Using Humanitarian Aid to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’: A Costly Failure?

Introduction

Jamie A. Williamson argues that integrating humanitarian aid into efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ in counter-insurgencies has failed, with operational and legal costs outweighing benefits.
Manipulation of humanitarian assistance contradicts international humanitarian law (IHL) principles.
Research suggests short-term aid programs in counter-insurgency, like in Afghanistan, have been ineffectual and may have undermined military goals.
As US and NATO operations in Afghanistan conclude, military and policymakers should re-evaluate ‘winning hearts and minds’ as a counter-insurgency strategy and recognize the importance of neutral, independent humanitarian aid.

Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and 'Winning Hearts and Minds'

Counter-insurgency has been a concept for decades, used in various non-international armed conflicts.
Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted a reevaluation of counter-insurgency strategies.
Emphasis has shifted towards soft power to gain local population acceptance and reduce support for insurgents.
Successful counter-insurgency requires less force and more ‘consent-winning’ elements.
US Army Field Manual 3-24 states counter-insurgency success is gained by protecting the local population, not the COIN force.
Soldiers and marines are expected to provide short-term humanitarian assistance and help rebuild infrastructure.
Delivery of impartial, needs-based humanitarian assistance by the military is welcome in the short term.
Counter-insurgency planners have viewed aid delivery as key to defeating insurgents, raising concerns within the humanitarian community.
The ICRC and others have resisted counter-insurgency that compromises the independence and impartiality of humanitarian assistance.
Security of aid workers can be at risk when aid is seen to further military aims.
IHL obligates belligerents to distribute aid without adverse distinction and prohibits manipulating it for military goals.
Despite resistance, aid delivery continues to be advocated as essential for successful counter-insurgency, exemplified by programs like Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Growing research suggests aid and development by the US military and NATO have been ineffective.
Local populations respond better to security restoration, good governance, and programs addressing social and economic concerns delivered by national authorities.
'Winning hearts and minds' through short-term humanitarian assistance has been ineffectual, with limited force protection gains and can even be counter-productive.

Counter-Insurgency Explained

Counter-insurgency operations and doctrine were primarily discussed among military strategists and historians until the 21st century.
The RAND Institute has documented eighty-nine insurgencies between 1945 and the present day.
Counter-insurgency has become common parlance, popularized by figures like General David Petraeus and Dr. David Kilcullen, emphasizing the delegitimization of insurgency by isolating it from grassroots support.
Conflict is now seen as a blend of military, political, and economic means to defeat insurgents, not just lethal force.
General Sir Rupert Smith describes modern conflict as ‘war amongst the people’, seeking to change intentions and capture the will of the opponent, with military force creating conditions for strategic results.
The goal is to win hearts and minds.

Population-Centric Approach

Modern counter-insurgency thinking reflects a population-centric approach in complex non-international armed conflicts.
The US Center for Army Lessons Learned states that the goal is to win over the population.
Hostile populations create hostile leaders until the source of hostility is alleviated.
Counter-insurgency is both warfare and political, depending on the relationship between the people, government, and military.
Strategies include:
- ‘Carrot-and-stick’ approach: using military force to punish and assistance to reward.
- ‘Winning hearts and minds’: gaining allegiance and support without force.
- Introducing rule of law, developing domestic justice mechanisms, and implanting good governance.
Short-term aid programs and humanitarian assistance used to gain loyalty are problematic.
Gaining local population support is crucial for operational success, especially post-combat, and involves injecting humanitarian and economic assistance to establish a secure environment.

Blending of Humanitarians and Military

US Army Field Manual 3-24 advocates an integrated military and civilian approach, emphasizing political, social, and economic programs to address conflict root causes.
Meeting fundamental needs of the local populace goes hand in hand with military action.
‘COIN actors’ include politicians, diplomats, local leaders, and humanitarian workers.
Civilian entities like IOs and NGOs bring complementary expertise.
Focus should be on effectively implementing programs, with military forces filling gaps in the absence of adequate civilian capacity.
Humanitarian groups play critical roles, even outside military control, with humanitarian assistance seen as an essential element of the counter-insurgency toolkit.
The US Field Manual recognizes difficulties in forming formal relationships with NGOs due to differing goals and independence, emphasizing trust-based relationships and information-sharing.
Commanders should encourage NGO participation in planning and help them understand mutual interests in security, stability, and relief objectives.
NGOs play important roles in resolving insurgencies, supporting lasting stability, and are present before and after military presence.
US counter-insurgency doctrine mixes tools: military attacks, holding operations, and civilian agencies brought in to win local support.
Military is ready to use aid programs during initial phases to access the population.

Militarization of Humanitarian Aid

The Afghanistan counter-insurgency has challenged humanitarian assistance principles.
Commanders viewed humanitarian organizations as key to counter-insurgency.
Coordination and cooperation between armed forces and humanitarian actors are needed.
Parties may restrict access for security reasons, but not to the detriment of those in need.
Cooperation should not become control of aid agencies by parties to the conflict.
Association with military operations can create security risks for personnel and civilians.
For the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, humanitarian action independence should never be compromised.
Failure to adhere to principles can jeopardize impartiality, creating security risks.
The 2011 ICRC report noted that humanitarian operations perceived as military or political instruments will face access difficulties and jeopardize worker security.
The ICRC Director General emphasized that aid must be needs-based, not based on political, military, or economic objectives.
The ICRC maintains a principled position despite challenges, stating humanitarian action should not be part of military campaigns or used as a tool to promote armed changes of regime.
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) cited the ‘co-optation of the aid system’ by the international military coalition in Afghanistan, making it difficult to distinguish between aid and military action.
MSF was critical of organizations that had seemingly forsaken their neutrality to work alongside ISAF, leading to a loss of impartiality and the ability to access and provide assistance to all people in need.
In April 2009, sixteen NGOs urged NATO troops clearly to distinguish military actions from humanitarian activities to protect civilians and aid workers.
The NGOs underscored that military forces should not use relief or development activities to win hearts and minds for military objectives and should refrain from relief activities where civilian actors are capable.
As recently as August 2011, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reiterated this concern, concluding that the ‘militarization of aid is undermining humanitarian assistance’.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), combining civilian, diplomatic, military, and development agencies under military control in Afghanistan, were particularly criticized.
Initiated in Iraq, PRTs aim to stabilize and reconstruct through capacity-building.
In Afghanistan, 26 PRTs were linked to ISAF, meant to be the ‘softer-side’ of counter-insurgency.
Even if the PRTs were to distinguish military from civilian endeavors, they were primarily militarily organizations led by the military and delivering aid as part of the counter-insurgency.
The first PRT, established in 2002 in Gardez, was co-located with US Special Forces and had very few civilian personnel due to security reasons.
‘PRTs do not conduct development for development’s sake’; their objective is counter-insurgency driven, aimed at ‘turning Afghans away from the insurgency and thereby creating a stable environment in which the Afghan government can exert its authority’.
Some initial reports suggested they should be renamed ‘Provincial Security Teams’.
A 2011 report of the Feinstein International Center found that PRTs were consistently perceived negatively in various Afghan provinces, with allegations of corruption and bias.
The ICRC cited PRTs as an example of parties to the conflict making humanitarian action one of their tools in the conduct of their military campaigns.
The very nature of PRT activities risked creating a perception that the delivery by any agency was part of military strategy.
Efforts in 2008 to recognize the difference between humanitarian and military roles were arguably too little, too late.
Once neutrality is lost, it is very difficult to undo, not only for specific organizations but also for the humanitarian community.
According to the Humanitarian Policy Group, distinctions between organizations working with PRTs and those that were not have faded, with all Western-based international humanitarian organizations being judged as partisan and part of a ‘Western agenda’, except for the ICRC.
Despite efforts by NGOs to minimize negative perceptions, a 2008 agreement to distinguish civilian activities from military actions supposedly went unnoticed by the Taliban.
In a recent article published in the Review, it was explained that the ICRC faced major challenges in demonstrating its continued independence from coalition forces.
Making matters more complex is the overlap between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, with recent restrictions imposed by counter-terrorism legislation having the potential to constrain activities of humanitarian actors still further.
Legislation aimed at criminalizing material support to terrorism is putting the control of aid delivery at the core of counter-terrorism strategies.
A perverse effect of the tightening of criteria and due diligence requirements is that successful IOs and NGOs run the risk of being perceived as extensions of donor states’ counter-insurgency strategy.
While it is difficult to quantify empirically, the loss of perceived neutrality can have serious security repercussions.
The ICRC has suggested a connection between certain attacks against the ICRC and the blending of humanitarian assistance and military action.
Civilians also pay a high price, with insurgents attacking villages that have accepted aid in retaliation for ‘collaborating’ with the enemy.
Talking with US and NATO forces makes local communities fearful of reprisals.
Documentary evidence suggests that all the above elements plead in favor of a clear distinction between humanitarian aid, strategic objectives, and military actions, to preserve their specificities.
Subjecting the humanitarian needs of a population to a strategy designed to defeat an opponent is ‘incompatible with the fundamental principles that govern the ICRC operations’.

IHL Principles

International humanitarian law (IHL) seeks to find equipoise between military necessity and humanitarian considerations.
It is a strict code of conduct for warring factions, with violations requiring repression.
It is also one of the most important safeguards for persons not participating in hostilities.
The respect of IHL allows for a semblance of humanity to remain.
Aid enables the civilian population to survive the conflict and maintain dignity.
Humanitarian assistance is to be given without adverse discrimination and in an impartial manner to all of those in need.
The armed forces are not specifically prohibited from aiding civilians.
The parties to the conflict are primarily responsible for ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need.
Where they are unable or unwilling to deliver the aid themselves, they are to allow aid and relief to be delivered by impartial humanitarian organizations, to reach those in need.
This is a corollary of the obligation of the parties to do their utmost to protect civilians from the effects of the hostilities.
The parties to the conflict can establish hospital and safety zones and localities, as well as neutralized zones where wounded soldiers and civilians can be sheltered from attack.
No military activities are to be carried out in these areas.
Free passage of medical and hospital stores destined for civilians of another state, as well as objects for religious worship, is to be granted by a party to a conflict.
There are provisions relating to the delivery of relief in occupied and non-occupied territories, and on family contacts and reunification.
In the context of non-international armed conflicts, where counter-insurgency prevails, there are far fewer provisions.
Nonetheless Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions does speak of the delivery of aid and relief, and Article 18 of Additional Protocol II underscores that parties to the conflict are to allow relief supplies ‘which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction’.
If the armed forces themselves cannot provide the aid, humanitarian organizations are to be allowed to do so, without adverse discrimination.
In other words, the beneficiaries of aid and relief are those who are in need and who are suffering because of the conflict, not those who might be strategically important in overcoming insurgents.
Humanitarian organizations must not be ‘affected by any political or military consideration’.
Moreover, the actions of humanitarian organizations and aid societies must be impartial and may not themselves compromise military operations.
For the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the need to maintain such neutrality and impartiality is particularly important in the context of a non-international armed conflict, which is fertile ground for counter-insurgency operations.
On the one hand, there is the risk that the state on whose territory the conflict is occurring may feel that humanitarian organizations are encroaching in internal affairs.
Common Article 3 facilitates aid delivery.
Humanitarian organizations have sought to minimize risk via public statements and codes of conduct.
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief adopted in 1996 calls upon NGOs and other humanitarian actors to maintain high standards of independence, and to comply with IHL in times of armed conflict.
It recalls the obligation of members of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance ‘wherever it is needed’.
Humanitarian organizations are expected not to act as instruments of foreign policy.
There are already many reasons to advocate a rethink of how counter-insurgency and ‘hearts and minds’ are executed.
Delivery of short-term humanitarian assistance must remain needs-based, without adverse discrimination and not as part of military strategy.
Reconsideration is warranted, as indicators suggest that ‘winning hearts and minds’ has not worked in practice.

Humanitarian Assistance in Winning Hearts and Minds

Counter-insurgency promoters in Afghanistan reasoned that hearts and minds would be won by blending civilian and military.
If there was evidence that the militarization of aid decreased violence, facilitated access, and reduced suffering, co-optation of humanitarian assistance might be considered acceptable.
However, recent research suggests that ‘winning of hearts and minds’ through short-term aid has not been successful in countering insurgents or benefiting the civilian population.

Militarization of Aid Effects

The main focus of counter-insurgency is to modify the environment to deprive insurgents of local support.
Ensuring that any negative perceptions on the part of the local government are undone is also something that's important.
Operationally, the litmus test is therefore whether the provision by the military of aid and assistance, whether in the short, medium, or long term, has succeeded in contributing to this objective.
There is a small but growing body of research tending to suggest that, writ large, development initiatives and improvement of economic situations have partially improved the security situation and increased support for the local government, thereby seemingly vindicating a counter-insurgency ‘hearts and minds’ approach.
Any success has been tempered, both in terms of effectiveness and duration, especially if delivered by the international forces.
One study on the economics of counter-insurgency in Iraq hints at a correlation between increased spending on aid and development programmes and a decrease in violence.
Author makes note that this may have coincided with the 2007 surge in US troop strength.
Another study on Afghanistan concluded that there was an obvious link between improved economic situations and attitude towards the Afghan government.
The authors found that this did not observably translate into improvements in security.
Interestingly, programmes that were seen to have a significant positive effect on both the ‘perception of economic wellbeing’ and ‘attitudes of the civilian population toward the central and local government’, and NGOs, were those provided by the Afghan government and not by the international forces.
Despite the moderate successes of medium- to long-term aid and development programmes, in reviewing the limited research available, there is little, if any, evidence that short-term humanitarian assistance initiatives, when implemented by the international forces, have benefitted the overall counter-insurgency strategy, especially in Afghanistan.
A number of factors have been advanced for these apparent failings: the coalition strategy focused on acceptance of ISAF forces rather than on generating support for the government; the use of force by the military cannot be reconciled with winning hearts and minds; trying to win hearts and minds can actually breed contempt and insecurity.
Millions of US dollars were spent on short-term initiatives in Afghanistan to undermine insurgency.
A 2012 report noted military officials reported short-term security benefits and force protection from military-administered aid projects.
Military felt that such projects saved lives because the local community was more willing to provide information on improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the military gained better access to villages in two other provinces.
Military-administered aid projects might help tactically but have little long-term overall strategic effect.
Incentives and concessions do not necessarily go hand in hand with a long-term transformation strategy aimed at putting in place sustainable and durable judicial mechanisms and good governance.
The RAND Institute concludes that US assistance might have short-term benefits for the safety of US forces, but that it ‘does very little to boost popular allegiance to the host nation.
The host nation government is discredited, U.S. assistance does little to boost popular allegiance for the host nation government.
As an example of problematic areas, a 2011 report cited Quick Impact Projects (QIPS) used by UK forces and the PRT in Helmand Province in 2008.
The report finds that integration into the 'Consenting Winning Approach' was underpinned by unrealistic optimistic expectations’.
Incoherence by the PRT, lacked local ownership of the projects, and corruption meant the intended objective was not met.
Corruption and inequitable distribution of aid were the findings from a follow up report examining aid and security and ‘hearts and minds’ in five Afghan provinces.
Local communities preferred large-scale, visible, infrastructure projects. Had the potential to create jobs and boost local economy thereby strengthening security.
Tying aid to counter-insurgency objectives skews perception of aid delivery.

More Harm than Good

'Winning hearts and minds provides the wrong focus' since the 'goal is to leave Afghanistan’.
It falls on Afghanistan it to 'win hearts and minds'.
Positive feedback and co-operation from the local population is better than nothing even a meagre amount.
The military should persevere with ‘humanitarian’, consent-winning programmes.
This could, however, come at a cost.
Military planners need to ask if soldiers can ever in practice win the hearts and minds of an unfriendly and less than receptive local population.
One of the appendicies hightlights this tension in with the military in winning hearts and minds as part of counter-insurgency: hearts means persauding people that their best intrests ar served by your success'; minds means convincing them that you can protect them and resisting is pointless.
The difficulty to reconcile is demonstrated in the documentary Restrepo.
Officer explains how the attempts of gaining the confidence of the local population are in the face of civilians casualties caused by their kinetic actions and are undermined.
Another explains that the Hearts and Minds thing is not working' ,that as infatrymen, they are not equipped to implement the strategy'
There is obvious frustration and some cynicism about their dual role in the counter-insurgency.
There are recent indicators that the provision of aid in general as part of a counter-insurgency strategy may actually be driving insecurity and have a destabilizing influence.
Aid projects that might be causing ‘tensions and conflicts’ because they were ‘perceived to reinforce inequalities and create winners and losers.'
Relevant parts of the report did not distinguish between short-term consent-winning projects and medium- and long-term development programmes.
Initial research should be heeded where aid is used to gain gratitude from local communities.
Short term aid has failed to produced a significant contribution to stability in Afghanistan.
Growing body of work is saying that aid projects are ineffectual, and counter-productive to the overall strategy.
Military operators argue that short-term security and intelligence benefit is worth co-opting humanitarian aid, still have conflicts with IHL.
As military officials and policymakers develop strategy for future conflicts , co-opting humanitarian ais is fraught with risks and ineffective.

A Future for Counter-Insurgency

Predicting conflict trends are beyond the scope.
Counter-insurgency-driven conflicts like in Afghanistan are likely to diminish.
Conventional all-out wars are on the wane, with expeditionary wars among local populations and counter-insurgency operations likely to prevail.
The US Department of Defense predicts a ‘complex and uncertain security landscape’. With the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors etc.
In its 2011 report the ICRC noted the predominance of non-international armed conflicts, marked by a blurring between ideological and non-ideological confrontations and longer duration.
The US does not see counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as ‘transitory’. The Department of Defense speaks of an indefinite future.
Fight against radicalized insurgents against Al Queda to be long and fought for multiple generations.
Large-scale unilateral military interventions in the Islamic world should be avoided.
According to the RAND Institute, ‘there is no empirical basis for expecting successful COIN in conjunction with large- scale foreign military intervention.
There is a growing consensus that more ‘civilian’ and less military involvement is going to be required to counter insurgents.
Reliance on automated vehicles such as drones. Operations involving the military will continue will will only be in a limiter manner.
Operations will be carried out with greater reliance on local forces.
Humanitarian aid and delivery will be driven on the basic needs for relief.

Conclusion

As US and coalition forces wind down operations in Afghanistan, it will be interesting to see the lessons learned from blending humanitarian and military activities as part of counter-insurgency operations.
Practice has shown that adapting to best meet challenges of insurgents is the expected part of counter-insurgency operations.
A strategy built on ‘winning hearts and minds’, does not necessarily benefit the goal of the military.
The concerns voiced by humanitarian agencies should be heeded from both a legal and a practical viewpoint.
If humanitarian actors are unable to function effectively in regions desperate for relief, the suffering of civilians in need of aid will be accentuated, in turn potentially fueling more instability.
Without separation, those organizations in the eyes of the locals ,who are in cahoots with military powers, will not be seen as partial or neutral.
The experiences has shows that a negative perception , after creation is difficult to fix.
Winning over hearts and minds by co-opting, is fraught with controversy and risks and very possibly ineffectual.