Rebecca Bennett's Critique of Savulescu Unit 3 P3
Rebecca Bennett's Critique of Savulescu on Procreative Beneficence and Embryo Selection Unit 3 P3
Introduction
Review of Savulescu's procreative beneficence principle and its critique by Rebecca Bennett.
Savulescu's argument stems from cases like the asthma and rubella examples, where selecting an embryo less likely to live the best life seems wrong. He uses these scenarios to establish the principle of procreative beneficence, especially concerning impersonal harm or harmless wrongdoing.
Impersonal harm: Actions that don't directly harm a specific individual but are still morally questionable. Such actions raise ethical questions because, while no specific person is harmed, the action still seems morally wrong.
Savulescu's Principle
The principle of procreative beneficence suggests parents should select embryos that would likely lead to the best possible life. This principle emphasizes maximizing well-being and minimizing suffering through reproductive choices.
This principle addresses situations where no direct harm is done, but a wrong choice seems apparent. It challenges the traditional focus on avoiding direct harm by considering the overall quality of life.
Rubella case: A woman who refuses to wait three months and has a child with disabilities doesn't directly harm the child because the child's life is still worth living. The child's existence, despite disabilities, is still considered valuable.
The child wouldn't exist if the woman had waited, so the child can't claim harm from the mother's decision. This introduces the non-identity problem, where the existence of the individual is contingent on the action in question.
To capture these wrongs, the notion of impersonal harm is introduced. Impersonal harm broadens the scope of ethical consideration to include actions that affect potential well-being without causing direct harm.
Bennett's Critique
Bennett argues against the principle of procreative beneficence, rejecting the notion of impersonal harm. She challenges the idea that potential well-being can be a basis for moral obligation in reproductive choices.
Instead, she suggests that our intuitions in those cases reflect nonmoral preferences. Bennett believes that these preferences don't rise to the level of moral obligations.
Analogy: Liking Diet Coke versus regular Coke; it's a personal preference, not a moral issue. She uses this analogy to illustrate that some choices are simply matters of personal taste.
Bennett provides three reasons to support her view:
Accepting the principle implies that impaired lives have less moral value than unimpaired lives. This objection raises concerns about devaluing the lives of individuals with disabilities.
The principle infringes on reproductive autonomy. Bennett argues that the principle could unduly restrict the choices of prospective parents.
The principle is a form of eugenics. She suggests that it promotes the selection of certain traits over others, echoing historical eugenic practices.
Inequality Objection
The inequality objection comprises two parts:
The principle suggests people with disabilities are less valuable. This part highlights the potential for discrimination and devaluation.
Using embryo selection for diseases may reduce the number of people with those conditions, leading to increased discrimination. It raises concerns about the impact on the disabled community.
Savulescu's response to the first part: Analogy with car accidents and paraplegia. Reducing accidents doesn't imply that people with paraplegia are less valuable. He argues that prevention efforts don't equate to devaluing existing lives.
Savulescu's response to the second part: Social institutional reform should tackle discrimination, not interfering with reproduction. He advocates for addressing the root causes of discrimination through policy and social change.
Reducing discrimination should focus on institutions and attitudes, not on altering reproduction. He believes that societal changes are more effective than reproductive choices in combating discrimination.
Bennett's Thought Experiment
Two worlds are compared:
World A: Disability and impairments are screened out using embryo selection.
World B: Impairments are not screened out.
The horizontal axis represents the size of the population, which is the same in both worlds.
The vertical axis represents the quality of life; World A is assumed to have a higher total quality of life. This assumption drives the thought experiment's exploration of moral implications.
The principle of procreative beneficence suggests World A is morally superior to World B. It implies that maximizing overall well-being is a moral obligation.
Dividing the total well-being by the number of people in each world shows that individuals in World B count for less. This raises questions about the value assigned to individuals in different states of well-being.
If World A is morally superior due to higher well-being, then each person in World A is morally preferable to each person in World B. This suggests that individuals without impairments are inherently more valuable.
This implies that people with impairments have less moral value, according to the principle of procreative beneficence. Bennett's critique underscores the potential for devaluation and discrimination.
Bennett's critique suggests Savulescu's argument implies that people who can see have greater value than people who cannot see. This highlights the potential for the principle to perpetuate ableism.
Eugenics Argument
Eugenics: Selective breeding to produce a better population. It involves interventions aimed at improving the genetic quality of a population.
Historical context: In the United States, eugenics was popular before Hitler. The eugenics movement had widespread support and influence.
Ideas: Eliminating criminality and violence by controlling who has children; poverty was also considered genetic. These ideas led to discriminatory practices and policies.
Practices: Sixty thousand Americans were forcibly sterilized, targeting the disabled, African Americans, and Native Americans. These sterilizations were part of a broader effort to purify the population.
Legal context: Buck v Bell Supreme Court ruling allows for forcible sterilization. This ruling provided legal justification for eugenic practices.
Savulescu's counterargument: Procreative beneficence is not eugenics because it aims at producing the best child for a couple, not creating the best society. He distinguishes between individual reproductive choices and state-sponsored eugenics.
He defines eugenics as interfering with reproduction to promote a social good. This definition raises questions about the motivations and outcomes of reproductive interventions.
Bennett's response: Savulescu's own definition implies that procreative beneficence is eugenics because it aims to reduce disability, a social good. She argues that promoting specific traits aligns with eugenic goals.
Reproductive Autonomy
Couple with dwarfism case: A couple with dwarfism wants a child who also has dwarfism to fit into their community. This case highlights the importance of cultural identity and community belonging.
Savulescu's view: An irresolvable conflict of principles exists between personal commitment to equality, personal interest, procreative autonomy, and procreative beneficence. These conflicting principles create complex ethical dilemmas.
Procreative beneficence is a pro tanto duty that can be outweighed by other factors. It can be overridden by other moral considerations.
In liberal democracies, there's a presumption in favor of liberty and reproductive autonomy. Reproductive autonomy is a fundamental right that should be respected.
Consistency Argument
Savulescu claims bringing a deaf child into the world is morally on par with deafening a hearing child. This provocative claim has significant ethical implications.
Bennett uses this claim against Savulescu's thesis. She argues that it exposes inconsistencies in his stance.
If deafening a child justifies intervention, then bringing a deaf child into existence should also justify intervention. This exposes a potential contradiction in his arguments.
Savulescu argues against government intervention in reproductive decisions but should advocate for intervention based on his claim. His position seems to be in conflict with his views on reproductive autonomy.
Infringement on Reproductive Autonomy
Saying it would be wrong for parents to pick an embryo with dwarfism or deafness might affect their behavior. Such statements could influence parental choices and decisions.
This can be seen as infringing on their autonomy. Any external influence on reproductive choices can be seen as a restriction on individual freedom.
Two ways to object to Savulescu's claim:
His view implies intervention in reproductive autonomy. This objection highlights the potential for the principle to be used to justify intrusive policies.