Notes on Scheffler "What is Egalitarianism?"

Luck Egalitarianism: core idea and scope

Luck egalitarianism is a form of distributive egalitarianism focused on fairness of outcomes given the sources of those outcomes.
Core claim across variants: inequalities that arise from unchosen features of a person’s circumstances are unjust; inequalities arising from voluntary choices are potentially permissible.
Unchosen circumstances include both social factors (e.g., class and wealth of the family one is born into) and natural factors (e.g., native abilities, intelligence).
Luck egalitarianism overlaps with, but also diverges from, prevailing liberal political morality on two fronts:
- On unchosen circumstances: luck egalitarianism rejects inequalities that derive from unchosen features; prevailing morality rejects some forms of discrimination and supports equal opportunity but tolerates some disparities from talent.
- On choices: luck egalitarianism accepts that income from choices (e.g., working longer hours) may not be objectionable in itself, but is more aggressive than the prevailing morality in endorsing redistribution to shield from taxation the portion traceable to choices rather than to natural endowments.
The upshot: luck egalitarianism is both more and less egalitarian than prevailing morality.
Important caveat: luck egalitarianism is not a monolith; there is disagreement about how much redistribution is justified and how much of actual inequality is due to circumstances vs. choices.
References to Rawls: luck egalitarianism is often framed as an extension of Rawlsian insights, but the article argues that Rawls does not provide support for luck egalitarianism; instead Rawlsian theory is anchored in equality as a social/political ideal, not strictly in luck concerns.

Prevailing political morality vs luck egalitarianism on unchosen circumstances

Prevailing liberal morality rejects discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnicity and supports equal opportunity.
It agrees with luck egalitarianism that inequalities from unchosen factors are unjust (e.g., discrimination).
However, the prevailing morality tolerates some distributive inequalities stemming from differences in talent and ability; luck egalitarianism denies that natural talents (creativity, intelligence, entrepreneurial ability) should justify legitimate inequalities.
On redistribution driven by choices: prevailing morality does not shield all income from taxation based on its source; luck egalitarianism is more inclined to tax to compensate for disadvantages arising from unchosen circumstances or, in some readings, to subsidize outcomes shaped by choices.
The result is a partial overlap but substantive divergence: luck egalitarianism is both more and less aggressive about redistribution than the prevailing morality in different respects.

Luck egalitarianism, Rawls, and Dworkin: central scholarly claims

Luck egalitarianism is often presented as an extension or generalization of Rawlsian ideas, supposedly closer to Rawls’s insights than Rawls himself is.
The article argues that luck egalitarianism can draw little support from Rawls; Rawls’s theory rests on a social contract framework and a different justification for just institutions.
The author identifies two commonly cited Rawlsian strands that luck egalitarians highlight:
- An informal moral argument against the system of natural liberty, noting that distribution under natural liberty is influenced by arbitrary natural attributes and contingencies; Rawls argues we should mitigate this influence.
- The appeal to responsibility in defending primary goods as the basis for interpersonal comparisons, with Rawls arguing that those with less expensive tastes should adjust their ends in light of expected primary goods.
Despite these overlaps, Rawls’s difference principle is not designed to be endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive in the same way luck egalitarianism is described by its proponents.
Will Kymlicka and others have argued that Rawls’s own theory is not compatible with luck egalitarianism because:
- The difference principle does not attend to special medical needs resulting from unchosen conditions; it only accounts for primary social goods.
- The difference principle may constrain the pursuit of differences that arise from voluntary choices (e.g., working shorter hours for leisure).
The article contends that Rawls can be understood as supporting a form of distributive egalitarianism anchored in equality as a social/political ideal, not as endorsing luck-egalitarianism.
The alternative tradition (Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism) seeks to carve out an interpretation of equality of resources aligned with ambition-sensitivity and endowment-insensitivity, but not all readers accept this as the best or only route to egalitarian justice.

The two key axes of luck egalitarian arguments about “choices” vs “circumstances”

Distinction at issue: should compensation come from outcomes determined by unchosen circumstances or by voluntary choices?
Dworkin’s position: talents, tastes, and personality traits may be construed as part of the chosen side if individuals identify with them and bear responsibility for their consequences; this can place costly tastes and other non-chosen features on the “choice” side.
- Dworkin argues that people cannot demand compensation for expensive tastes because they are constitutive of individuals’ identities and voluntary choices may shape or reflect those traits.
- Rakowski argues for a similar line: values and beliefs are constitutive elements that people must assume responsibility for, and hence should be placed on the “choice” side.
Critiques of broad “choice vs circumstances” line:
- If talents are placed on the choice side because they influence choices, then one could demand compensation for unearned advantages tied to talent, which many find morally implausible.
- Expanding the “choice” category to include constructs like temperament and identity risks collapsing distinctions between choice and circumstance, undermining the intuitive fairness of equality of opportunity.
The author argues that Rawls does not endorse a simple choice vs circumstance dichotomy; his emphasis lies in ensuring fair cooperation within a framework that respects basic liberties and equal opportunity, not in neutralizing brute luck as a general aim.
The inward-looking, self-centered judgments about responsibility that luck egalitarianism encourages may be morally troubling and empirically implausible for many people.

Luck egalitarianism as anchored in a broader equality ideal

The author argues that any robust distributive egalitarianism must be anchored in a general conception of equality as a moral value or normative ideal, not merely as a distributional aim.
The “society of equals” ideal: equality is a social, political, and moral conception about how people ought to relate to one another, not merely a claim about the distribution of resources at the margin.
Equality as a moral value: equal moral worth, equal standing, and equal political claims; equality is not simply about minimizing brute luck but about structuring relations so that everyone can participate as equals.
The social/political ideal of equality implies that basic needs must be met (food, shelter, education, healthcare), and that market outcomes should not entirely determine people’s political agency or life prospects.
The author argues that the luck-egalitarian project risks treating equality as a neutralization of brute luck, which can be at odds with the broader social and political ideal of equal status and reciprocity.

How Rawlsian theory differs from luck egalitarianism on equality and justice

Rawls’s theory centers on a fair system of cooperation among free and equal persons, with two foundational ideas:
- The basic liberties for all, and
- A fair equality of opportunity with respect to the primary goods framework.
Primary goods: a basis for interpersonal comparisons of well-being; Rawls argues that primary goods are a practical basis for evaluating justice in the basic structure of society, not a universal measure of welfare for all contexts.
A key Rawlsian claim: citizens must be able to pursue diverse plans of life within a framework of reciprocity and mutual respect; fairness requires a public basis for distributing goods that is accessible without violating liberties.
Michael Freeman and others point out Rawls’s insistence that primary goods are not to be used for all comparisons, only for questions arising in the basic structure.
Rawls’s account preserves a degree of responsibility for ends, with a social division of responsibility: society ensures basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity; individuals adjust their ends in light of the means available under a fair distribution.
The author contends that Rawls’s framework provides a strong anchor for a distributive egalitarianism based on the social/political ideal of equality, rather than a theory that seeks to neutralize brute luck in every domain.

Dworkin, Cohen, and the administrative conception of equality

Dworkin’s equality of resources: an attempt to anchor luck egalitarian principles in a broader ideal of equality—treating people with equal concern as the sovereign virtue of political community.
The administrative (or statocentric) reading of Dworkin: equality of resources is a way to operationalize the principle of equal concern by the state, but it does not necessarily capture the full social egalitarian ideal or guarantee an egalitarian community.
Cohen’s critique: it is not clear that a state that shows equal respect and concern necessarily achieves equality in the sense luck egalitarians seek; there can be a social hierarchy even with equal concern at the state level.
The author’s position: Dworkin’s framework is compatible with an egalitarian administrative framework, but it does not capture the broader social/political ideal of a genuine society of equals; the ideal involves more than distributing resources to reflect equal concern.
The broader point: even if luck egalitarian principles can be anchored in an equality ideal, their fit with the morality and social structure of a “society of equals” is contested; distributive norms must flow from a broader conception of equality.

The political and empirical landscape: why luck egalitarianism matters today

The rise of luck egalitarianism among philosophers occurred during a period of rising income and wealth inequality in liberal democracies, alongside a political shift toward privatization and market emphasis.
There was a significant gap between the philosophical prominence of luck egalitarianism and actual political practices, which tended toward less redistribution.
The essay argues that the practical appeal of luck egalitarianism rests on its potential to persuade people that equality is a legitimate political and moral aim and to show how to resolve conflicts between individual choices and social cooperation within a framework of equal worth.
The pluralist and multicultural debates in liberal democracies—race, gender, culture, and ethnicity—underscore the continuing vitality of the idea of a society of equals, which influences the evaluation of distributive norms beyond luck egalitarian concerns.

Utilitarianism, rawls, and the place of equality in moral theory

The discussion draws connections to utilitarianism, noting that Rawls’s critique targets utilitarianism’s emphasis on maximizing welfare and its single-axis measure of well-being.
Rawls rejects a monistic, utilitarian notion of the good and instead emphasizes a pluralistic, morally significant conception of human life and diverse plans of life.
The comparison between luck egalitarianism and utilitarianism is not straightforward: some luck-egalitarian writings compare themselves to utilitarianism, but the author cautions against treating utilitarianism as a theory of equality.
Critics of luck egalitarianism raise two objections in relation to utilitarian concerns: utility monsters (extremely efficient beneficiaries) and expensive tastes (disproportionate needs that could justify unequal distributions under welfare theories).
The author suggests that focusing on equality as a social/political ideal helps clarify how distributive justice should be understood, rather than forcing equality to be interpreted solely as a distributional problem.

Special medical needs, basic needs, and the problem of extending Rawls’s framework

Rawls acknowledges special medical needs and the importance of extending primary goods to include medical care, but he treats this as a problem of extension to be solved after addressing the basic structure problem.
The problem of expansion involves whether and how to provide for extraordinary medical needs while maintaining a fair distribution for everyone’s basic liberties and primary goods.
Rawls’s tentative stance is to assume that all citizens have the essential capacities to participate in cooperative life, with costs and benefits balanced at the legislative stage by public policy.
This approach tries to balance the need to help those with special medical needs with the broader aim of maintaining fair cooperation, without guaranteeing compensation for every unchosen disadvantage.

The practical questions for equality: basic needs, social cooperation, and a truly equal society

The aim is to understand what constitutes a genuinely egalitarian society beyond mere equal distribution:
- What are people’s basic needs, and how should they be met within a fair cooperative framework?
- How should political institutions assess well-being given diverse tastes and preferences, without treating expensive tastes as justifications for unequal treatment?
- To what extent should we calibrate redistribution to accommodate differences in talents and preferences while preserving equal standing as members of a society?
The author argues that the appeal of luck egalitarianism depends on whether it can be anchored in a broader ideal of equality that resonates with people’s sense of justice and social belonging.
The central test for an egalitarian theory is not only whether it reduces brute luck but whether its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens within a society organized as equals.

Concluding perspectives: the legitimacy and limits of luck egalitarianism

The author emphasizes that luck egalitarianism should be grounded in a broader conception of equality as a social and political ideal, not simply as a distributive rule aimed at erasing brute luck.
Even if luck egalitarianism can be anchored in an equality ideal, its appeal is limited if it cannot convincingly connect its distributional rules to the values of a society of equals.
The enduring debates around pluralism, multiculturalism, and diversity reinforce the importance of equality as a social and political ideal, suggesting that the most persuasive forms of distributive justice will be those that are rooted in the ideal of a society of equals and that can be plausibly connected to broader social aims.

Key terms and concepts (glossary)

Luck egalitarianism: distributive ideals that seek to neutralize the effects of luck (brute luck) on distribution, while allowing differences due to choices.
Brute luck: advantages or disadvantages due to factors beyond one’s control (e.g., natural endowments, birth circumstances).
Option luck: consequences arising from deliberate choices (e.g., working more hours for higher income).
Endowment-insensitive: a theory that does not attach significance to unchosen endowments when distributing goods.
Ambition-sensitive: a theory that takes into account individuals’ ambitions or plans when evaluating justice.
Equality of welfare vs equality of resources vs equal opportunity for welfare: different metrics or currencies used in egalitarian theories to measure and justify distribution.
Primary goods: a broad class of goods that matter for a wide range of possible life plans (as used by Rawls).
System of natural liberty: Rawls’s alternative to his own theory—an unfettered market influenced only by liberty and formal equality of opportunity.
Principle of redress: a prima facie obligation to compensate for undeserved inequalities; Rawls treats it as a consideration weighed against others, not as a comprehensive theory of justice.
Social division of responsibility: Rawls’s idea that society bears responsibility for liberties and fair equality of opportunity, while individuals adjust their ends given the resources available in a fair system.
Administrative/statocentric equality (in Dworkin’s interpretation): an equality that centers on the relationship between the state and its citizens and on how the state distributes resources to treat citizens as equals.
Society of equals: a normative ideal where individuals are treated with equal respect and concern, and social/political institutions reflect that equality.
Equal concern: a core feature of Dworkin’s view that states should treat citizens with equal concern as part of legitimate political community.

Notes on references and context (indicated in the transcript):

The discussion references Elizabeth Anderson’s What is the Point of Equality? (Ethics, 1999) and her critique of luck egalitarianism.
It situates luck egalitarianism in relation to Rawls’s two principles of justice, primary goods, and the difference principle, as well as to Dworkin’s equality of resources and the debates with Cohen and Rakowski.
The article contrasts luck egalitarianism with the prevalent liberal morality in terms of redistribution and the treatment of unchosen circumstances.
The analysis also engages with utilitarian concerns, the possibility of “utility monsters,” and the critique that utilitarianism as equality theory is problematic; the author argues for anchoring equality in a broader social ideal rather than in distributive arithmetic alone.

Key quotes and paraphrases to remember for the exam

Luck egalitarianism: inequalities due to unchosen features are unjust; inequalities due to choices may be acceptable.
Rawls on primary goods: primary goods are a basis for interpersonal comparisons in the basic structure, not across all contexts; the aim is to enable free and equal citizens to pursue diverse plans of life within a framework of reciprocity.
Difference principle: oppose maximizing the position of the worst-off in terms of primary goods; yet this principle interacts with voluntary choices and may resist imposing costs for others’ leisure preferences.
Dworkin’s equal concern: equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community; distribution should reflect equal concern, but it does not imply a totalitarian enforcement of distributive parity; it’s compatible with social hierarchy in an administrative framework.
The societal ideal of equality: beyond distribution, equality is a moral and political ideal governing relations among people that shapes laws, institutions, and public life.
The critique: Rawls’s framework does not entail luck egalitarianism; luck egalitarianism needs its own independent motivational basis that aligns with the broader ideal of equality as a social and political value.