Durkheim on Imitation Study Notes

Introduction

The role of the concept of imitation in Émile Durkheim’s thought is significant for several reasons. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it is historical-interpretative, intending to demonstrate that imitation can serve as a lens to reveal the conceptual transformations distinguishing young Durkheim, as seen in The Rules of Sociological Method (2013b) and Suicide (1966), from the older Durkheim found in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995). Second, it seeks to highlight the contemporary relevance of Durkheim’s later engagement with imitation. Through this exploration, the work aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Durkheim's engagement with the concept of imitation and his critique of Gabriel Tarde, a contemporary and adversary, contrasting it with recent literature that discusses their conflict (e.g., contributions in Candea, 2010). Essentially, imitation ultimately finds a crucial role in Durkheim's late work as it relates to the creation of the sacred through ritual, yet this late recognition often remains overlooked in academic discourse.

Tracing Durkheim’s Engagement with Imitation

To appreciate Durkheim’s reorientation towards imitation, it is essential to trace his complex relationships with the concept throughout his lifetime. Initially, his hostility towards imitation is intricately tied to his efforts to establish and differentiate his epistemological framework. Much of young Durkheim’s work involves a critique of Tarde's position, which positions imitation as a fundamental social fact. Durkheim's sociological project fundamentally centers on delineating the social from the individual or psychological realms; his emphasis on the social as exterior and coercive stems from this desire to differentiate.

Holism and Individuality

This insistence on distinguishing the social from the individual and psychological leads to two consequential flaws in Durkheim's early work. First, it gives rise to a problematic methodological holism, which de-collectivizes the social and isolates the individual. Second, in discrediting imitation as a sociological category and relegating it to the psychological, Durkheim diminishes its significance to the point where it fails to generate authentic social sentiments. However, in his later sociology of religion, Durkheim escapes this predicament. After engaging with ethnographic accounts of ritual, Durkheim reintroduces the concept of imitation, emphasizing its importance in understanding social phenomena and the connection between the social and the objective in his newer framework.

The Rules of Sociological Method

Durkheim's first significant criticism of Tarde emerges in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), a foundational text for Durkheimian sociology. In this work, he lays down the objectives of sociology, aiming to create a distinct object for the field by asserting the social as sui generis. He seeks to distance sociology from psychological explanations by framing social facts as norms, rules, or duties that carry moral authority, urging individuals towards compliance. This positioning means that social facts often go unnoticed unless individuals resist them; Durkheim insists that the social asserts itself even in internalized forms of compliance (2013b: 21).

Between Individual and Social

While Durkheim critiques Tarde's notion of imitation, it is essential to note the limitations within his own conceptual framework. He acknowledges a form of community but views it as consisting of a normative grid structured by abstract rules rather than a cohesive entity of individuals. This reflects a significant Kantian influence in his work, where norms are not merely followed out of fear but demand moral respect, albeit constructed socially.

Critically, this perspective leads to a coercive view of social order, which is often perceived as inherently oppressive. Multiple critics, including Adorno (1979) and Latour (2014), have pointed out this oppressive naturalization in Durkheim’s early works.

Distinction and Coercion

Durkheim asserts that social institutions are regimes imposing externality upon individuals, encasing norms and values in objective forms. Central to his holism is the idea that the whole must explain its parts, emphasizing that institutions outlast individuals and dictate behaviors from an external vantage point. He recognizes social cohesion generated from mere compliance but neglects to consider the rich, dynamic interactions contributing to collective social experiences, especially in crowd phenomena, where the potential for genuine participation is overlooked.

Critique of Mass Dynamics

Durkheim confronts crowd dynamics with an understanding characterized by individual sentiment being overshadowed by collective emotional outbursts. He laments that while individuals might experience collective emotion, such occurrences are abstract and detached from the meaningful synchrony of interactions; this clouds the role imitation plays in genuine collective sentiment. In many instances, he conceptualizes responses to social pressures without recognizing the imitative dynamics that thrive in collective settings.

Imitation Versus Normative Forces

To illustrate his holism, Durkheim often paths back to norm-following behaviors rather than exploring individual imitation-derived interactions. In his explanation of phenomena like fashion, he categorizes them as instances of normative constraint instead of acknowledging their imitative underpinnings. This resistance stems partly from his viewpoint of pure imitation as one-way suggestion or contagion, reducing it to a mere psychological occurrence devoid of collective agency, reiterating that any instance of imitation remains an individual phenomenon rather than a social one (2013b: 27).

One significant remark concerning the inability to assign sociological importance to imitation is as follows: "[A]n individual state which impacts on others none the less remains individual" (2013b: 27). Durkheim contends that social facts achieve generalization not through imitation but due to their obligatory nature that demands compliance through norms, which leads him to formulate the idea of imitation-through-norms.

Progressive Interlude: The Italian Review

In a review of French sociology for an Italian journal (1895), Durkheim escalates the conflict with Tarde, critiquing the latter's notion of pure imitation as an automatic and unconscious process. This repetition, according to Durkheim, misrepresents the depth of social realities in favor of simplistic contagion dynamics, which overlook the relevant social variables constituting the inner social environment. The inquiry should focus on empirical factors, as demonstrated in Suicide, rather than a superficial understanding of individual resonance (1975a: 90).

Reframing Imitation

As Durkheim's understanding evolves, he aligns imitation more closely with prestige and the attraction of socially constructed objects rather than mere coercive adherence to norms. He acknowledges that practices are imitated due to their prestige, leading to the emergence of imitation-through-objects, which reflects a shift towards understanding imitation as rooted in a collective attraction instead of mere conformity (1975a: 86).

Despite this shift, Durkheim does not elaborate on how such an attraction influences behavior, a theme further developed in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This lack of nuanced distinction between imitation types often results in conflated ideas of normative versus object-centric imitation across his works.

Suicide

Suicide (1897) presents Durkheim's most thorough critique of imitation and a direct confrontation with Tarde's criticisms. He categorizes imitation into three distinct usages, debunking two as spurious. The cultivating influence of societal norms emerges as a critical impetus for social behavior, distancing the concept of imitation from mere automatic replication (1966: 124–30).

He likens pure imitation to instinctual, automatic acts devoid of cognition or intentionality; imitation as 'mechanical ape-like repetition' (1966: 127) cannot forge social bonds necessary for collective sentiment. Durkheim illustrates this with examples like collective behaviors in crowds, emphasizing the normative authority guiding social cohesion.

In the Crowd

Durkheim expands on crowd dynamics to emphasize the leader’s role as imposition rather than manifestation of social charisma. The leader operationalizes authority via directive action without fostering genuine emotional connections, reiterating a coercive perspective on social interactions. The dynamic shifts again in light of what he perceives as barrier-free individual experiences in crowds that inhibit acts of mutual imitation or interaction, relegating individuals to passive experiences (1966: 126).

Closing the Conversation

Ultimately, Durkheim's engagements with imitation evolve into complex dialogues with Tarde and the sociological landscape. He moves from a concrete rejection of imitation's sociological significance toward glimpses of its potential in collective interactions through late works like The Elementary Forms. This ongoing transformation—from rigid normative frameworks to acknowledgment of collective, object-rooted experiences—marks a significant intellectual journey for Durkheim, though he does not fully integrate these insights into a cohesive framework.

Conclusion

Durkheim's variations in engaging the concept of imitation evoke critical ontological and normative insights throughout his career. He initiates with the minimization of Tarde's multifaceted interpretation of imitation, reducing it to a caricature thereby losing what could otherwise account for the collective notion of social energies. The dissection of imitation through normative compliance becomes a hallmark of Durkheim’s early ideology, eventually yielding space to an understanding premised on self-induction via socially perceived objects. He is reconceptualizing imitation shaped by common object identifications rather than compelling norms.

Final Thoughts

Although Durkheim never fully reconciles the ongoing tensions between his early restrictive definitions and evolving appreciations for the collective production, his journey reflects a pivotal shift for sociological discourse on imitation. His insights resonate within discussions on collective sentiment and ritual that remain pertinent today, demonstrating the necessity of situating individuals within the vibrant fabric of social interrelations rather than as mere subjects of external, normative enforcement.