Readings

2021 – Charles L. Glaser

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1. Key reason it is now harder for the U.S. to deter China (re: Taiwan)

• China’s improved military capabilities, especially A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) systems.

• These capabilities limit U.S. ability to operate near China, making intervention riskier and less credible.

• China now has a “reasonable prospect of prevailing” in a Taiwan conflict, weakening deterrence.

👉 Bottom line: Deterrence is harder because China is now militarily capable of winning or at least contesting a war over Taiwan.

2. Author’s overall argument (what the U.S. should do)

Glaser argues for reconsidering and reducing U.S. commitments in East Asia.

• The U.S. should:

  • End or scale back commitment to Taiwan

  • Reduce opposition to China in the South China Sea

• Goal: Lower the risk of great-power war with China

👉 Core idea:
Maintaining all commitments = increasingly dangerous
Reducing commitments = strategic retrenchment to avoid war

3. Hierarchy of U.S. interests in East Asia

Glaser ranks U.S. interests like this:

1. Vital interest

   • U.S. homeland security (not threatened)

2. High priority

   • Allies (Japan, South Korea)

   • Seen as essential for regional balance and credibility

3. Secondary interest

   • Taiwan

   • Important, but not vital

4. Lower-tier interest

   • South China Sea (freedom of navigation, disputes)

👉 Key takeaway:
Taiwan is NOT a vital U.S. interest—it is below allies in priority.

4. Arguments for defending Taiwan

Glaser outlines (but is skeptical of) common pro-defense arguments:

• Democracy / humanitarian argument

  • Taiwan is a “vibrant democracy” worth protecting

• Credibility argument

  • Losing Taiwan might make allies doubt U.S. commitments

• Strategic argument

  • China could gain military advantages (e.g., submarine access)

👉 Glaser’s response:

• Credibility concerns are overstated

• Military advantages for China are limited

• Costs and risks of defense are too high relative to benefits

5. What “retrenchment” looks like in practice

Glaser’s preferred strategy:

• End formal commitment to defend Taiwan

• Publicly signal this shift

• Still:

  • Condemn use of force

  • Possibly continue arms sales to Taiwan

• Increase commitment to allies (Japan, South Korea)

👉 Key logic:

• Reduce commitments that risk war

• Strengthen those that protect core interests

2024 – Glaser, Weiss, Christensen

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1. Two key components of successful deterrence

The authors argue deterrence requires:

1. Credible military threats

2. Credible assurances

• Threat alone is insufficient

• Deterrence works only if the adversary believes:

  • “If you stop, I won’t punish you”

👉 Core idea:
Deterrence = threats + reassurance

2. Specific assurances the U.S. could make

The U.S. should clearly signal:

• It does not support Taiwan independence

• It opposes unilateral changes to the status quo (by either side)

• It does not seek to restore a defense alliance with Taiwan

• It would accept a peaceful resolution agreed by both sides

👉 Purpose:
Convince China that restraint won’t lead to permanent loss of Taiwan

3. “Strategic ambiguity” (traditional U.S. policy)

• The U.S.:

  • Does not specify if it will defend Taiwan

  • Avoids clear commitments

• This:

  • Deters China (uncertainty about U.S. response)

  • Constrains Taiwan (no guarantee of support for independence)

👉 It balances deterrence and restraint.

4. How China and Taiwan could reassure each other

China could:

• Scale back military pressure near Taiwan

• Clarify it will not use force if Taiwan avoids independence

• Offer more credible peaceful unification terms

Taiwan could:

• Avoid moves toward formal independence

• Reaffirm commitment to the status quo

• Avoid symbolic or legal changes implying sovereignty shifts

👉 Goal:
Reduce fear and prevent escalation spirals.

5. How the U.S. has weakened assurances to China

The authors argue U.S. actions have undermined reassurance:

• Statements implying:

  • Taiwan is independent

  • U.S. would definitely defend Taiwan

• Suggestions of:

  • Restoring a formal alliance

  • Recognizing Taiwan diplomatically

• Failure to clearly state:

  • The U.S. would accept a peaceful resolution

👉 Result:

• China fears:

  • The U.S. is blocking unification permanently

• This reduces incentives for restraint and increases war risk

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