3.1 - Papua New Guine

Author: Rashmi Aslam, Special Counsel and Deputy Executive Director, Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Papua New Guinea

The case features public servants in Fiji's Accounts Section of the Public Works Department (PWD) implicated in manipulating the Financial Management Information System (FMIS).
They created fake purchases, collaborated with selected private entities, and garnered financial gains.
Charges were brought against accounts officers across six instances involving different private companies.
The orchestrator was the experienced Head of the Accounts Section, a certified fraud examiner.

The operation mirrored classic procurement fraud but exploited digital channels via FMIS.
Fraud included false procurement documents and collusion with corrupt companies, resulting in significant financial advantages without real transactions.
Over a year, more than 1 million Fijian Dollars (approx. USD 500,000) were siphoned from public funds.

Initially designed to curtail corruption and enhance transparency, the use of technology revealed vulnerabilities as criminals manipulated the system.
At the time of investigation, Fiji lacked specific cybercrime laws and methods for gathering digital evidence, necessitating reliance on general criminal procedures.
Investigators utilized expert witnesses to digitally recreate 101 fraudulent transactions totaling 360,000 Fijian Dollars.

Strategic Item Selection: Toners and cartridges were picked to avoid suspicion due to their commonality.
Unusual Purchase Patterns: Purchases consistently fell between FJ$2800 to FJ$2999, just below the FJ$3000 limit, avoiding scrutiny.
Budget Discrepancy: Actual spending of FJ$360,000 starkly contrasted with a budget of only FJ$600.
The first case uncovered pointed to a broader scheme involving other corrupt companies.

Although primarily digitized, initial requisitions still required physical documentation due to the transitional phase.
Physical evidence was largely destroyed during the investigation, making reliance on FMIS data critical.

Creation of Purchase Orders: Accounts Officers created online purchase orders verified by the Head of Accounts.
Quotations: Selected officers obtained quotes and chose vendors based on cost and favor.
Requisitions: Manual requisitions were required to initiate the purchase process.
Online Payments: The payment process involved several officers and included checks and approvals to manage the fraud scheme.

Most physical evidence was destroyed; reliance on the preserved data in FMIS became essential.
Suspects' digital footprints created via user IDs during transactions provided crucial evidence for investigations.
Over 1200 digital traces, corresponding to 101 transactions, clarified the actions of those involved.

All defendants were found guilty after a two-month trial, leading to custodial sentences ranging from 3 to 12 years.
The mastermind received a 12-year sentence; subsequent guilty pleas from accounts officers resulted in parallel sentences.
Ongoing legal proceedings concerning implicated private companies.

Digital evidence was circumstantial; sharing of user credentials complicated accountability.
The volume of transactions made evidence compilation lengthy, and no concessions were made by defendants.
FMIS had vulnerabilities that were exploited.