Nicomachean Ethics - Book II (Chapter 1-9) Flashcards
Book II
Chapter 1: Habit and the two sorts of virtue
Virtue comes in two distinct kinds: intellectual (excellence of thinking) and ethical (excellence of character).
Intellectual virtue is acquired and developed through teaching, requiring significant experience and dedicated time for study and maturation.
Ethical virtue (character) is not innate but developed through habituation (ethos).
Ethical virtue comes about as a consequence of habit; its Greek name, "ethikē," is derived from "ethos" (habit), indicating that character is formed by repeated actions. This habituation leads to a stable state or disposition (hexis) produced by consistent behavior.
The cultivation of character involves overcoming inner conflict (e.g., between rational desires and irrational impulses) and habituating to appropriate responses. For instance, a temperate person has outgrown being ruled automatically by base impulses (e.g., an overwhelming craving for chocolate) and is no longer governed by weak or childish desires, but rather chooses self-control.
Socratic reference: In Plato’s Republic (443D), Socrates describes a just person as someone who possesses inner harmony, ruling himself and bringing the various parts of the soul (reason, spirit, appetite) into proper alignment and balance.
Law and habit: The laws and institutions within cities play a crucial role in training citizens toward virtue by habituation. Moral development is presented as a fundamentally social and political process, not merely a matter of one's innate disposition or individual effort isolated from community norms.
Analogy for habit: Virtues are not innate gifts that appear automatically, like the capacity to see. Rather, we acquire them by actively doing just, temperate, and courageous deeds, much as crafts (e.g., harp-playing, housebuilding, or medicine) are learned by extensive practice. One becomes a harpist by playing the harp, and similarly, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, and courageous by doing courageous acts.
Potencies and work: Some capacities are given by nature (potencies or potentialities), such as the capacity for sight or hearing, but they require cultivation to become actualized or fully developed. Unlike sense organs, which are acquired first and then used (you don't get senses by using them, you get them and then use them), moral virtues come to be in us through habitual activity and practice.
Teachers and laws: While the presence of a specific teacher is not strictly necessary for every aspect of virtue, without general guidance (e.g., from parents, elders, or mentors) or proper laws, individuals who have the potential to be good might fail to achieve fully virtuous character.
The role of public life: The established practices, laws, and institutions of the city significantly shape moral character. Good governance effectively aims to habituate citizens toward virtuous behavior, thus fostering a flourishing community.
Summary: Virtue of character arises fundamentally from habitual action and consistent practice, not from purely theoretical knowledge or passive understanding alone. The foundations of virtue are typically formed in childhood through upbringing and are continually reinforced throughout life through ongoing practice and supportive social structures.
Chapter 2: Action and right reason
The inquiry focuses practically on how one ought to perform actions, because these actions directly determine the kinds of active states (dispositions) that come into being within us. The purpose of this study is not merely for contemplation or intellectual understanding, but to become good through our conduct.
The phrase "acting in accordance with right reason" (orthos logos) is introduced, acknowledged as a crucial guiding principle. Aristotle promises a later, more detailed discussion to define what constitutes right reason and how it is intrinsically connected to the development and exercise of virtue.
A key principle is that virtues, like physical health or strength, are delicate states that can be destroyed by both deficiency and excess. Just as strength depends on proportionate training and a balanced diet (too little or too much of either can harm), virtues depend on hitting the proper mean.
Examples of excess and deficiency:
Courage: Excessive fearlessness on the battlefield leads to rashness (an excess), while excessive fear leading to flight is cowardice (a deficiency).
Temperance: An excessive pursuit of bodily pleasures leads to dissipation or self-indulgence, while an extreme insensitivity to pleasure or lack of enjoyment in appropriate situations leads to insensibility or austerity.
Physical health: Too much or too little food, drink, or exercise can destroy health and strength.
The proper mean is not a universal or absolute quantity, like a mathematical midpoint (e.g., 50 for every person). Instead, it is a mean relative to us and to the specific actions and circumstances, and it is consistently guided by practical judgment (phronesis)—the ability to discern the right course of action in a given situation.
Practical example: Virtues like temperance and courage are significantly developed and strengthened by habituation. This involves consistently refraining from inappropriate pleasures (for temperance) and enduring frightening circumstances (for courage). The same pattern of developing by avoiding extremes applies to all other ethical virtues.
The general principle: Virtues, embodying excellence, are fundamentally destroyed by both going to far (excess) and not going far enough (deficiency). The path to virtue consistently lies in finding and maintaining the intermediate state through persistent practice and wise, contextual judgment.
The medical (art) analogy: Just as a physician must tailor remedies to an individual patient's condition (health or disease) because no single cure fits all, virtue similarly requires careful attention to the specific circumstantial details of each case, rather than applying rigid, abstract rules.
This analogy extends to recognizing the right amount of things like food, drink, and workout for an individual. Both excess and deficiency harm the health or virtue one aims for, highlighting the need for individualized, proportional action.
The role of education and upbringing: Early and consistent training in childhood is crucial for shaping and supporting the formation of virtuous dispositions. Virtue, therefore, requires both the natural potential present in individuals and diligent cultivation through experience and habituation.
Relationship to law and governance: Lawmakers are intrinsically concerned with citizens' moral development, aiming to habituate them toward virtue through the institutional framework of the city. The overall quality and success of a political regime are significantly judged by how effectively it produces virtuous citizens.
Summary: Action guided by right reason must be adaptable to specific circumstances and individuals. Virtue emerges from consistently adjusting one's actions and responses to the right reasons in context, emphasizing practical wisdom over rigid adherence to abstract, one-size-fits-all rules.
Chapter 3: Pleasure, pain, and the education of character
The signs of truly virtuous or vicious active states are clearly reflected in the pleasures and pains that accompany an individual's actions and choices. This is a critical indicator of one's moral development:
A temperate person not only refrains from excessive pleasures but also takes pleasure in refraining and in moderate indulgence. Conversely, a person who refrains reluctantly or with pain is not truly temperate but merely self-controlled (continent), struggling against their desires.
A courageous person endures fear and stands firm in dangerous situations with a sense of resolve or even pleasure related to the noble act, and is not overly pained by the risk. A coward, in contrast, endures fear poorly and is overwhelmed by it.
One who avoids disgraceful acts because they are disgraceful, and feels pleasure in doing so, is good. One who avoids them only for fear of punishment, and feels pain in doing right, is not.
The truly good person (i.e., the virtuous character) arises primarily from the right kind of childhood education. This involves a steady, formative process from a young age that shapes their emotional responses and behavioral tendencies correctly.
Pleasures and pains are central to moral character because virtue fundamentally concerns our actions and feelings. Actions are often chosen for what is pleasant and avoided for what is painful, making our orientation toward these feelings decisive for our character type.
The role of punishment: Punishments in society effectively act as medicines for the soul that work through opposites. They are designed to influence future behavior by attaching pain to vicious actions, thereby shaping patterns of pleasure and pain to guide individuals toward more virtuous conduct.
The unified view: Virtues are not merely passive feelings or predispositions; they are certain kinds of choices (prohairesis) that result from a settled disposition. We are praised or blamed not simply for having feelings, but for how we manage and respond to them. Feelings themselves do not carry moral praise or blame, but our choices and actions in relation to them do.
The difficulty of overcoming pleasure: Resisting the strong pull of pleasure can be exceedingly difficult for many people. Achieving true virtue in this realm requires not just willpower but artful self-control and ongoing, diligent practice to train one's desires.
Summary: Virtue is intrinsically linked to how we appropriately respond to pleasures and pains. Education, particularly from early childhood, fundamentally shapes these responses. Moral development is thus a comprehensive process of habituation that trains us toward the correct feelings, desires, and actions.
Chapter 4: Becoming just and temperate through action
The problem: Aristotle addresses a crucial philosophical puzzle: how can one become just by merely performing just actions? If one acts justly, does that automatically make one a just person, or must one already possess a just character beforehand to truly act justly? This appears to be a circular argument.
Aristotle's argument: He resolves this by asserting that one becomes just by doing just actions in the right way and for the right reasons. Mere mechanical repetition of an action, without the appropriate motive, understanding, or stable disposition, does not suffice to build true virtue.
To become truly virtuous, an agent must act under three specific conditions:
Knowledge: The agent must know what they are doing and why it is virtuous.
Choice for their own sake: The agent must choose the actions for their own sake, i.e., because they are just or noble, not for external rewards or to avoid punishment.
Stable, controlled state: The action must spring from a firm and unchangeable character, indicating a stable, controlled state that reliably supports virtuous behavior.
It is insufficient merely to engage in acts that appear virtuous externally. One must perform them in a way characteristic of a truly just or temperate person, demonstrating the internal consistency and motivation of virtue, not merely in a superficial yes/no fashion. For example, giving money is not enough; one must give it to the right person, at the right time, in the right amount, and with the right motive.
The critique of mere discourse: Aristotle cautions against those who believe that merely discussing or philosophizing about virtue, without consistently practicing virtuous acts, will yield a virtuous soul. True practical improvement and character development require active engagement and deeds aligned with virtue, akin to a patient who listens to a doctor but does not follow medical advice.
Summary: True virtue requires both correct intellectual understanding (knowledge) and consistent, appropriately motivated practice (choice and stable state). The agent must be capable of enacting virtuous acts as a stable, internal trait of their character.
Chapter 5: The nature of virtue and its components
Aristotle identifies that there are three distinct kinds of things that can be present in the soul, which are crucial for understanding virtue:
Feelings (Pathē): These are desires, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, affection, hatred, longing, pity, and generally those states typically accompanied by pleasure or pain. They are immediate emotional responses.
Capacities/Dispositions (Dunameis): These are the natural tendencies or predispositions to feel or react in certain ways (e.g., the capacity to feel angry, to feel pity, or to be capable of generosity). They are the potential for a feeling.
Active States/Dispositions (Hexeis): These are the stable, settled ways we bear ourselves toward feelings and actions. They represent a firm, trained condition of character—e.g., being strongly or mildly angry, being measured or hasty in reaction. Virtues and vices fall into this category.
Crucially, virtues and vices are not feelings (pathē) or mere natural capacities/predispositions (dunameis); they are active states (hexeis) by which we regulate our feelings and actions in a consistent and characteristic manner.
We are justly praised or blamed, not for simply having feelings (which often arise spontaneously), but for our virtues and vices—that is, for how we manage and choose to act in response to those feelings. Feelings themselves do not inherently carry moral praise or blame.
Feelings often arise without conscious choice (e.g., you don't choose to feel fear in a dangerous situation, it just happens), but virtues are fundamentally connected to choices (prohairesis) that we make. One is not said to be virtuous without having deliberately chosen to cultivate and act from that state.
The virtues are settled dispositions that guide us toward the right kind of response and action, rather than being passive feelings themselves. While we may be moved by feelings, virtues are active states that place us in a condition where we are consistently disposed to act well and appropriately.
The three kinds of present things (feelings, capacities, active states) together provide a comprehensive framework to explain how virtue integrates cognition (knowledge), emotion (feelings), and deliberate action, demonstrating the complexity of human moral life.
Conclusion: Virtue of character is an active, settled capacity to choose well and to act consistently in line with right reason. It is neither simply a passing feeling nor a mere natural predisposition, but a refined and cultivated combination that reliably leads to good and excellent action.
Chapter 6: The impossibility of a universal mean for some actions
It is important to emphasize that not every act or feeling admits of a mean with respect to virtue. Some actions, by their very nature, are inherently wrong, and it is impossible to find a virtuous mean for them (i.e., there is no "right" way or amount to commit them).
For such actions (e.g., adultery, theft, murder, spite, shamelessness, envy), there is no virtuous mean between excess and deficiency. Any performance of them, regardless of how it is done, is inherently wrong and vicious. One cannot, for instance, commit adultery "temperately."
The same principle applies to other extreme behaviors that are intrinsically evil or base. There is no intermediate, virtuous form or quantity for these acts; they are always wrong.
This means that the concept of "the mean" for virtues of character is not simply a generic mathematical midpoint. It varies with the action and the person, and crucially, some actions are so inherently bad that they defy the application of a mean altogether.
Summary: While the concept of the mean is central to many virtues, there are certain acts for which no virtue-mean is possible. These acts are intrinsically wrong, regardless of the circumstances or how they are performed, and should always be avoided.
Chapter 7: Application to particulars and the roles of extremes
In applying virtue theory to particular cases, Aristotle notes that universal statements are often less truthful or precise than context-specific judgments. This is because ethical actions are always situated in particular circumstances, involving specific agents, motives, times, and places, all of which influence what constitutes the right action.
For fear and confidence: The mean is courage. Excessive fearlessness (lacking appropriate fear) is rashness, while excessive fear (even when inappropriate) leading to undue flight or panic is cowardice. Both extremes fail to be virtuous, demonstrating a failure to feel and act appropriately in the face of danger.
For pleasures and pains (particularly bodily ones): Temperance is the mean. Dissipation or self-indulgence (licentiousness) is the excess, characterized by an uncontrolled pursuit of bodily pleasures. Insensibility (a lack of response to appropriate pleasures) is the deficiency. True temperance involves experiencing and enjoying pleasures in the right way and degree.
For giving and taking money (small sums): Generosity (liberality) is the mean. Wastefulness (prodigality) is the excess, involving giving too much, to the wrong people, or in the wrong way. Stinginess (illiberality/meanness) is the deficiency, involving holding onto money too tightly or giving too little. Magnanimity is a related virtue but concerns great things (e.g., large-scale public giving or grand aspirations), as opposed to generosity which concerns smaller or everyday expenditures. Within magnanimity, gaudiness (showiness) and chintziness (small-mindedness) serve as extremes in related dispositions concerning great expenditures or aspirations.
Similarly, for honor (especially great honor): Magnanimity (greatness of soul) is the mean. Vanity is the excess (claiming more honor than one deserves), while smallness of soul (pusillanimity) is the deficiency (claiming less honor than one deserves). The general passion for honor can also be excessive or deficient, with the mean sometimes unnamed but still representing a proportionate desire for honor.
For small honors: A general virtue for aspiring to honor appropriately (perhaps "proper ambition") exists as a mean, with "ambition" as an excess and "unambitiousness" as a deficiency; these intermediate states are often unnamed, and their names may shift depending on the specific context and cultural understanding. Some traits are better named to aid understanding, while others remain more descriptive.
Summary: Virtue must always be interpreted and applied in particular cases, as universal rules provide insufficient guidance. The mean is inherently context-dependent and requires discernment (phronesis) about how far to go in any given situation, considering the specific details and individual involved.
Chapter 8: The mean and its opposites across multiple virtues
This chapter reiterates and elaborates on the structure of ethical dispositions: there are always three kinds of dispositions in play: two are vices (one of excess and one of deficiency), and one is the virtue (the mean).
Extremes oppose the mean, and they also oppose each other. This three-way opposition is characteristic of ethical virtue. For example, courage opposes both rashness and cowardice, and rashness and cowardice also oppose each other.
The virtuous mean active condition (hexis) is defined as occupying a position that exceeds the deficiencies and falls short in relation to the excesses for both feelings and actions. Conceptually, the equal amount (the mean) is relatively greater in relation to the smaller (deficiency) and less in relation to the greater (excess).
The pattern holds across various paired opposites:
Courage (mean) versus rashness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency).
Temperance (mean) versus dissipation (excess) and insensibility (deficiency).
Generosity (mean) versus wastefulness (excess) and stinginess (deficiency).
This shows a consistent conceptual framework for understanding virtues.
Individuals positioned at the extremes tend to mischaracterize and push the person at the mean toward the opposite extreme. For example, the person who falls short in courage (the cowardly person) often calls the truly brave person rash. Conversely, the person who exceeds in confidence (the rash person) might call the brave person cowardly. This perceptual distortion similarly applies to other paired opposites, as extremes struggle to grasp proper moderation.
Note on quasi-virtues: In some cases, Aristotle describes certain intermediate states that are not full, named virtues but rather habits of feeling or minor dispositions (e.g., a proper sense of shame), which exist between extremes but may sometimes lack a distinct name, or their names may be ambiguous.
Summary: The mean is the defining feature of ethical virtue, representing a balanced state between two vices. This mean is not a fixed quantity but relative, and true virtue requires diligent cultivation toward that context-dependent mean. The opposition between extremes and the mean clarifies the dynamic nature of character.
Chapter 9: Hitting the mean and the difficulties of practical judgment
This chapter reiterates the core principle that virtue of character is fundamentally a mean condition (mesotēs) existing between two kinds of vice (excess and deficiency). It is an active state (hexis) aimed at choosing and acting appropriately in relation to both feelings and external actions.
Hitting and maintaining the mean is inherently difficult in all contexts. It demands constant vigilance, significant self-knowledge, profound practical wisdom (phronesis), and strong self-direction, as the right amount or way to act is rarely obvious.
The best practical way to hit the mean is often to begin by pulling strongly away from the extreme that is most contrary to the mean or to which one is naturally most inclined. This is likened to Calypso advising Odysseus to steer his ship away from Scylla and Charybdis: avoid the greater error by keeping the ship out beyond the spray and swell of the more dangerous extreme.
We should carefully consider our own natural inclinations and tendencies and adjust our behavior accordingly. Different people may naturally tend toward different goods, pleasures, or excesses, so the precise mean must be adjusted to the individual's specific disposition.
When faced with the strong allure of pleasure, we should actively resist its pull and view it with caution and prudence, treating it somewhat like the Trojan elders treated Helen—acknowledging its power but exercising critical judgment. The evaluation of pleasures should always be guided by practical judgment rather than by rhetoric or immediate gratification.
The "practical rule" for hitting the mean is not a fixed, rigid law but a flexible judgment made by a good and prudent person. There is no universal, scientific rule that applies identically to all cases, because the specific situations, individuals, and circumstances always require nuanced discernment and adaptation.
Summary: To cultivate virtue and hit the mean, one must consciously steer away from extremes, particularly those to which one is personally most susceptible. Judgments about the mean must be tailored to oneself and the specific situation. The ultimate guide for ethical action is the context-sensitive practical judgment of a prudent and virtuous person, rather than a universal directive.
Chapter 10: The nature and scope of virtue and practical wisdom
The discussion concludes by emphasizing that in ethics, a perfect, universally applicable rule does not exist. True moral guidance emanates from the wise (phronimos) person, who possesses the cultivated ability to discern and act well across a complex range of circumstances, rather than from a set of rigid precepts.
The text indicates that as the ethical inquiry deepens in subsequent books, exceptions to generalizations will inevitably emerge, and the understanding of both pleasure and its intricate role in virtue will be further revised and expanded through more thorough conceptual analysis.
Overall takeaway: Virtue is understood as a refined, practically oriented mean between two extremes, which is achieved and maintained through systematic habituation, deliberate moral education, and ongoing, acute prudent judgment (phronesis). The sustained path to moral excellence thus requires both accurate intellectual understanding of ethical principles and consistent, context-aware action in daily life.
Key concepts and formulas (summary for quick reference)
Ethical virtue is defined as a mean condition between two vices (excess and deficiency), which is relative to us (individual and circumstance-dependent) and is determined by practical judgment (phronesis) as a wise person would define it:
\text{Virtue (the Mean)} = \text{Intermediate State between (Excess) and (Deficiency), relative to the agent, and determined by Right Reason (\text{orthos logos}).}