Foots ' Natural Goodness Chpater 1

Natural Goodness: Overview of Philippa Foot's Moral Philosophy

Abstract and Keywords

  • Abstract: Philippa Foot critiques G. E. Moore's anti-naturalism, emotivism, prescriptivism, and other non-cognitivist theories in moral philosophy. Foot proposes an alternative, cognitivist approach to practical rationality rooted in facts about human life.

  • Keywords:

    • Anscombe

    • Emotivism

    • Hume

    • Moore

    • Moral Virtues

    • Non-cognitivism

    • Practical Rationality

    • Practicality Requirement

    • Prescriptivism

Chapter 1: A Fresh Start?

  1. Critique of Anti-naturalism and Non-cognitivism

    • Foot criticizes Moore's anti-naturalism and non-cognitivist theories based on emotivism and prescriptivism.

    • She links non-cognitivism to a desire-based interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, which suggests morality's necessity for action.

    • Proposes an alternative cognitivist notion of practical rationality that still satisfies this practicality requirement.

  2. Moral Evaluation in Context

    • Foot argues that moral evaluation is not opposed to descriptive statements; rather, it relates to facts about human life.

    • Advocates that moral arguments should ultimately be grounded in factual considerations regarding human nature.

  3. Conceptual Structure of Moral Judgements

    • Foot asserts that moral evaluations share a structure with evaluations in biology and experience.

    • She discusses moral evil as a type of natural defect and identifies human lives as central to morality.

    • Argues for a naturalistic ethical theory that challenges Moore's anti-naturalism and subjectivist theories.

Chapter 2: Origins of Non-cognitivism

  1. Historical Context

    • Foot traces the roots of non-cognitivism to early 20th-century figures such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson, identifying the linguistic turn in moral philosophy.

    • Emotivism and prescriptivism proposed that moral judgements reflect emotional expressions rather than objective truths.

  2. Ayer and Stevenson’s Perspectives

    • Ayer's emotivism represents moral judgements as expressions of feeling, not based on objective statements.

    • Hare's prescriptivism links evaluation directly to the speaker's intention and attitudes.

  3. Common Characteristics of Non-cognitivist Theories

    • Foot identifies a shared flaw: non-cognitivists assert that moral judgements necessitate individual feelings or attitudes, separating them from factual descriptions.

    • She critiques the view that moral judgements cannot be rooted in the nature of actions or consequences.

Chapter 3: An Alternative Perspective on Practical Rationality

  1. Hume's Practicality Requirement

    • Reiterates Hume's assertion that morality must be action-guiding.

    • Foot’s proposal shows how moral actions relate to practical rationality without reverting to subjectivism.

  2. Redefining Practical Rationality

    • Foot argues for a new understanding where moral reasoning is inherent in human rationality and actions, instead of motivated solely by feelings or desires.

    • She stresses that different moral virtues interact with rationality without sacrificing non-moral considerations.

  3. The Concept of Virtue

    • Discusses how virtues entail recognizing particular reasons for actions—e.g., justice involves keeping promises when possible under given circumstances.

    • Foot emphasizes that virtuous actions emerge from recognizing compelling reasons beyond mere intentions or desires.

Chapter 4: Moral Evaluation and Human Nature

  1. Connection Between Goodness and Human Action

    • Opposes the idea that moral assessments must deviate from facts about human behavior.

    • Discusses the parallels between human and animal evaluations, asserting that moral actions are grounded in factual human conditions.

  2. Challenges to Egoistic Rationality

    • Foot critiques the psychological egoism idea, noting that morality encompasses more than just individual self-interest.

    • Stresses that social cooperation and morality are essential for human life.

  3. Understanding Human Cooperation

    • Highlights that human cooperation is fundamental and must be considered in moral assessments.

    • Explores how virtues like justice are vital for social functioning, paralleling instinctual behaviors in the animal kingdom.

Conclusion

  • Foot concludes that a cognitivist approach can reconcile morality with rational action, emphasizing the role of human life and facts as foundational to moral evaluation.

  • Advocates for a morality that recognizes the inherent rationality of moral actions while challenging the non-cognitivist interpretations of moral language.

  • Asserts the necessity of grounding moral arguments in facts about human existence and experiences.

Philippa Foot's Main Arguments and Objectives in Natural Goodness

  1. Critique of Non-cognitivism

    • Foot critiques G. E. Moore's anti-naturalism and non-cognitivist theories (emotivism and prescriptivism), arguing that they fail to ground moral evaluations in human life. She believes moral judgements should not be purely emotional expressions or personal attitudes but should relate to facts.

  2. Cognitivist Approach to Practical Rationality

    • She proposes an alternative cognitivist understanding of practical rationality that aligns morality with facts about human nature. This creates a link between moral evaluations and facts about human behavior, fulfilling Hume's practicality requirement without necessitating subjective feelings.

  3. Moral Evaluation in Context

    • Foot emphasizes that moral evaluations are not incompatible with descriptive statements. Instead, they should be informed by factual considerations regarding human nature, asserting that morality is grounded in understanding human conditions and behaviors.

  4. Conceptual Structure of Moral Judgements

    • She argues that moral evaluations share a structural similarity with biological evaluations, portraying moral evil as a natural defect. Foot contends that this naturalistic approach represents a challenge to Moore’s anti-naturalism and subjectivist theories.

  5. Re-Evaluating Practical Rationality

    • Foot argues for redefining practical rationality, suggesting that moral reasoning is part of human rationality rather than driven solely by desires or emotions. She stresses the interaction of moral virtues with rationality while considering non-moral aspects.

  6. Connection Between Goodness and Human Action

    • Opposing the notion that moral assessments must deviate from human behavior, Foot's analysis finds parallels between human and animal evaluations. This connection serves to ground moral actions in the reality of human existence, emphasizing the fundamental relationship between morality and cooperation.

  7. Moral Virtue and Recognition of Reasons

    • Foot discusses how virtues are essential for moral assessments, arguing that they involve recognizing particular reasons for actions (e.g., justice entails keeping promises). Virtuous actions emerge from understanding compelling reasons that guide conduct beyond mere desires or intentions.

  8. Challenges to Egoistic Rationality

    • She critiques psychological egoism, stressing that morality extends beyond self-interest and underscores the importance of social cooperation. This highlights the interconnectedness of individuals in moral frameworks.

  9. Conclusion and Call for Cognitivism

    • In conclusion, Foot argues for a cognitivist approach to morality that reconciles moral judgment with rationality. She asserts that moral arguments must be grounded in facts about human existence and experiences, advocating for a nuanced understanding of morality that acknowledges the interplay of reason, virtue, and human nature.