Responses to International Conflict – NGOs and Conflict Management (Study Notes)

Page 1

  • Document Title: “RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT – Highlights from the Managing Chaos Conference: NGOs and Conflict Management”
  • Author: Pamela R. Aall (United States Institute of Peace – USIP).
  • Central Theme: Examination of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as critical actors in conflict management, humanitarian relief, and peacebuilding in post–Cold-War complex emergencies.

Page 2

  • Table of Contents / Key Points (with pagination in original booklet):
    • Preface (p. 1)
    • 1 Reframing the Issues (p. 3)
    • 2 The Changing Nature of NGOs (p. 5)
    • 3 New Roles for NGOs (p. 7)
    • 4 The Challenge of Coordination (p. 11)
    • 5 NGOs as Conflict Managers (p. 14)
    • Contributors, Agenda, About the Author, About the Institute (pp. 15-25)
  • Implicit message: growing complexity and multiplicity of NGO functions demands systematic analysis.

Page 3

  • Post–Cold-War Conflict Characteristics
    • Shift from interstate wars to internal, identity-based conflicts (ethnic, religious, communal).
    • These sub-national conflicts generate massive refugee flows, collapse of state services, famine, epidemics, and regional spill-overs.
    • Labeled “complex emergencies” – e.g., Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia.
  • Role of NGOs
    • Provide non-military alternatives: humanitarian relief, preventive action, conflict resolution, development assistance, institution-building.
    • Relief NGOs usually first on the scene → operating amid violence; forced to expand into de-facto governance & political-stability tasks.
    • Ongoing debate within UN, member governments, and NGO community regarding appropriate NGO roles across conflict cycle.
  • Diversity & Typology of NGOs
    • United by mission to improve world conditions but differ in objectives, structure, methods.
    • Two broad categories:
    1. Operational NGOs (direct action – relief, conflict resolution).
    2. Advocacy NGOs (policy change, awareness, rights monitoring).
    • Traditional humanitarian relief doctrine = neutrality; aid regardless of affiliation.
    • Complex emergencies force reconsideration of neutrality when aid inadvertently fuels conflict.

Page 4

  • Necessity for Cooperation with Governments
    • NGOs increasingly work with state structures to deliver assistance.
    • Funding streams may need to shift from pure relief to integrated programmes linking reliefdevelopmentconflict resolution\text{relief} \rightarrow \text{development} \rightarrow \text{conflict resolution}.
  • Four Fundamental NGO Roles (preview)
    1. Early-warning.
    2. Human-rights monitoring.
    3. Relief & rehabilitation.
    4. Conflict-resolution / peacebuilding.
  • Early-Warning Nuances
    • Field proximity gives NGOs situational awareness; they can alert international actors to impending governance or inter-group breakdown.
    • Debate: Should NGOs remain information providers or also lobby governments for preventive policy? Ultimately states must muster political will.
  • Peacebuilding Linkage
    • Advocacy for strategies binding short-term relief to long-term sustainable development via grass-roots & mid-level initiatives, favouring indigenous capacities over top-down donor models.
  • Coordination Imperative
    • Large numbers of heterogeneous actors → risk of duplication & counter-productive overlaps.
    • Proposal: comprehensive strategies combining diplomacy, military capability, and NGO expertise under a UN mandate.

Page 5

  • U.S. Government Reform Suggestion
    • Consider single entity for foreign relief with one senior official → streamline decisions & improve UN interface.
  • Accountability Context
    • NGOs not bound by same accountability framework as states/IGOs yet rarely operate in isolation; major powers supply leadership, NGOs operate within that context.
  • Question Posed: Are NGOs equipped to address violent conflict dimensions or only certain aspects? Their competency is role-specific and should fit within integrated relief-development framework.

Page 6

  • Historical Backdrop: Post-Cold-War Era Defined by
    • Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia: genocide, atrocities, state collapse, refugee crises.
    • Emergence of NGOs as new international actors tackling “complex emergencies.”
  • Humanitarian Relief NGOs
    • Drawn most directly into violent crises; increasingly provide governmental services (food, shelter, medical, administrative). Example: failed-state scenarios.
  • “Managing Chaos” Conference (USIP, Fall 1994)
    • Explored new diplomacy, conflict tools, and NGO expansion.
    • Participants questioned appropriateness & capacity of NGOs to assume governance-like functions.
  • Coordination Gap
    • No single entity aligns NGO efforts with other interveners.
  • Neutrality Challenge
    • Difficult to stay impartial when relief benefits perpetrators as well as victims.
  • USIP Follow-up Initiatives
    • Post-conflict Bosnia NGO support, NGO–military relations study with U.S. Army War College, and conflict-resolution trainings (ICREST).

Page 7

  • Operational vs. Advocacy Distinction Illustrated
    • Operational NGOs concentrate on direct aid/service; advocacy NGOs on information dissemination & policy influence.
  • Neutrality Debate Expanded
    • Somalia & Rwanda cases where relief inadvertently benefited conflict perpetrators → some NGOs now question unconditional neutrality.
  • Advocacy NGOs are explicitly non-neutral, often adversarial toward authorities.
  • Conflict-Resolution NGOs
    • Facilitate dialogue without taking sides.
  • Growth Metrics
    • Example budgets: CARE USA 346million\approx 346\,\text{million}; World Vision >140\,\text{million}.
    • InterAction coalition (160 NGOs) revenue 2.3billion2.3\,\text{billion} ( 56\frac{5}{6} from private donations).
    • 1,500\approx 1{,}500 NGOs registered with UN (largely international; excludes many indigenous NGOs).
  • Complexity Metaphor
    • John Paul Lederach: NGO system resembles medieval Europe—diffuse, decentralized, hard to orchestrate during emergencies with limited time.
  • Funding Alignment Challenge
    • Internal disagreement within NGOs when conflict-management tasks (e.g., mediating water-source disputes) do not match existing budget lines.
  • Call for Skill Development
    • Lederach: “Like it or not… you’re actually doing conflict resolution; develop the skills accordingly.”

Page 8

  • Four Fundamental NGO Roles Detailed (Andrew Natsios)
    1. Preventive early-warning.
    2. Human-rights monitoring.
    3. Relief & rehabilitation.
    4. Conflict resolution (mediation/reconciliation).
  • Separation Principle
    • Mixing roles can endanger staff & mission integrity (e.g., relief workers should not simultaneously conduct rights monitoring).
  • Early-Warning Debated
    • Jan Eliasson outlines stepped approach: fact-finding → early-warning → peacebuilding.
    • Vivian Derryck argues operational NGOs should advocate policy, leveraging field insight to influence government decisions (e.g., Rwanda – urging earlier U.S. intervention, addressing disarmament in camps).
    • Lionel Rosenblatt: failure not lack of data but lack of political will; proposes six policy initiatives:
    1. Retool intelligence & diplomatic reporting for early response.
    2. NGO–UN partnerships for negotiation & reconciliation.
    3. UN rapid-deployment force.
    4. Counter-terrorism capabilities where local government fails.
    5. Mechanisms for internally displaced persons, not only refugees.
    6. Comprehensive reintegration planning (housing, livelihoods) for returnees.
  • Linking Relief → Sustainable Development (Lederach)
    • Need decadal perspective; embed emergency actions within strategies for reconciliation & economic recovery.
    • Cautions against solely top-down approaches; emphasises middle-level actors & community networks.
    • Advocate use of indigenous resources (cultural practices, women’s networks); example: Somali women’s inter-clan communication.
  • Resource Dilemmas (Natsios)
    • Introducing goods (food) alters power dynamics; without security (often military–provided) resources can fuel conflict.
    • Misconception that relief automatically generates goodwill; must plan for contention over scarce/high-value inputs.

Page 9

  • Coordination Shortfalls
    • Numerous actors, limited mutual awareness; grass-roots initiatives often invisible to higher tiers.
    • NGO-military relations: historic mistrust; Rwanda/Somalia showed effectiveness when cooperative. Need shared communications, mission clarity.
    • Divergent timelines: military seeks rapid exit; NGOs focus on nation-building – acceptance of differing end-states but harmonisation of immediate objectives is needed.
  • Rosenblatt: incorporating humanitarian operations into military training enhances readiness for post–Cold-War missions.
    • Advocates single emergency coordinator & streamlined command structures.
  • Somalia Case Study
    • Role confusion: NGOs handling security, military rebuilding roads → lost chance for local employment & indigenous development.
  • Structural Differences & Policy Inclusion
    • Governments/IGOs operate nationally; NGOs locally; military obeys national command; NGOs accountable to boards/donors.
    • Julia Taft: NGOs once “eccentric relatives,” now at policy table; coordination still lagging.
  • Mohamed Sahnoun Proposal
    • New international institution for conflict management → coordinate & decentralise simultaneously; create synergy among local, regional, international levels.
  • Accountability & Leadership Concerns
    • Lederach: NGOs replacing state functions in failed states raises “to whom are they accountable?”
    • Rosenblatt: U.S. should unify its humanitarian apparatus to set example for UN reforms.
    • Natsios: Ultimate leadership must come from great powers; NGOs cannot substitute for major diplomatic/military leverage.

Page 10

  • Criteria for NGO Engagement in Conflict Management (Vivian Derryck)
    1. Deep knowledge of country & regional institutions.
    2. Strong indigenous partnerships.
    3. Staff trained in mediation/negotiation.
    4. Field personnel aware of personal risk.
  • Lederach’s Endorsement
    • NGOs’ cultural insight, local relationships, and grasp of relief–development continuum make them valuable peacebuilders.
  • Consensus Points from Conference
    • NGOs can unintentionally influence conflict dynamics; coordinated multisectoral strategy needed.
    • NGOs provide early-warning, advocacy to spur governmental will, and community-level capacity-building for civil society reconstruction.
    • Integration of NGO work into wider intervention toolbox is indispensable in post–Cold-War conflicts.

Page 11

  • Contributor Highlights (selection)
    • Chester A. Crocker: Former U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs; architect of Namibia peace accords.
    • Vivian Lowery Derryck: President, African-American Institute; extensive field work.
    • Jan Eliasson: Swedish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; ex-UN Humanitarian Affairs chief.
    • John Paul Lederach: Scholar-practitioner, expert on community-level peacebuilding.
    • Andrew Natsios: VP, World Vision; ex-USAID Food & Humanitarian Assistance chief.
    • Mohamed Sahnoun: Former UN SRSG for Somalia; analyst of “missed opportunities.”

Page 12

  • Managing Chaos Conference Agenda Snapshot (Nov 30–Dec 1 1994)
    • Sessions on character & sources of 21st-century conflict, NGO roles, preventive diplomacy, Bosnia, Sudan, new diplomacy, cross-cultural negotiation, information tech tools.
    • Keynote speeches: Les Aspin (values-based interventions); Ted Koppel (global information revolution); closing dinner with Henry Kissinger (21st-century diplomacy perspectives).

Page 13

  • Additional USIP Activities Noted
    • ICREST (International Conflict Resolution Skills Training) for diplomats, military, NGOs.
    • Post-conflict Bosnia initiative, Africa humanitarian/conflict conference (Sept 1995), NGO–military relations research.

Page 14 – 32 (Institutional & Publication Data)

  • Author Bio: Pamela R. Aall—USIP program officer for Education & Training; leads NGO initiative; background at Rockefeller Foundation, Harvard, Columbia, LSE.
  • USIP Board leadership detailed; statutory mandate: to promote research, education & training on peaceful conflict resolution.
  • Peaceworks series context: This report is Peaceworks No. 5; previous numbers include conference keynote addresses & analyses of sources of conflict.
  • Contact Information: USIP, 1550 M St NW, Washington DC 20005; phone, e-mail, gopher.
  • © 1996 initial publication; views are those of authors/participants, not necessarily USIP.