: Being aware of "my seeing the sun," "my desiring food," or feeling pleasure or pain. - Limitations: One can only be immediately aware of what happens in their own mind. Knowledge of other people's minds is mediated through the perception of their bodies and the associated sense-data. - Human vs. Animal: Russell suggests that self-consciousness may distinguish humans from animals. While animals have acquaintance with sense-data, they may never become aware of that acquaintance or conscious of themselves as subjects.
The Question of the Self
Acquaintance with the ‘I’: Russell considers it a difficult question whether we are acquainted with our "bare selves" as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings. - When looking inward, we usually find a specific thought or feeling rather than the "I" that has it.
Arguments for the Self: Russell provides reasons to believe we are acquainted with the "I," though it is hard to disentangle. - Every instance of acquaintance is a relation between a person and an object. - If one is acquainted with "my seeing the sun," the fact observed is . - To understand the truth "I am acquainted with this sense-datum," it seems necessary to be acquainted with the thing called "I."
Conclusion on the Self: While acquaintance with the self probably occurs, Russell notes it is not wise to assert it with certainty, as complicated arguments exist on both sides.
Knowledge of Universals (Concepts)
Definition: We have acquaintance with universals, which are general ideas such as whiteness, diversity, or brotherhood.
Conceiving: The act of being aware of a universal is called "conceiving," and the universal itself is called a "concept."
Linguistic Necessity: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word representing a universal, as all verbs have universal meanings.
Non-Existent Entities: Knowledge by acquaintance is not limited to particular, existent things; it extends to abstract ideas.
Knowledge by Description
Definition of a Description: - Ambiguous Description: A phrase of the form "a so-and-so" (e.g., "a man"). - Definite Description: A phrase of the form "the so-and-so" (singular) (e.g., "the man with the iron mask").
The Mechanism of Descriptive Knowledge: We say an object is known by description when we know there is exactly one object having a certain property, even if we are not acquainted with that object.
Knowledge of Physical Objects: Physical objects (like a table) are known by description. We are acquainted with sense-data and describe the table as "the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data." - Direct awareness of the table is impossible; the actual thing that is the table is not strictly known to us. We only know that there is one object fitting the description.
The Logic of Descriptive Propositions: - To say "the so-and-so exists" means there is precisely one object that is the so-and-so. - " is the so-and-so" means has the property, and nothing else does. - Example: "Mr. A is the Unionist candidate" means "Mr. A is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is."
Proper Names as Concealed Descriptions
General Rule: Common words and proper names are usually concealed descriptions. The specific description in a person's mind when they use a name varies between individuals and over time.
Case Study: Bismarck: - Bismarck's perspective: If Bismarck himself made a judgment about himself, he might use his name to designate the person with whom he was acquainted (himself). He would be a constituent of the judgment. - A contemporary's perspective: Someone who knew Bismarck was acquainted with sense-data associated with his body. Bismarck’s mind and physical body were known to them only by description (e.g., the body connected to those sense-data). - History's perspective: Those who never met Bismarck use descriptions such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire."
Reference to Particulars: To identify a specific particular via description, the description must eventually involve a reference to a particular with which we are acquainted (e.g., through testimony, or terms like "here," "there," "past," or "present"). - Without this, as in the description "the most long-lived of men," we can only make judgments that follow logically from the description itself, without further knowledge about the actual person.
The Fundamental Principle and Communication
The Fundamental Principle: "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted."
Significance of Meaning: To speak significantly rather than making "mere noise," we must attach meanings to our words, and those meanings must be items of our acquaintance.
Case Study: Julius Caesar: We are not acquainted with Caesar himself. Our statements about him involve descriptions such as "the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March." These descriptions are composed of universals and particulars we have experienced.
The Function of Communication: We communicate despite using different descriptions because we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual object (e.g., Bismarck). - We describe the proposition we would like to affirm (e.g., "The actual object B was an astute diplomatist"). - As long as the description is correct, the proposition described remains the same regardless of the description used.
The Hierarchy of Removal from Acquaintance
Russell identifies various stages of removal from direct acquaintance: 1. Bismarck to those who knew him: The closest possible removal regarding another person. 2. Bismarck to those who only know history: We know "who" he was but only via historical descriptions. 3. The man with the iron mask: We know he existed and can know propositions about him, but we do not know "who" he was. 4. The longest-lived of men: A purely logical description where we know nothing beyond what is deducible from the definition.
Conclusion: Knowledge by description is vital because it allows us to pass beyond the limits of private experience. It enables us to have knowledge of things we have never experienced, provided the truths are composed of terms we have encountered through acquaintance.
The Niggardliness of English: The English language is often criticized for using the single word ‘know’ to encompass two distinct concepts that other languages make a clear distinction between. In French, for instance, there are two separate terms: connaître refers to knowing things, such as people or places, whereas savoir implies knowing truths or facts. Similarly, in German, kennen denotes acquaintance with things or places, while wissen refers specifically to knowledge of factual information. An illustrative example is found in English when a speaker claims to "know London" and also asserts, "know that London is foggy." A German speaker would use kennen for their familiarity with the city and wissen to express knowledge about its weather conditions.
Epistemological Consequences: The blending of these concepts in English can cause significant misunderstandings within epistemology. Specifically, the failure to differentiate between knowing things (such as people, places, objects, or experiences) versus knowing about them (involving concepts or qualities) can lead to misguided philosophical assumptions. For example, one prevalent assumption is that all types of knowledge must involve mental contents or 'ideas' that are present to the mind, which is not necessarily the case.
Bertrand Russell's Contribution: Although not the first to identify this distinction, philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) was a pioneer in providing a clear and comprehensive account of it, illustrating its importance to the broader theory of knowledge. He outlined how understanding the nuances between these forms of knowing can contribute to clearer epistemological discussions.
The Reduction Principle: At the heart of Russell’s philosophy lies the reduction principle, which posits that all knowledge can ultimately be distilled down to knowledge concerning what is known through direct acquaintance. Essentially, this asserts that any judgments we make about things depend on having prior knowledge of what precisely we are making judgments about.
The Nature of Knowledge by Acquaintance
Definition of Acquaintance: Acquaintance refers to a direct awareness of entities or experiences, where we perceive them without reliance on intermediary mechanisms such as inference or abstract understanding of truths. This direct awareness forms the bedrock of genuine knowledge.
The Directness of Sense-Data: When encountering a physical object, like a table, individuals are directly acquainted with the sense-data that comes from its outward appearance, including its color, shape, texture, and solidity. These elements represent immediate conscious experiences accessed through sight and touch. For example, while one can articulate that a particular shade is "brown," such descriptions do not enhance the knowledge of the color itself. True knowledge of the color comes simply from the experience of seeing it; no additional theoretical knowledge of the color can improve one’s acquaintance with it.
Completeness of Acquaintance: Russell emphasizes that one knows a color "perfectly and completely" through visual perception. This idea highlights the limitations of theoretical knowledge, reinforcing the notion that some experiences cannot be fully conveyed through language.
Narrowness of the Domain: In line with British empiricism, Russell adopts a restrictive perspective regarding what may constitute genuine acquaintance. He limits the objects of acquaintance to those experiences deemed "subjective" or reflects "private experience," encompassing sense-data, concepts (universals), and potentially one’s own self.
The Scope of Acquaintance: Sense-Data, Memory, and Introspection
Sense-Data: This category is the most straightforward form of acquaintance, as it involves knowledge that arises exclusively from immediate sensory experiences of the world. Without reference to these sense-data, any knowledge we possess would be limited to what is currently perceivable.
Memory: Memory provides immediate awareness of our past experiences, despite these memories appearing as reflections of what has transpired rather than direct experiences. Without memory, no evidence or knowledge regarding past occurrences could be inferred or understood. This underlines the indispensable role memory plays in forming a coherent understanding of temporal realities.
Introspection (Self-Consciousness): This refers to the active awareness of one’s own mental activities and states, allowing individuals to have insight into their thoughts and feelings. Examples include awareness of the experience of "my seeing the sun," or "my desire for food." This self-awareness is inherently introspective, marking it as a source of knowledge about mental phenomena. One limitation, however, is that such introspective awareness is confined to the individual's mind; knowing others' inner experiences requires mediating through external expressions or behaviors manifested in their bodies.
Human vs. Animal: Russell proposes that the capacity for self-consciousness may serve as a distinguishing feature that separates humans from other animals. While animals experience acquaintance with sense-data, they may lack the capacity to reflect upon or recognize that acquaintance consciously, suggesting a higher cognitive complexity in humans.
The Question of the Self
Acquaintance with the ‘I’: Russell grapples with the intricate question of whether individuals can attain acquaintance with their "bare selves" as distinct from their specific thoughts and feelings. Introspection often reveals immediate thoughts or feelings rather than an awareness of the "I" that is perceiving those thoughts.
Arguments for the Self: Despite the challenges in establishing this acquaintance, Russell posits arguments indicating that individuals likely do possess a sense of their "I," even if it remains unarticulated. Each instance of acquaintance denotes a relationship connecting a person to an object. For instance, if one asserts, "I am aware of my seeing the sun," one must also engage in an acquaintance with the self that experiences this awareness.
Conclusion on the Self: Although acquaintance with the self is probably a valid concept, Russell advises caution in making definitive assertions about its nature. This caution arises from the complex array of arguments available on both sides of the debate, lacking conclusive clarity.