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The Mind-Body Problem and Initial Theoretical Frameworks

Definition of the Mind-Body Problem: In its simplest form, it is the problem of how the mind is related to the body. More precisely, it asks how one can square the existence of a conscious, intentional, qualitative, and subjective mental life with a physical reality composed of particles moving within fields of force.
Characteristics of Mental Life: * Consciousness: The state of being awake and aware. * Qualitative: The "feel" or "what-it-is-like" aspect of experiences. * Subjective: Existing within the perspective of an individual subject. * Intentional: Mental states that are "about" or directed toward things (e.g., beliefs and desires).
Examples of Intentional Mental States: * Desires: Wanting a piece of cake, wanting world peace, or wanting specific political outcomes. * Beliefs: Believing that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle equals the sum of the squares of the opposing sides ( $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ ), believing Regina is in Treaty Four Territory, or believing Jupiter has $63$ moons.
Conceptual Origins: Theories in the philosophy of mind emerge as answers to this problem or as attempts to resolve difficulties found in previous theories. It is critical to identify both the unique solutions and the specific problems they aim to fix.

Idealism: A Non-Material Alternative

Core Thesis: Idealists hold that the world is non-material, phenomenal, and composed of consciousness rather than matter moving in force fields.
Matter as Abstraction: In this view, the "material world" is considered a model or abstraction created by scientists to help with predictions, rather than the actual fabric of reality.
Solution to the Mind-Body Problem: Idealism solves the problem by denying the existence of the material half of the dichotomy. If there is no material world, there is nothing that needs to be "squared" with the mind.

Substance Dualism

Definition: The view that the mind and body are composed of two fundamentally different types of substances. Properties and substances are distinct: * Substance: Instantiates properties but is not a property itself (e.g., Mount Everest instantiates "tallness"); it is capable of independent existence. * Substance Dualism: The mind is mental substance; the body is physical substance.
Motivations for Dualism: * Religious Beliefs: Specifically the immortality of the soul. Note that one can believe in an immortal soul without being a dualist, but it is a common reason for the view.
The Argument for Dualism from the Immortality of the Soul: * $(p1)$ The soul is immortal (religious belief). * $(p2)$ The soul is part of the mind. * $(p3)$ The body is not immortal (common knowledge). * $(p4)$ Leibniz’s Law: If $m$ and $n$ are identical, they must share all properties. * $(c1)$ Therefore, the mind and body are not identical.
Descartes’ Argument for Substance Dualism: * Descartes avoided the immortality argument because it wouldn't convince skeptics. Instead, he used the Cogito-based argument from doubt: * $(p1)$ We cannot doubt the existence of our mind. * $(p2)$ We can doubt the existence of our body. * $(c1)$ The body has a property the mind lacks: being doubtable. * $(p4)$ Leibniz’s Law: If $b$ has property $D$ and $m$ lacks property $D$ , they are not identical. * $(c2)$ The mind is not identical to the body.
The Counter-Argument (Peter Parker/Spiderman): * $(p1)$ I can doubt Peter Parker is Spiderman. * $(p2)$ I cannot doubt Spiderman is Spiderman. * $(c1)$ Therefore, Peter Parker is not identical to Spiderman. * Conclusion: This is absurd. It shows that "being doubtable" is not a differentiating property for establishing non-identity; we might simply not know that two things are the same.
Non-Identity by Temporal Difference Argument: * Principle: If $x$ existed at time $t$ but $y$ did not, then $x \neq y$ . * $(p1)$ I existed in $2008$ . * $(p2)$ My body did not exist in $2008$ (due to cellular turnover). * $(p3)$ I am identical with my mind. * $(p4)$ If my mind is identical with any physical body, it is identical to my body. * $(c3)$ My mind is not identical with any physical body.
Problems with Substance Dualism: 1. The Problem of Causality: It is unclear how a non-physical substance can cause changes in a physical substance (e.g., a desire causing the body to study). 2. Argument from Physics: Non-physical interaction violates basic physical laws. 3. Argument from Brain Damage: Mental changes follow physical brain damage. 4. Argument from Biological Development: Humans start as non-mental entities and become mental. 5. Argument from Simplicity: Dualism adds unnecessary complexity.

Behaviourism

Methodological Behaviourism: A psychological theory suggesting researchers should avoid claims about "internal mental states" because they are private and unobservable.
Logical Behaviourism: A philosophical theory about the meaning of mental state language. To say "S has mental state X" is to say S is disposed to behave in certain ways.
**Gilbert