Arab–Israeli Relations, 1964–75: Comprehensive Study Notes

Overview

• Timeframe: 1964–1975, a decade of two major wars (the June War of 1967 and the October War of 1973) and several turning points that redefined Arab–Israeli dynamics and superpower involvement.
• Three converging developments post‑World War II that shaped the period:
  • The rise of the Arab League as a regional actor.
  • The Israeli–Egyptian conflict at the center of the Middle East.
  • The global Cold War between the Socialist Camp and the Free World.
• After 1964, superpower influence in the Middle East grew for two main reasons:
  • The deepening Israeli–Arab conflict, culminating in the June War (1967).
  • The conflict committing both superpower blocs to the region, with the Socialist Camp backing Arab states and the Free World backing Israel.
• Until late 1970, superpower antagonism generally supported local actors in the stalemate; from 1970 onward, Egypt’s shift (with Saudi backing) began pushing back against Soviet influence and—aided by unilateral American influence—pushed the region toward greater Western diplomatic predominance, even as the United States failed to capitalize fully.
• The chapter links the Israeli–Egyptian conflict to broader regional cold wars and to cross‑regional links (Asia, Europe, and the Global South). It traces how Chinese, Soviet, American, and European actions, alliances, and embargoes interacted with Middle Eastern dynamics.
• Major throughline: Egypt’s evolution from Nasserism to Sadat’s pragmatic pivot, including the switch from a Soviet–Egyptian alignment toward greater American influence, and the implications for a future peace process (culminating in the 1979 peace treaty).
• Key mechanisms shaping the era: UNEF deployments and withdrawals, naval chokepoints (Strait of Tiran), arms deals, oil embargoes, diplomacy at the United Nations, and shifting regional coalitions.

From Khartoum to Amman, 1967–1970

• Preceding context (1964–1966):
  • Syria radicalization under the Baath; a 1966 defense treaty between Egypt and Syria aimed at unified action against Israel, but also constrained Egyptian initiative.
  • Egyptian domestic and foreign policy tensions: economic crises, nationalizations, resumption of Yemen conflicts, and the Sino–Soviet split affecting Cairo’s choices.
  • Khrushchev’s fall (1964) and China’s nuclear tests in 1964 that influenced Egyptian calculus, including Beijing’s willingness to offer nuclear know‑how as a counterweight to Israel.
• May 1967 crisis and escalation
  • May 22, 1967: Nasser closes the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, threatening to hit Israel “at a very sensitive spot” and thereby ending the last mechanism freezing the Arab–Israeli conflict.
  • Israeli restraint and U.S. diplomacy failed to secure an unequivocal commitment to free passage; Egypt’s move sparked international concern and U.S. concerns about a potential wider war.
  • The May escalation exposed miscalculations on both sides, including wrong assumptions about Soviet leverage and U.S. willingness to intervene.
• June War (the Six‑Day War) of 1967
  • On June 5, 1967, Israel’s air force destroyed Arab air forces on the ground; within 80 minutes a long‑contemplated plan was executed, enabling rapid Israeli gains.
  • By June 7, Israeli forces reached the Suez Canal; by June 9–10 they seized Sharm al‑Sheikh (Strait of Tiran) and then moved to East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
  • Syria and Egypt suffered strategic setbacks; Egypt’s commitment to Yemen against Saudi Arabia weakened its battlefield strength.
  • Egypt’s leadership under Nasser faced a political crisis and a realization that the Arab coalition could not rely on Soviet support to the extent anticipated. Nasser briefly contemplated resignation after the Naksa (the setback) but was reinstated due to popular support.
  • The war demonstrated the ultra‑rapid tempo of modern air and ground campaigns and exposed weaknesses in Arab strategic planning and coordination among Israel’s neighbors.
• Immediate post‑war consequences
  • Israel’s gains included East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, while Egypt’s leadership faced a heavy material and reputational toll; Egypt’s Suez Canal revenue was cut off for eight years.
  • The war led to a dramatic reevaluation of Arab unity and strategy, with Algeria and Boumédiène playing a central role in seeking military and diplomatic responses, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states weighed oil as a tool of policy.
  • The war shifted superpower dynamics: the United States and the USSR both redirected their focus to Middle East diplomacy; Washington sought to manage a balance between Israeli security and Arab nationalism, while Moscow sought to preserve influence and deter a broader conflagration.
• Khartoum and the response of the Arab League (1967)
  • Khartoum (August 29–September 1, 1967) produced the famous three no’s: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel until withdrawal.
  • Despite the three no’s, there was a pragmatic strand within the Arab states advocating for political solutions and coordinated regional strategies rather than perpetual militarization.
  • The Khartoum decisions reflected a balance between radicals demanding continued struggle and moderates seeking coordination with the United Nations and superpowers to secure a political settlement.
• Global and regional implications in 1967–1970
  • The oil embargo from the Baghdad Conference in late May 1973 (though not yet in place during 1967–70) foreshadowed how Arab oil could be used as political leverage.
  • The war prompted a broader linkage of regional conflict with global Cold War considerations, including Sino–Soviet tensions and the question of how China’s foreign policy (and the PRC’s nuclear status) would influence Middle East diplomacy.

Toward June 1967 and the June War: Domestic and Regional Dynamics (1964–1967)

• Syria’s radicalization and its impact on the region
  • March 1963 onward: Syria’s Baath regime positioned itself as the “true” representative of Arab unity and Palestinians, pressuring Egypt and others toward confrontation with Israel.
  • 1964 Baath congress: Syria declared itself the true champion of the Palestinians and sought closer ties with the PRC; China’s nuclear program reinforced Cairo’s sense of urgency to counter Israel.
• The external environment and shifts in alignments
  • The Sino–Soviet split and the PRC’s growing influence globally complicated Soviet and American diplomacy in the Middle East.
  • Nasser’s attempts to balance the USSR and the United States faced domestic economic and political pressures, including nationalizations and Yemen’s conflict with Saudi Arabia.
• Internal Egyptian considerations and strategic recalibration
  • Economic difficulties, food aid withdrawal, and persistent regional threats forced Nasser to rethink foreign policy, including courting Moscow for enhanced security guarantees and seeking Chinese assistance at times.
  • Despite rhetoric of Arab unity, Egypt increasingly faced domestic constraints that limited its ability to project power beyond the Sinai and the Palestinian issue.
• The phase culminates in a reassessment of military options and a recognition of the limits of Soviet leverage in deterring Israel.

The June War (1967): Military Campaign and Consequences

• Israeli strategic decisions and execution (June 5–10, 1967)
  • Dayan and the Israeli leadership launched an aggressive campaign to neutralize Arab air power and seize strategic objectives, including the Sinai, Suez Canal approaches, Jerusalem, West Bank, and Golan Heights.
  • The war unfolded rapidly with Israel demonstrating military superiority and surprising the Arab coalition with its swift victories.
• Arab strategic miscalculations and the consequences for Egypt, Jordan, and Syria
  • Egypt’s forces were weakened by prior commitments in Yemen and by the limitations of mobilization and logistics after the war began.
  • Jordan lost East Jerusalem, the Aqsa Mosque, and vast economic resources; Syria lost the Golan Heights; widespread disillusionment followed in several Arab states.
• Superpower responses and immediate post‑war diplomacy
  • The USSR warned against war but faced the practical consequences of its limited ability to deter Israel or enforce a peace on favorable terms for the Arab states.
  • The United States navigated a delicate balance between backing Israel and mediating a broader political solution; France and the United Kingdom reevaluated their roles in armament supply and diplomacy.
• UN and diplomatic developments post‑June 1967
  • U.N. Security Council and U.N. mediation efforts intensified, including discussions around a comprehensive peace framework and withdrawal from occupied territories as part of a broader settlement.
  • The language of Resolution 242 and the later 338 became central in debates about legitimacy, borders, rights to passage, refugees, and security guarantees.

No War, No Peace, 1970–1972: The War of Attrition and Diplomatic Stalemate

• The War of Attrition and Egyptian escalation (1970–1971)
  • Egypt, under Sadat after Nasser’s death in 1970, sought to regain initiative and bring the great powers back to the table via controlled, limited warfare and repeated clashes across the Canal Zone.
  • The War of Attrition (from March 1969 onward) continued into the early 1970s with periodic bombardments, air strikes, and Soviet support for Egyptian air defenses and missiles, while Israel pursued counter‑insurgency tactics and deterrence.
• US–Soviet diplomacy and the Rogers Plan (1970–1971)
  • In mid‑1970, Washington proposed a 90‑day ceasefire and a resumption of Jarring’s shuttle diplomacy, anchored by a political settlement linked to Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967.
  • Nasser’s successor and Cairo’s leadership considered the plan viable but remained skeptical about Israeli willingness to withdraw unconditionally.
  • Egypt accepted a modified American framework, pressuring Israel to withdraw while allowing free maritime passage through strategic areas; Israel remained wary of conceding land or strategic depth.
• Jordan’s civil conflict and regional disunity
  • The Rogers Plan contributed to a dangerous Jordanian crisis as Palestinian factions in the West Bank posed internal threats to King Hussein’s regime.
  • Civil war began with hijackings in September 1970; external powers supported King Hussein’s government to stabilize the situation.
• Nasser’s death and Sadat’s rise to power (1970–1971)
  • Nasser’s death in 1970 created a leadership vacuum and a new Egyptian orientation toward the United States, while Sadat sought to recalibrate Egyptian ties with both the Soviet bloc and Western powers.
  • Sadat moved quickly to sever some of the more radical alignments and began negotiating with the United States as a preferred mediator, while seeking to preserve Egyptian independence and leverage with regional partners.
• Outcomes and the erosion of the old Cold War dynamics
  • The period highlighted the limits of Soviet military influence in deterring Israel and the willingness of the United States to play a decisive role in shaping the conflict’s trajectory.

The October War (1973) and Its Aftermath: Reversal, Realignment, and Reconciliation of Power

• Prelude to the October War (early 1970s)
  • Sadat sought to normalize relations with conservative Saudi Arabia and to build closer ties with Syria and Libya, seeking a more unified Arab stance while maintaining Egyptian strategic autonomy.
  • Israel remained confident in its military advantages but faced signs of Arab willingness to escalate and test American resolve.
• The outbreak of war (October 6, 1973)
  • Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal, breached the Bar Lev Line, and established bridgeheads on the eastern bank; Syrian forces attacked the Golan Heights.
  • Israel’s leadership faced substantial losses and asked for U.S. military resupply; the USSR began providing military support to Egypt and Syria, including air defense and fighter aircraft.
• The United States and the Soviet Union’s diplomatic response
  • Western powers, led by the United States and with Soviet involvement, moved to broker a ceasefire and implement UN Resolution 338, while also coordinating with Kissinger to manage the ceasefire and disengagement
  • The war shifted international leverage, with the United States emerging as the principal regional broker and Egypt seeking a political settlement that recognized its strategic needs.
• Outcomes and disengagements
  • Egypt and Israel maintained a rough parity in the territorial layout after disengagement agreements and the subsequent negotiations; Israel controlled more territory on the Sinai and Golan Heights than before the war, though gains were offset by political costs.
  • Egypt’s strategic posture shifted toward comprehensive political settlement rather than purely military victory; Sadat’s leadership era began to pivot toward peace with Israel under U.S. mediation.
• The oil weapon and Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM)
  • OAPEC member states coordinated oil policy as a political tool and leveraged an embargo against supporters of Israel; most Arab states joined the embargo, but not all fully supported its duration or scope.
  • NAM’s involvement in mediation efforts emphasized regional sovereignty and non‑alignment with the superpower blocs, though many NAM members leaned toward the Arab front in practice.
• Domestic consequences within Israel and the Arab states
  • In Israel, the October War exposed weaknesses in readiness and intelligence, contributing to political upheaval and the resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir in 1974.
  • In Egypt, the war produced a heroic narrative for Sadat and a desire to pivot toward external engagement with the United States; the war also underscored the need for political rather than purely military solutions to achieve lasting security.
• International diplomacy and the post‑war landscape
  • Moscow’s posture toward Israel softened after the war, with a long‑term disengagement in diplomatic relations with Israel until 1991; Washington leveraged the opportunity to reposition the U.S. role as the primary mediator in the region.
  • The war culminated in a global realignment where the United States gained greater leverage in Middle East diplomacy, and the dependence on superpower involvement gradually shifted toward a more American‑led framework, while Soviet influence waned in the long run.

Suez Canal reopening, disengagements, and the road to 1975

• Post‑war settlements and the canal
  • The Suez Canal, closed for eight years due to the war, reopened on June 5, 1975, after disengagement agreements and negotiations, marking a symbolic and strategic re‑integration of the Egyptian economy and a step toward regional normalization.
  • Despite reopening, Israeli ships did not have free passage; Egypt allowed Israeli goods on third‑party ships, reflecting a mixed policy aimed at preserving flow while maintaining leverage.
• Israeli internal political shifts
  • Meir resigned in 1974 due to domestic criticism of the war and the broader strategic failures, signaling a major political turnover in Israel and a potential reorientation of security and peace policies.
• Soviet and American diplomatic trajectories in the wake of war
  • Moscow refrained from resuming full diplomatic ties with Israel until 1991, limiting its ability to influence the post‑war settlement in the region, whereas the United States used its enhanced role to drive peacemaking efforts and leverage Israeli concessions.
• Regional realignments and the lead‑in to 1977
  • Sadat’s leadership and his political moves culminated in the famous Camp David–style trajectory that would come to define the next phase of Arab–Israeli diplomacy, with a stronger Egyptian emphasis on separate peace with Israel and a more independent Arab track.

Regional, Global, and Practical Implications

• Arab unity and strategic recalibrations under Sadat
  • Sadat forged a degree of Arab unity by late 1973 that had not existed since 1945, but the unity was driven more by Egyptian goals than by a supra‑national Arab consensus.
  • The 1973 war demonstrated that unity could be mobilized for strategic aims (warfare with political outcomes in mind) rather than purely ideological solidarity.
• The shift from Soviet to American predominance
  • Egypt’s decision to cut military relations with the USSR in July 1972 marked a turning point, consolidating a more American‑led approach to Middle East diplomacy.
  • The United States, despite domestic political turbulence (e.g., Watergate), leveraged post‑war diplomacy to fashion a framework for peace negotiations and to manage security commitments in the region.
• Cold War linkages and cross‑regional dynamics
  • The conflict linked Asia, Europe, and the Middle East: Sino–Soviet border clashes, Sino–American rapprochement, and German and East European relations with Israel and its allies.
  • European cohesion and oil politics: the oil embargo highlighted how Western European economies depended on Arab energy and could be swayed by political events in the Middle East.
• The United Nations and diplomatic roles
  • By the early 1970s, UN mediation largely faded as an active diplomatic instrument in the Arab–Israeli conflict; UNSC resolutions provided a framework but did not yield a definitive settlement, underscoring the limits of UN diplomacy in this period.
• Ethical, political, and strategic implications
  • The Palestinian refugee issue remained unresolved; the conflict continued to shape displacement, security, and human rights concerns across the region.
  • The period illustrates the dangers of overreliance on great power mediation without credible regional compromises and the risks of conflict escalation when political settlement is deferred.
• Key numerical anchors and references
  • The June War (1967): major territorial gains by Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights; the war ended with significant territorial changes and a transformed security landscape.
  • The October War (1973): Egyptian and Syrian military operations across the canal and Golan; a large‑scale oil embargo by OAPEC followed by a UN‑brokered ceasefire and disengagement negotiations.
  • Resolution numbers central to the diplomacy: $242$ (UN Security Council Resolution 242) and $338$ (UN Security Council Resolution 338).
  • The Suez Canal’s closure from 1967 to 1975 and its reopening on a specific date: $1975$.
  • Casualties and domestic political milestones: Israeli casualties around 2,656 during the 1973 war; Meir’s resignation in $1974$ reflecting domestic critique of the government’s performance.

Key actors and their shifts

• Israel: leadership under Eshkol (until 1969) and Golda Meir (1969–1974); transformational military campaigns in 1967 and 1973; strategic debates about borders, settlements, and peace terms; internal political strain culminating in Meir’s resignation in $1974$.
• Egypt: leadership under Nasser (until 1970) and then Sadat (from 1970); pivot from a heavy Soviet alignment toward greater U.S. engagement; strategic use of diplomacy and force to secure political goals (notably at Suez and in the Suez Canal crisis); involvement in the War of Attrition and the 1973 war; death of Nasser in $1970$ and the subsequent realignment under Sadat.
• Syria: Baathist radicalization; brinkmanship with Israel; cooperation with Egypt initially but later disagreements over strategy and alignment with the USSR and PRC.
• Jordan: losses in the 1967 war (including East Jerusalem) and the 1970–71 civil conflict; strategic emphasis on preserving the monarchy, with a cautious approach to peace negotiations.
• USSR and the United States: deep involvement and competition for influence; arms deliveries to Arab states and to Israel; the 1970s saw a shift toward American leadership in peacemaking, with a corresponding reduction in Soviet leverage by the mid‑1970s.
• Other actors: Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM), OAPEC, and the European states whose policies (especially oil) influenced Arab decisions and Western responses.

Connections to broader themes and implications

• Cross‑chapter connections: the Middle East is tied to broader Cold War dynamics, including Sino–Soviet competition, U.S.–Soviet détente, and the global movement of decolonization and alignment with non‑alignment policies.
• Realpolitik and the calculus of peace: the lesson that sustained peace required more than military victories; it required credible guarantees, regional consensus, and economic and political incentives that align with the security needs of all parties.
• The Palestinian issue: while the focus is on Egypt–Israel, the Palestinian problem remained central, shaping Arab strategy, Arab League diplomacy, and the international community’s response to conflict and displacement.

Formulaic references (key numbers and designations)

• UN Security Council Resolution $242$ (adopted after the 1967 war) outlines withdrawal from occupied territories and the right of all states to live in peace with secure borders.
• UN Security Council Resolution $338$ (adopted after the 1973 war) calls for a ceasefire and implementation of Resolution $242$.
• Oil policy reference: the oil embargo mechanism under OAPEC in the early 1970s and its impact on Western economies.
• Gaps and timings: the opening of the Suez Canal in $1975$; the dynamic of a decade marked by a shift from a Cold War milieu to a more regionalized, post‑war settlement phase.

Core takeaways for examination

• The period demonstrates how a regional conflict can be shaped and amplified by global power dynamics, while also revealing the complexity of strategic bargains that governments must strike to achieve durable outcomes.
• Egypt’s transition from a Soviet‑leaning posture to a more American‑led diplomacy under Sadat was pivotal for the direction of the Arab–Israeli conflict and for the eventual peace processes of the 1970s and 1980s.
• The three no’s of Khartoum represented a significant moment in Arab diplomatic posture, signaling unity against Israel while admitting the potential for political solutions under international auspices.
• The October War underscored the limits of military power in achieving long-term political objectives and highlighted the necessity of combining military readiness with credible diplomacy and regional unity.

Connections to the next chapter

• The next chapter shifts focus to the Palestinian Question from 1945 to 1975, situating the Nakba’s long‑term humanitarian and political consequences within the arc traced here and setting up the broader context for the search for a comprehensive peace in the later 1970s and 1980s.