Federalism and Autonomy in the Philippines
Federalism versus Autonomy in the Philippines
The Philippines, while a unitary state, has a history of decentralization and autonomy experiments, especially to address separatist demands from Philippine Muslims in the south. It has been a democratic country in Southeast Asia, except during Ferdinand Marcos's rule. After the 1986 People Power revolution, political power was devolved under a new Local Government Code. Attempts were made to accommodate the demands of Philippine Muslims and minority cultural communities through regional autonomy in Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Federalism wasn't on the agenda in 1986-87, but there's been a belief that it could address regional dissidence and boost popular participation. In 2005, President Macapagal-Arroyo supported a constitutional review and the federal option.
Decentralization and Autonomy in the Philippines: An Overview
The Colonial Experience
When Spanish colonizers arrived in the 16th century, they created a hierarchical administrative structure based on barangays, municipalities, and provinces. In Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, they encountered well-organized Muslim communities, which they termed ‘Moros’ and launched military campaigns against. However, the Spanish were never able to fully integrate these islands into their colonial regime due to strong Moro resistance. Other indigenous people resisted Spanish rule, referred to as ‘infieles’ or ‘tribus independientes’, later identified as ‘tribal minorities’ or ‘cultural communities.’
In 1898, the United States took over the Philippines and maintained the administrative structure established by Spain. In 1901, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was created to gather information on non-Christian people, including the Moros. In 1902, a bill passed by the US Congress recognized the distinction between the Moros, Pagans, and Christian Filipinos, necessitating different forms of government for different people. A more intensive military campaign against the Moros ended hopes of Moro sovereignty. In 1903, a special Moro Province was created, comprising five districts: Sulu, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, and Zamboanga. It had a legislative Council with limited powers and was expected to be fiscally self-reliant. In 1913, the Moro Province was replaced by the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, with control passing to civilian authorities. The districts were renamed provinces, and the non-Moro Mindanao provinces of Bukidnon and Agusan were added. The Department was abolished in 1920. Several ‘special provinces’ were created for the governance of other non-Christian tribes. In the Cordilleras of northern Luzon, the American administration established a Mountain Province in 1908.
Around this time, there was some agitation for the administration of non-Christian tribes to be handed over to Filipino provincial and municipal officials. From 1914, responsibility for non-Christian tribes was exercised increasingly by provincial and municipal authorities. Dissatisfaction with these arrangements resulted in the reconstitution of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1917. Following the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was abolished, and the administration of non-Christian tribes passed to the Department of the Interior. The same year, a group of datus from Lanao petitioned the US not to include Mindanao and Sulu in an independent Philippines.
These historical arrangements reflected the perception of the colonial administration that regionally based autonomy was needed to safeguard the interests of the Muslim and tribal people. After 1935, the special arrangements lapsed in the drive for national integration. Four decades later, however, regional autonomy arrangements were revived.
Muslim and Cordillera Autonomy
In the late 1960s, an Islamic resurgence, coupled with tensions associated with inmigration to Mindanao and encroachment on traditional lands, led to armed conflict between the Philippine government and Muslim insurgents under the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF demanded an independent Bangsa Moro in the 25 provinces of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, later scaled down to autonomy in the 13 provinces of traditional Muslim dominance. By the end of the 1960s, Muslims were a majority in only five of the 13 provinces. In 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed an agreement in Tripoli, providing for autonomy in the 13 provinces. Disagreements over implementation led to the MNLF’s withdrawal from peace negotiations. Two autonomous regional governments were set up in administrative regions IX and XII but lacked popular support.
The Marcos presidency also saw the growing politicization of tribal Filipinos, particularly in the Cordilleras. Following the 1986 People Power Revolution, a new constitution made provision to create areas of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu (the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, ARMM) and northern Luzon (the Cordillera Autonomous Region, CAR), assigning them legislative powers. In 1989, an organic act was drafted and put to a plebiscite in the 13 provinces and nine cities of central and western Mindanao and Sulu. The MNLF boycotted the poll, and only four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) voted to join the autonomous region. The ARMM lacked popular legitimacy and proved largely ineffective. In the Cordilleras, an Interim Cordillera Regional Administration was established in 1986. An organic law was drafted and submitted to plebiscite in 1990, but only one province (Ifugao) voted for the autonomous region.
In 1992, negotiations with the MNLF were reopened, culminating in the signing of a Peace Agreement in 1996. The agreement provided for the creation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). Provision was also made for a Consultative Assembly, a Darul Iftah, and the integration of 7500 former MNLF fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. A crucial provision required a referendum to extend the ARMM to cover the area of the SZOPAD. The 1996 Agreement was specifically with the MNLF, but the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was almost certainly the more powerful group and vowed to continue the armed struggle. There was considerable popular opposition to the 1996 Agreement among Christian communities and members of Congress. In 2001, the required referendum was conducted, and only five of the 15 provinces and one of the 14 cities voted for an expanded ARMM. The ARMM continues to function, but with limited popular support, while the MILF operates as a virtual autonomous region within the autonomous region. In 1997, Congress legislated to create the Cordillera Autonomous Region, and another plebiscite was held. The plebiscite again failed to approve the CAR.
The long saga of attempts to use autonomy arrangements provides little ground for optimism. In the case of Muslim Mindanao, the disjuncture between the Moro claim to the area and the demographic reality creates a continuing obstacle to a lasting settlement. The problems of the ARMM have been exacerbated by a lack of commitment and by the failure of the ARMM to use resources wisely. It is against this background that the idea of federalism began to gain support.
Administrative Decentralization, People Power, and the Local Government Code
The Spanish colonial regime established an administrative structure based on the barangay, maintained by the US and inherited by the independent republic in 1946. After independence, decentralization was enacted through the Local Autonomy Act, the Decentralisation Act, and other legislation, but governance remained strongly centralized. During the Marcos presidency, there were further moves to decentralize, but political power was centralized. In 1972, the Marcos government created a structure of 11 regions for economic planning and general administration. Following the People Power Revolution, a new Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, providing for a substantial decentralization of responsibility for the delivery of basic services, with a corresponding increase in the allocation of funds to LGUs. The 1991 Code also provided for enhanced participation in local governance by NGOs and POs. Amendments to the Code in 1995 strengthened the decentralization of the system.
The barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies. Each barangay has a legislative body (sangguniang barangay) and a barangay assembly. There are about 45,000 barangays. Municipalities coordinate the delivery of basic services. Each municipality is headed by a mayor and a vice mayor and has its own legislature (sangguniang bayan). There are 1543 municipalities. Cities are divided into ‘highly urbanized cities’ and ‘component cities.’ Each city is headed by an elected mayor and vice-mayor and has a sangguniang panlungsod. There are 65 highly urbanized cities. Provinces are at the top of the LGU structure. There are 79 of them. Each is headed by an elected governor and vice-governor and has a legislature (sangguniang panlalawigan). The provincial governor is a person of significant power and authority. Authority to exercise ‘general supervision’ over LGUs resides with the president but is delegated through the Department of Interior and Local Government. All LGUs have exclusive powers to raise revenue from specified taxes, fees, and charges. The majority of LGU funding comes from unconditional block grants from the national government.
Since 1972, the administrative regions have acquired some degree of local identity. Recent additions have been given titles which identify them with the locality: ARMM, CAR, National Capital Region (NCR), Caraga (Region XIII), CALABARZON and MIMAROPA (Regions IV-A and IV-B), and SOCCSKSARGEN. In what little discussion there has been about what might constitute the component units of a federal system, the regions seem to have provided the major point of reference.
The Local Government Code of 1991 promised a great deal in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, fiscal redistribution, and checks on corruption. Assessments of the decentralization initiatives of 1991 and 1995 have generally been positive, but critics have argued that the Code has simply delivered greater power to local dynasties and ‘warlords.’ President Macapagal-Arroyo specifically referred to the success of decentralization in the Philippines. That said, there is no clear evidence that democracy provides a receptive environment for federalism or that decentralization has fostered greater democratization.
The Idea of Federalism in the Philippines
While the Philippines has never had a federal system, the federal idea is not entirely new. During the Philippines Revolution against Spain, the first Philippines Republic established at Biak-na-Bato had a federal constitution. The ‘Malolos Constitution’ approved by the Revolutionary Congress in 1899 was not federal, though Aguinaldo recognized the separate status of the Moros and proposed that the new government be empowered to negotiate with the Moros. The Moros declined negotiation. A group of Filipinos submitted a draft constitution for a Federal Republic of the Philippines, with 11 states, but the US did not pursue the federal idea. Delegates to a constitutional convention set up by the Marcos government voiced some support for a federal system. But in 1972, Marcos declared martial law, and the constitutional convention lapsed.
Following the People Power Revolution, a Mindanao People’s Democratic Movement emerged, with the declared intention of establishing a Federal Republic of Mindanao. When a new constitution was drafted in 1986–87, federalism was not on the agenda. Proposals for a federal system emerged again in the late 1990s. Probably the most prominent advocate of federalism was Senator John Osmeña. Another advocate was Aquilino Pimentel. In 2000, Senators Pimentel, Osmeña, and Francisco Tatad proposed a bill to establish federal government. About this time, political scientist Jose V. Abueva published a seminal article which supported a shift to a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a parliamentary government. In Mindanao, civil society organizations Lihuk Pideral and Kusog Mindanaw emerged to push for a federal system; these gave birth to the national Citizens’ Movement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP).
Over the next few years, the idea of federal government gained ground. The German government, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and the Canadian government sponsored workshops to discuss federalism. Most prominent in the advocacy of federalism has been the CMFP, convened by former Congressman Rey Magno Teves. Towards the end of the presidency of Fidel Ramos, there were proposals for a review of the 1987 constitution. In 1997, a Peoples Initiative for Reform and Amendment gathered the constitutionally required number of signatures to petition for constitutional amendment, but the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. A consultative commission was created in 1999 by Ramos’s successor, Joseph Estrada. Proposals for charter change were revived by incoming president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2003. In the presidential election the following year, she promised to shift to a federal constitution. Macapagal-Arroyo was supported by House of Representatives Speaker Jose de Venecia. In 2004, Constantino Jaraula introduced a concurrent resolution calling for constitutional change. Eventually, in her state of the nation address in July 2005, President Macapagal-Arroyo suggested that it was ‘time to start the great debate on charter change.’ In August 2005, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed a Consultative Commission (ConCom) to propose constitutional amendments.
There appeared to be a good deal of support for the proposed parliamentary–federal charter change; nevertheless, as happened with former president Ramos, there was also some strong opposition.
The Debate
Why Federalism?
An annotated CMFP draft constitution lists six advantages of federalism:
Build a just and enduring framework for peace through unity in ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity.
Empower citizens by enabling them to raise their standard of living and enhance their political awareness, participation, and efficacy.
Improve governance by empowering and challenging State and local leaders and entrepreneurs.
Hasten the country’s development through inter-State and regional competition.
Improve governance by promoting the development of program-oriented political parties.
Broaden and deepen democracy and make its institutions deliver on the constitutional promise of human rights.
A ‘Primer on Constitutional Reform/FAQ’ by the Institute of Popular Democracy answers that the federal system will foster closer dialogue and interaction between the people and regional leaders because the locus of power is physically closer to the people. The specific expectation that federalism would help solve the Mindanao conflict has been a recurring theme. It is an argument that has been made by Pimentel and by Teves, and also by Datu Michael Mastura. More importantly, it is a view that was endorsed as early as 1997 by MNLF leader Misuari and also by the late MILF leader Salamat. Lorena has argued that, under the present autonomy arrangements, the ARMM is treated as a local government under the supervision of the national government, whereas in a federal system it would have sovereignty within its own sphere of responsibilities. The argument has been questioned, however, by Benedicto Bacani.
With respect to claims that federalism would empower citizens and ‘broaden and deepen democracy’, there has been a good deal of rhetoric but little explanation of how the introduction of a federal structure would change patterns of behavior that have dominated Philippine politics for decades.
What Form Might Federalism Take?
As revised to 14 February 2005, the ‘CMFP Draft Constitution for a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government’ envisaged a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a federal or national government and ten states: Bangsamoro (ARMM); Central and Southern Mindanao (Regions XI, XII); Northern and Western Mindanao (Regions IX and X and Caraga); Eastern Visayas (Region VII); Western Visayas-Palawan (Region IV and part of Region VI); Bicol (Region V and part of Region IV); Southern Luzon (most of Region IV); Metro Manila; Central Luzon (Region III), and Northern Luzon and Cordillera (Region I and CAR). (A later, June 2005, paper by Abueva refers to 11 states, with Northern Luzon and CAR becoming separate states.) It was proposed to establish a federal capital, New Manila, within the Clark Special Economic Zone, north of Manila. The draft constitution proposed a distribution of powers and functions, with 33 subjects listed for exclusive federal jurisdiction, 28 subjects listed for primary state jurisdiction, and another 23 areas for concurrent jurisdiction. The CMFP draft constitution proposed a bicameral federal parliament. The draft constitution made provision for the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system at both levels of government. The chief executives of the states were to have the title of ‘governor.’
It was suggested that ‘A transition period is needed to enable the Federal Government and the various states to prepare for, and adjust to, the redistribution of powers, functions, and tax bases between the Federal Government and the several States and their local governments’ and that ‘The actual formation of the individual States shall depend upon their relative political, economic, fiscal, and administrative capabilities to govern themselves as autonomous regional governments and territories.’ It was proposed that the ‘more developed and ready’ become fully operative in the first five years following ratification of the revised constitution, and the ‘less developed’ in the next five years. The CMFP proposed the holding of a plebiscite in 2007 to ratify the proposed revision of the 1987 constitution.
The Report of the Consultative Commission
The Commission reported in mid-December 2005. The Commission recommended a unicameral national parliament. On the proposed shift to a federal system, however, divisions emerged within the Commission. It was reported that one commissioner, Camaguin Provincial Governor Pedro Romualdo, had said that ‘The federal structure is a beautiful mechanism for fragmenting the country.’ In the event, it was reported that the commissioners had unanimously agreed ‘to junk the mandatory switch to federalism’ as proposed by Abueva and instead approved ‘a gradual constituent-initiated transition to federalism.’
In fact, the Commission’s report makes scant reference to federalism, though provision is made for its eventual realization. In a section on ‘Autonomous Territories’ (Article XII B), the proposed revision of the 1987 constitution says:
SEC. 12. An autonomous territory may be created in any part of the country upon a petition addressed to Parliament by a majority of contiguous, compact and adjacent provinces, highly urbanized and component cities, and cities and municipalities in metropolitan areas through a resolution of their respective legislative bodies.
SEC. 13. Within one year from the filing of the bill Parliament shall pass an organic act which shall define the basic structure of government for the autonomous territory, consisting of a unicameral territorial assembly.
The autonomous territory assemblies will have legislative power in the following areas (SEC. 16):
Administrative organization, planning, budget and management;
Creation of sources of revenues and finance;
Agriculture and fisheries;
Natural resources, energy, environment;
Trade, industry and tourism;
Labour and employment;
Public works, transportation, except railways, shipping and aviation;
Health and social welfare;
Education and the development of language, culture and the arts;
Ancestral domain and natural resources;
Housing, land use and development;
Urban and rural planning and development; and
Such other matters as may be authorized by law.
Special provision is made (SEC. 14) for the ARMM to ‘exercise the powers and . . . be entitled to benefits given to autonomous territories.’
Under ‘Transitory Provisions’ (Article XX, SEC. 15, 16), the proposed revision of the constitution stipulates that within one year, parliament will enact the basic law for the establishment of a Federal Republic of the Philippines. A constitutional preparatory commission will be appointed by the prime minister. The national election scheduled for 2007 is now to be held in 2010. In the meantime, members of House and the Senate will become members of an interim parliament, which will elect an interim prime minister, and the president will appoint a cabinet from among the MPs. Amendment or revision of the 1987 constitution may be proposed by a 75 per cent vote of all members of Congress or a constitutional convention; ratification requires a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite.
Will Federalism Work?
Considering the groundswell of support for a federal system in the Philippines (at least prior to December 2005), it may seem churlish to question the idea. Nevertheless, the advantages claimed for federal over unitary systems read more like statements of faith than reasoned arguments. This is the more so given the long history of unsuccessful autonomy arrangements, and the already high degree of decentralization prescribed by the amended Local Government Code. If autonomy arrangements specifically directed to the demands of Philippine Muslims have fallen short of expectations, what chance is there that the establishment of ten or so states in a federal republic will, incidentally, solve the ‘Moro problem’?
Most of the prospective benefits claimed are available under existing political arrangements. And if the CAR has twice rejected autonomy, why should federalism be any more attractive? Further, if the elaborate processes of the Local Government Code have not succeeded in further democratizing Philippine society, why should the creation of yet another level of government between Manila and the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays do so? Social engineering, through a shift from unitary to federal government, will not necessarily change entrenched patterns of political behavior. Moreover, some of the bigger, and more intractable, questions about a federal form of government have yet to be addressed.
A particular aspect of the Philippine discussion of federalism is that there seems to be little recognition amongst those pressing for a federal system that any workable arrangement almost certainly must recognize the particular demands of Muslim Mindanao, based on historic claims, a sense of separate ethnic identity, and relative deprivation – that is, any viable federal arrangement must be asymmetric. The push for federalism, largely as a response to ethnic or regional tensions, is enjoying something of a renaissance, from the Solomon Islands to Iraq. Evidence for a posited correlation between democracy and federalism is also thin. Both propositions have enjoyed some support in the Philippines, though there now seems to be growing doubt amongst Philippine Muslims as to whether federalism offers a solution to the ‘Moro problem’, and there is no real consensus that federalism will promote democracy.
Whether or not the Philippines will become a federal republic remains to be seen. Certainly the proposals that there be a transitional period to develop support for the idea, and that the achievement of statehood be geared to individual states’ capabilities are to be commended. In the meantime, if the issues do not get lost in the personalistic politics that has characterized the Philippines for some decades, there should be some interesting debates.