AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION POD
Authority & Obligation
Jurisprudence — Tutorial II Revision Notes
Central question: is there a general moral obligation to obey the law? Two strands run together: (a) the obligation strand — do we have a duty to obey, and is it general/conclusive or occasional/defeasible? (b) the authority strand — does law have (or claim) legitimate authority, and is submitting to it compatible with autonomy? The dominant modern view is sceptical: there is no general duty to obey all laws, though we may owe duties to obey some.
1. Conceptual Toolkit (deploy in every answer)
• Obligation vs reason: obligations are non-optional, not generated by desire, and breach is a wrong; failing to act on a mere reason is not a wrong. Obligations are a special, weightier component of reasons.
• Strength of duty (define this early): prima facie = apparent, may dissolve; pro tanto = a genuine reason as far as it goes; all-things-considered = what you ought to do once everything is weighed. NB Smith says ‘prima facie’ but Hasan notes he means pro tanto — you may adopt Smith’s usage if you define it.
• Obedience vs mere conformity: obedience = acting because the law so requires; conformity = acting as the law requires for independent reasons. The duty in question is one of obedience (content-independent).
• Generic vs specific; particularity: the disputed claim is a generic duty to obey all law; few deny specific duties (not to murder). Particularity = the duty binds you to your own system — hard to ground.
• Authority vs power; de jure vs de facto (Wolff): authority = a right to rule + right to be obeyed; power = mere ability to compel. De facto = believed legitimate; de jure = actually legitimate.
• ‘Unjust law’ — two senses: (i) enacted by a body lacking legitimate authority; (ii) unjust in moral content. The debate usually means sense (ii).
2. The Sceptical Case — No General Duty to Obey
Smith — there is no prima facie duty to obey all laws
• Against Rawls’ assumption of a duty: we often have a PF duty to obey particular laws, but no PF duty to obey all. Tests three families of argument, all of which fail:
◦ (1) Benefit-based — gratitude (accepting benefits incurs a debt): fails — no duty to be grateful for benefits foisted on you or given for ulterior reasons. Fair play (Hart/Rawls — Citizens are part of a cooperative scheme. Everyone restricts their liberty for mutual benefit, so it is unfair to take the benefits without obeying the rules): captures a real obligation but misses its limits — fairness can’t ground a duty to obey all rules (incl. unjust ones).
◦ (2) Consent/promise — direct consent is rare; indirect consent (Plamenatz: voting, even abstaining) must be fully informed to bind, which is vanishingly rare — so it can’t ground a duty to obey all laws. Not binding.
◦ (3) Utility/general good — Brandt’s rule-utilitarianism: a PF duty if general acceptance has better consequences than none. Fails — requires settling countless moral propositions we can’t, and rests on contested common sense.
Green — obligations are justification-based; political obligation is ‘idle’
• Obligations = content-independent + binding reasons that exclude competing considerations. The accumulated failure of all voluntarist and non-voluntarist theories suggests no general duty to obey.
• Three theses are all sound and consistent with scepticism: (1) normally good reason to do what law requires; (2) some people have duties to obey; (3) some laws everyone must obey. False: (4) everyone must obey all laws.
• Focus on obedience conceals three real obligations underpinning legal order: to facilitate the rule of law, to know the law, to develop the law.
Wolff — the anarchist challenge
• The state’s defining mark is authority (right to rule); man’s primary duty is autonomy (responsibility for one’s own moral choices, refusing to be ruled). These conflict irreconcilably.
• So the concept of a de jure legitimate state is vacuous, and philosophical anarchism is the only reasonable stance. (An anarchist may comply, but never treats commands as binding because commanded.) — the key foil for any ‘autonomy vs authority’ question.
3. Defences of an Obligation
Rawls — fair play + natural duty
• Duty to obey flows from the natural duty to support just institutions + the principle of fairness (obligations assumed voluntarily, provided the institution is reasonably just). Under a just constitution we must accept majority rule, so unjust laws bind ‘provided they don’t exceed certain limits of justice’ — consensus better than none.
• Weakness (Smith): the ‘limit of injustice’ is vague; everyone who posits a duty faces this line-drawing problem.
Raz — at most an occasional, redundant duty
• A PF duty to obey exists only in a reasonably just state. But there it is ‘a mere shadow of other moral duties… at best redundant’: the conscientious person would do what (e.g.) prohibitions on murder require anyway — the law ‘is for those who deny their moral duties.’
• BBQ example: where individual restraint is futile but coordinated restraint works, once the state regulates I do acquire a duty to obey — grounded in law’s superior knowledge and coordinating capacity. But this can’t be generalised into a duty to obey all law.
• Upshot: the extent of the duty varies person-to-person and case-to-case; beyond a common core it depends on the individual and circumstances. Ties to authority: if there’s no general duty, law lacks general authority (a right to rule entails a duty to obey) — the service conception’s sting.
Finnis — law as coordination grounds genuine moral authority
• Coordination explains the source of law’s moral authority: it lets people coordinate for the common good without imposing a single national enterprise.
• Law makes itself salient not by the merits of its solution but by characteristic features: (1) it presents as a ‘seamless web’ (no picking and choosing); (2) its procedural features warrant treating it as authoritative. These create a shared interest — in the impartial upholding of law and a fair scheme relating benefits to burdens — giving everyone moral reason to comply → general/presumptive duty.
• Against Raz: ‘effectiveness for what?’ — law’s point isn’t mere governmental survival but real fairness among members; reducing all activity to one ‘coordination solution’ confuses the common good with a common enterprise and damages it.
Dworkin — associative obligation + integrity
• Law connects to the justification of state coercion; obligation is ‘close to a necessary’ condition for legitimate coercion. A state honouring integrity has a better claim to legitimacy.
• Political obligation is associative (like family/friendship): genuine only if the group’s practice meets four conditions — obligations seen as (1) special, (2) personal, (3) flowing from concern for members’ wellbeing, (4) showing equal concern for all. Whether they’re met is an interpretive question in which justice figures (e.g. a culture’s unequal treatment of daughters defeats genuine community).
4. The Live Debates
• Finnis vs Raz (the central clash): is the coordination-based duty general/presumptive (Finnis) or occasional/redundant (Raz)? Both agree morality is objective, the state should promote wellbeing, and law solves coordination problems — they split on whether that yields a generalisable duty. Raz: moral reasons to comply come from the practice of coordination, not the law; Finnis: law’s own features create a shared interest that does bind.
• Authority vs autonomy: Wolff says they’re irreconcilable → anarchism. Replies: Raz’s service conception dissolves the conflict — obeying a justified authority (one that helps you conform to reasons already applying to you) is not a surrender of autonomy but a better exercise of it.
• Does the duty depend on others’ behaviour? Yes, on fair-play/reciprocity (the duty is owed to cooperating fellow-citizens, so widespread non-compliance / non-enforcement can erode it) and on coordination (a solution only binds if enough others comply). Dworkin’s associative reciprocity says the same. This is the through-line for TT20 Q9, TT21 Q2, TT24 Q7.