Organizational Behavior Modification and Rewards

Organizational Behavior Modification Theory and Expectancy Theory
  • Both theories advocate rewarding employees for high performance over low performance.

  • Existing gap: Only 20% of US and Canadian companies believe merit pay drives individual performance.

Improving Pay-Performance Linkage
  • Objective performance measures can alleviate inconsistencies and biases when rewarding employees.

  • Employ gainsharing, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), etc., for better alignment of performance and rewards.

  • Multiple Information Sources: Use various sources for performance assessments, especially when subjectivity is involved.

  • Timeliness of Rewards: Rewards should be provided soon after performance and be substantial enough to evoke positive emotions.

Relevance and Control of Rewards
  • Align Rewards with Controllable Performance: Employees should see a clear connection between actions and outcomes.

  • Example: At United Rentals, managers are rewarded based on controllable asset management rather than overall company performance.

  • Adjust for Situational Factors: Tailor bonuses to reflect external economic variables affecting performance.

Team-Based Rewards for Interdependent Work
  • Rewards based on team performance are more effective in highly interdependent jobs.

  • Example: Nucor Corp uses team bonuses for steel production, fostering cooperation and joint accountability.

  • In low-collectivism cultures, employees still prefer individual over team-based rewards, which can affect motivation.

Valuing Rewards
  • Effective rewards must have perceived value among employees.

  • An anecdote: A company rewarded employees with branded coffee cups after a significant project, failing to resonate with the workforce; a meaningful lunch and gift card later yielded better reception.

  • Employee Feedback: Companies should proactively ask employees what types of rewards they find valuable.

Potential Unintended Consequences of Performance-Based Rewards
  • Gaming the System: Employees may manipulate their behavior to meet reward criteria rather than improving actual performance.

  • Example: UK hospitals misused 'hello nurses' strategy just to meet triage times.

  • Information Manipulation: Employees might falsify or misrepresent data to enhance performance metrics.

  • Example: A Norwegian hospital inflated success statistics through inaccurate patient coding.

  • Focus on Measured Activities: Employees often prioritize measured outcomes at the expense of unmeasured but critical behaviors.

  • Example: Bus drivers in Santiago prioritized fare collection over passenger safety due to incentive structures.

  • Transactional Employment Relationship: A shift occurs from relational to transactional relationships when rewards become overly quantified and systematic.

  • Example: Faculty systems measuring publications led to decreased engagement in unmeasured activities.

Job Specialization Benefits and Problems
  • Specialization Advantages: Reduces labor waste and improves efficiency via better skills matching and fewer task switches.

  • Historical support for job specialization by Adam Smith noted high production rates due to task division.

  • Scientific Management: Introduced by Frederick Winslow Taylor, focusing on maximizing efficiency through job specialization and standardization.

  • Enhanced work practices based on scientific observation and analysis.

  • Negative Effects of Over-Specialization:

  • Tedious tasks can lead to employee dissatisfaction, causing potential turnover and absenteeism.

  • Quality of output can diminish due to lack of engagement and connection with the overall product.

  • Example: Supermarket cashiers often produce high-quality work due to task proficiency, but repetitiveness can reduce motivation and attentiveness.

Conclusion
  • While rewards and job specialization can enhance efficiency, attention must be paid to potential negatives such as employee motivation, job satisfaction, and overall work quality.