Parker, Ch.7: End of German Expansion

Main actors: British Admiralty vs. German U-boat Command
- Each side believed the outcome would significantly impact the overall war outcome.
Grand Admiral Donitz, Commander-in-Chief of the German submarine force, aimed to sink 700,000 tons of merchant shipping per month to defeat Britain.
November 1942: The British Admiralty deemed U-boat operations the only campaign where they could lose the war.
November 1942 saw the highest sinkings of Allied merchant ships during the war, with over 725,000 gross tons lost.
The situation was worsened by an increasing number of U-boats in action, which were exceeding losses monthly by 5 to 10 boats.

US shipbuilding began to exceed shipping losses starting in August 1942 and maintained this trend, except for November 1942.
- US shipbuilding output: 1,160,000 gross tons in 1941; over 13,500,000 tons in 1943.
- By contrast, British shipbuilding was faltering: 1.3 million tons built in 1942, down to 1.2 million tons in 1943, and barely above 1 million in 1944.
Britain's survival became increasingly dependent on American-built ships for imports.
The Red Army's engagements diverted significant German forces, easing British vulnerabilities.

Donitz’s capabilities allowed him to delay Allied victories but could not change the inherent trends in shipbuilding and naval resource allocation.
Average U-boats available for patrols:
- 1942: About 140
- Early 1943: Over 200
Success in the Atlantic was defined not just by numbers, but also by tactical superiority and advancements in intelligence.

British signal intelligence improved after December 1942, enabling the reading of German codes for U-boats and diversifying their operational response.
U-boats were able to attack American shipping due to poor convoy strategies by the US Navy.
By March 1943, U-boats attacked two convoys from New York:
- Convoy SC 122: 52 ships, 10 lost
- Convoy HX 229: 40 ships, 13 lost
- Only one U-boat was sunk.

Starting from May 1943, heavy losses were inflicted on German submarines as Allied advancements in technology and tactics became dominant.
Donitz expressed disbelief and frustration over escalating losses, illustrating the tactical turning point of the Battle of the Atlantic.
- Total German losses in May included 22 submarines against 20 sunken merchant ships.

British forces, supplemented by American air support, played a vital role in the defeat of U-boats in the Atlantic.
By July 1943, the Allies sunk 22 U-boats—a clear indicator of improved strategic execution.
Merchant ship construction outpaced sinkings, with Allied construction exceeding total losses by summer 1943.

The 8th Army's confrontation with the Axis forces highlighted the importance of tactical coordination and supply logistics:
- Important battles at El Alamein marked British victories, situating the Allies to reverse earlier setbacks in North Africa and pushing back German advances.
Constant factors included the competition of resources, particularly the quality of German equipment and the effectiveness of British strategic response.
In 1942, British and American reinforcements began shifting the balance back towards the Allies, despite initial German superiority in equipment and tactics.

The stalemate in Russia after the German offensives in 1942 led to a crucial phase in the overall strategic outlook.
The Red Army gradually began to bolster their strength, with increasing industrial production counterbalancing prior losses.
By end of 1942, the Red Army had transformed into a more potent force ready for counter-offensive, aided significantly by Western supplies.

The culmination of these battles and strategies across the Atlantic, North Africa, and Eastern Europe represented turning points that culminated in the eventual decline of German military expansion by mid-1943.
The successful strategies demonstrated by the Allies, particularly in technology and coding intelligence, significantly leveled the playing field against the German U-boats and Axis forces in general.